Building upon the "preliminary conception of Phenomenology" introduced by Heidegger in section II of the Introduction to Sein und zeit,l one may say that a phenomenology of death would mean: "to let death, as that which shows itself, be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself. " Does this mean then, that a properly phenomenological d- cription of death may reveal to us what death as a factical event is like "in the very way in which it shows itself from itself"? Although I cannot experience my death in order to describe it, may some kind of phenomenologica'l inference or "extrapolation"2 be the condition for a unique and privileged revelation of what it is like to be dead? There is an important element of phenomenological descr- tion which renders such an extrapolation implausible, and it involves what Husserl originally called the reduction to signi- cance or meaning. It can never be true for the phenomenologist, 1 Heidegger, Martin, Sein und zeit, p. 34. e. t. page 58. 2 Henry W. Johnstone Jr. thinks that while one cannot extrapo late from the experience of sleep to the experience of death, it may be possible to extrapolate from the phenomeno lQgy of sleep to the phenomenology of death. Cf. H. W. John stone Jr. , "Toward a Phenomenology of Death", in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. XXXV, No. 3, 1975, pages 396-7. Cf.

Building upon the "preliminary conception of Phenomenology" introduced by Heidegger in section II of the Introduction to Sein und zeit,l one may say that a phenomenology of death would mean: "to let death, as that which shows itself, be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself. " Does this mean then, that a properly phenomenological d- cription of death may reveal to us what death as a factical event is like "in the very way in which it shows itself from itself"? Although I cannot experience my death in order to describe it, may some kind of phenomenologica'l inference or "extrapolation"2 be the condition for a unique and privileged revelation of what it is like to be dead? There is an important element of phenomenological descr- tion which renders such an extrapolation implausible, and it involves what Husserl originally called the reduction to signi- cance or meaning. It can never be true for the phenomenologist, 1 Heidegger, Martin, Sein und zeit, p. 34. e. t. page 58. 2 Henry W. Johnstone Jr. thinks that while one cannot extrapo late from the experience of sleep to the experience of death, it may be possible to extrapolate from the phenomeno lQgy of sleep to the phenomenology of death. Cf. H. W. John stone Jr. , "Toward a Phenomenology of Death", in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. XXXV, No. 3, 1975, pages 396-7. Cf.

From Nietzsche's pronouncement that "God is dead" to Camus' argument that suicide is the fundamental question of philosophy, the concept of death plays an important role in existential phenomenology, reaching from Kierkegaard to Heidegger and Marcel. This book explores the phenomenology of death and offers a unique way into the phenomenological tradition. Paul Fairfield examines the following key topics: the modern denial of death Heidegger's important concept of 'being-toward-death' and its centrality in phenomenological ideas, such as authenticity and existence the philosophical significance of death rituals: what explains the imperative toward ritual around death, and what is its purpose and meaning? death in an age of secularism the philosophy and ethics of suicide death as a mystery rather than a philosophical problem to be solved the relationship between hope and death. Death: A Philosophical Inquiry is essential reading for students of phenomenology and existentialism, and will also be of interest to students in related fields such as religion, anthropology and the medical humanities.

In Pathways into the Jungian World contributors from the disciplines of medicine, psychology and philosophy look at the central issues of commonality and difference between phenomenology and analytical psychology. The major theme of the book is how existential phenomenology and analytical psychology have been involved in the same fundamental cultural and therapeutic project - both legitimize the subtlety, complexity and depth of experience in an age when the meaning of experience has been abandoned to the dictates of pharmaceutical technology, economics and medical psychiatry. The contributors reveal how Jung's relationship to the phenomenological tradition can be, and is being, developed, and rigorously show that the psychological resonance of the world is immediately available for phenomenological description.

Rethinking Nature brings the voices of leading Continental philosophers into discussion about what is emerging as one of our most pressing and timely concerns—the environmental crisis facing our planet. The essays featured in this volume embrace environmental philosophy in its broadest sense and include topics such as environmental ethics, environmental aesthetics, ontology, theology, gender and the environment, and the role of science and technology in forming knowledge about our world. Here, philosophy goes out into the field and comes back with rich insights and new approaches to environmental problems. This far-reaching and lively volume affords firm ground for thinking about the multiple ways that humans engage nature. Contributors are David Abram, Edward S. Casey, Daniel Cerezuelle, Ron Cooper, Bruce V. Foltz, Robert Frodeman, Trish Glazebrook, James Hatley, Robert Kirkman, Irene J. Klaver, Alphonso Lingis, Kenneth Maly, Diane Michelfelder, Elaine P. Miller, Robert Mugerauer, Stephen David Ross, John Sallis, Ingrid Leman Stefanovic, Bruce Wilshire, David Wood, and Michael E. Zimmerman.

Utilizes Heidegger in rethinking common environmental paradigms.