The project to replace the 46 Fire and Rescue Services' local control rooms across England with nine purpose-built regional control centres linked by a new IT system has been a comprehensive failure. The Department for Communities and Local Government acted to cut its losses by terminating the contract in December 2010, seven years after it had begun, but at least £469 million will have been wasted, with no IT system delivered and eight of the nine new regional control centres remaining empty and costly to maintain. The Department tried to impose a national control system, without having sufficient mandatory powers and without properly consulting with the Fire and Rescue Services. The Department rushed the start of the project, failing to follow proper procedures. Ineffective checks and balances during initiation and early stages meant the Department committed itself to the project on the basis of broad-brush and inaccurate estimates of costs and benefits and an unrealistic delivery timetable, and agreed an inadequate contract with its IT supplier. The Department under-appreciated the project's complexity, and then mismanaged the IT contractor's performance and delivery. The Department failed to provide the necessary leadership to make the project successful, over-relying on poorly managed consultants and failing to sort out early problems with delivery by the contractor. The Department is now trying to minimise the future cost of the project by subsidising Fire and Rescue Services to use the Regional Control Centres.

FiReControl was an ambitious project with the objectives of improving national resilience, efficiency and technology by replacing the control room functions of 46 local Fire and Rescue Services in England with a network of nine purpose-built regional control centres using a national computer system. The project was launched in 2004, but following a series of delays and difficulties, was terminated in December 2010 with none of the original objectives achieved and a minimum of £469 million being wasted. The Department attempted, without sufficient mandatory powers, to impose a single, national approach on locally accountable Fire and Rescue Services who were reluctant to change the way they operated. There were no basic project approval checks and balances - decisions were taken before a business case, project plan or procurement strategy had been developed and tested. The result was hugely unrealistic forecast costs and savings, naève over-optimism on the deliverability of the IT solution and under-appreciation or mitigation of the risks. Fundamentals of project management were absent: the centres were constructed and completed whilst there was considerable delay in even awarding the IT contract, let alone developing the essential IT infrastructure. There was a high turnover of senior managers although none have been held accountable for the failure. The IT contract went to a company with no direct experience of supplying the emergency services. £84.8 million is now earmarked to meet the project's original objectives, to improve resilience, efficiency and interoperability within the Fire and Rescue Service but there is no certainty this will provide value for money.

The evidence continues to grow that the effective management of risk is the very kernel of successful project management. Its absence frequently leaves project sponsors lamenting missed objectives and shareholders coming to terms with an organisation’s poor bottom line performance. Dr Robert Chapman's The Rules of Project Risk Management stands out from other risk management texts because it provides very practical guidance, supported by numerous mini case studies, many of which have attracted considerable publicity. The book brings to life both the benefits of project risk management when effectively applied and the ramifications when it is misunderstood or receives scant attention. The structure of the book is based on International Standard ISO 31000 seen through the lens of general systems theory - where projects are undertaken by organisations which have an external context and internal sub-systems. A project system is seen to be composed of seven key subject areas. Practical short ’rules’ or implementation guidelines, written in an engaging style, are offered to support each of these subject areas and aid quick assimilation of key risk management messages. Each rule focuses on a specific aspect of effective risk management which warrants attention in its own right. Taken together the rules will provide those implementing projects with the building blocks to secure a project’s objectives. They have been drawn from a wealth of experience gained from applying risk management practices across multiple industries from Europe to Africa, the Middle East and Asia.

The Government's programme to replace 46 local fire and rescue service control rooms with nine purpose-built regional control centres has been inadequately planned, poorly executed, and badly managed. Given the investment of public funds already committed, and the benefits that will accrue, the MPs conclude that the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) should press ahead with the FireControl project so long as Ministers can agree urgently a viable project plan that will see the project go live by a target date of mid-2011 and in which the main stakeholders can have confidence. The excessive cost of abandoning the project - an extra £8 million more than it will cost to complete - indicates the Department should continue with the project so long as it also: examines alternatives and provides assurances that FiReControl represents the best viable option for the future of Fire and Rescue Services; resolves its contractual dispute with EADS and implements a viable project plan; addresses the shortcomings in its management of the project; consults fully with FRS staff and professionals to define end-user requirements; provides assurances that the safety and security of the Olympic Games will not be compromised by the roll-out of new Regional Control Centres. DCLG should urgently to draw up and consult on contingency plans for any further failures in the FiReControl programme to ensure ongoing safe and effective fire and rescue services cover across the whole country.

Critical Perspectives on the Management and Organization of Emergency Services makes an important contribution to the subject of emergency services management and to public administration and organization studies more generally. It critically assesses developments in emergency services management by examining the multi-dimensional nature of the provision of emergency services and their connectedness in advanced western democracies. The effective management of emergency services has never been more important than in today’s high-pressured and cost-conscious public sector. The authors of this volume forensically analyse the challenges of delivering emergency services within this context. This book provides an in-depth, scholarly and comprehensive analysis of the changing landscape of emergency service provision and clearly addresses a gap in the market for a critical volume on the emergency services. For anyone seeking to understand why and how the management of emergency services matters, this collection is essential reading.

The book examines the new arrangements for organizing policy, delivery and public accountability in Fire and Rescue Services. Contributors of this invaluable text assess the effectiveness of government responses to new legislation that came as a result of inadequacies identified in governmental reviews, namely the Policing and Crime Act of 2017.

Why does policy succeed or fail? In Substance not Spin, Nick Raynsford, a former member of the UK parliament, government minister, and campaigner pulls back the curtain on the front lines of policy making. Drawing on more than forty years of experience working at the very heart of both local and national government and the voluntary sector, Raynsford explores what works and what doesn't in making and implementing policy and legislation. He gives an insider's view on a range of events--some not previously made public--including the botched 1980s reform of housing benefit legislation, the vacuum left by the 1986 abolition of the Greater London Council, the ill-fated 2002 fire and rescue service strike and subsequent reform program, and fitful regeneration in the Thames Gateway in the 2000s. Bringing his investigation up to the current day, he even explores various devolution plans leading to the so-called Northern Powerhouse of the Coalition and now Conservative Government. Offering solutions to obstacles in policy making and implementation and challenging the prevailing public belief that politicians are unable to deliver, Substance not Spin provides a fascinating bridge across the political divide between policy and practice.