Although the Soviet Union's centrally planned economic system played a significant role in world economic growth and modernization, it ultimately failed to compete with market forms of economic organization. Despite unavailing efforts at reform, it has now been abandoned, as the republics of the former USSR move painfully toward the market. Robert W. Campbell, one of the most respected U.S. specialists on the economy of the former Soviet Union, probes the evolution, behavior, and fatal weaknesses of the Soviet administrative-command economy. His essays cover a broad set of perspectives--theoretical interpretation of the Soviet-type economy and the growth model that went with it, concrete analyses of individual sections and functions, evaluation of the microeconomics of Soviet decision making, and descriptions of attempts at institutional and doctrinal reforms. They provide instructive background on some of the biggest problems now facing the Commonwealth of Independent States, such as the monetary and fiscal collapse engendered by reform, the looming fuel and energy disaster, and the seemingly intractable task of transforming the military-industrial complex and integrating its resources into the civilian economy. Robert W. Campbell's outstanding work provides an indispensable resource for understanding what the Soviet economic system was and the problems it faced in the transition to the market model.

The ideas set forth in these pages matured in the authors mind during the early years of constructive communism in Petrograd. The communist government, intoxicated by its successes in the counter-revolution, had promised to deal promptly with all economic problems now that its hands where free to do so. It was at this moment of its greatest triumphs that the author put forward his contention that the system of Marxian communism, as then conceived, was-intrinsically unsound and must inevitably break down.

On its publication in 1985, this book offered a fresh analysis of the problems faced by the Soviet economy by focussing on the key issues in the economic planning system. David Dyker considers the available options for reform during the 1980s and the most likely developments. Discussing the origins of the Soviet economic planning system and the theories which founded it, previous attempts to reform the organisational structure and the particular problem of agriculture, Dyker presents a picture of an increasingly bleak future for the Soviet economy. This is a comprehensive title written by a renowned expert on the Soviet economy, which will be of particular value to students and academics researching the political and economic development and history of the Soviet Union.

Why did the Soviet economic system fall apart? Did the economy simply overreach itself through military spending? Was it the centrally-planned character of Soviet socialism that was at fault? Or did a potentially viable mechanism come apart in Gorbachev's clumsy hands? Does its failure mean that true socialism is never economically viable? The economic dimension is at the very heart of the Russian story in the twentieth century. Economic issues were the cornerstone of soviet ideology and the soviet system, and economic issues brought the whole system crashing down in 1989-91. This book is a record of what happened, and it is also an analysis of the failure of Soviet economics as a concept.

For half a century the Soviet economy was inefficient but stable. In the late 1980s, to the surprise of nearly everyone, it suddenly collapsed. Why did this happen? And what role did Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's economic reforms play in the country's dissolution? In this groundbreaking study, Chris Miller shows that Gorbachev and his allies tried to learn from the great success story of transitions from socialism to capitalism, Deng Xiaoping's China. Why, then, were efforts to revitalize Soviet socialism so much less successful than in China? Making use of never-before-studied documents from the Soviet politburo and other archives, Miller argues that the difference between the Soviet Union and China--and the ultimate cause of the Soviet collapse--was not economics but politics. The Soviet government was divided by bitter conflict, and Gorbachev, the ostensible Soviet autocrat, was unable to outmaneuver the interest groups that were threatened by his economic reforms. Miller's analysis settles long-standing debates about the politics and economics of perestroika, transforming our understanding of the causes of the Soviet Union's rapid demise.

Restructuring the Soviet Economy examines the Soviet leadership's most urgent question - how to revitalize the soviet economy. David Dyker argues that the current impasse can can only be understood in the context of the failure of 60 years of central planning. He analyses both the problems besetting the centrally planned system and those that have paralysed perestroika and assesses whether the most ambitious attempt ever to reform the Soviet economy will succeed.

In Soviet Economy and the War the author presents a concise factual record of Soviet economic developments during a short period. This book outlines the economic planning and performance that accompanied the military training and preparation to meet the onset of Nazism. To some extent complementary to Dobb's Soviet Economy & the War, the author offers detailed studies of a few special aspects of the Soviet Economic System.