​In light of the handover from the European Central Bank President Mario Draghi to Christine Lagarde in November 2019, this book provides an in-depth analysis of the events which unfolded since the euro area sovereign debt crisis in 2010 up until today. The book focuses on the far-reaching implications of the last decade, shedding light on a wide spectrum of political, economic and financial aspects of the European poly-crises and how monetary policy reacted to these challenges. The book places particular emphasis on the tensions that the supranational central bank was subject to during this period, and on their outcomes in terms of the policies, their legitimacy, and their public reception. As such, this book will be relevant not only to understand the political implications of the past crisis but also, and foremost, in understanding "what is next".

The first twenty years of the European Central Bank (ECB) offer a clear demonstration of how a central bank can navigate macroeconomic insecurity and crisis. As the global economy moves into a new phase of unheralded uncertainty, the story of the ECB holds multiple lessons of wider significance for the central banking community and researchers of monetary policy. This volume provides a unique account of how the ECB has reacted to the challenges confronting the euro area through its monetary policy, turning to innovative measures and unprecedented policy actions to fend off the various threats posed by the global financial turmoil of 2007/08, the euro area sovereign debt market crisis, and the subsequent period of anaemic growth and deflationary pressures. It also addresses some of the criticisms the ECB has faced regarding its policy initiatives. It identifies the ultimate motivation behind the ECB's cautious attitude in the early phases of the financial crisis, and its peculiar definition of price stability and attention for credit creation, as well as addressing the criticism that central banks were fundamentally unprepared to head off a major financial cataclysm as they were wedded to a deficient economic paradigm which made them blind to financial risks. It also shows that the ECB's unconventional low-interest policies have not compromised the position of financial intermediaries in the way commentators initially predicted they would. By condensing the facts and lessons of the first 20 years of the ECB, this volume will acquaint the reader with the structures and decision-making processes behind the complex, often controversial, crisis measures that were taken during some of the toughest economic challenges in the history of modern Europe, and provide them with fresh ex-post analysis on their effect on the real economy and inflation.

The social contract that has underpinned growth and political stability in the Western world since World War II has broken down. Houses, health care and higher education have become unaffordable to a majority of people, while the burden of unregulated monopolies, globalization and uncontrolled immigration has fallen disproportionately on the lower and middle classes. Wrapped in political correctness, an increasingly out of touch Western elite continues catering to special interests and fails to grasp the urgency for change. Populist movements harnessing public anger appear unable to propose and implement effective solutions. The last financial crisis was bad enough. But the next crisis will spread deeper and wider. And yet we stand economically, politically and most of all intellectually unprepared. This book is the story of how we have arrived at the brink of disaster and how we can move away from the win-lose policies of recent decades to restore much-needed balance.

"This book brings together some of the greatest thought leaders and monetary policy scholars to examine how the Fed is being politicized and what that means for our economy." -Jeb Hensarling, Former Chairman, House Financial Services Committee The 2008 financial crisis and the Covid-19 pandemic greatly expanded the Fed's scope and power. Populism and the Future of the Fed features highly readable essays that avoid technical jargon and provide a broad perspective on core issues-including the populist challenge to Fed independence, fiscal dominance and the return of inflation, the limits of Fed power versus the expansion of its dual mandate, and the strange world of helicopter money and fiscal QE. One could argue that those who want the Fed to allocate credit, help fund a Green New Deal, engage in helicopter drops, and so on, are well intentioned. However, the real issue is whether such actions are consistent with long-run price stability and the rule of law. Thus, several questions come to mind. What are the limits to what the Fed can do and what it should do in a free society? Where do we draw the line between fiscal and monetary policy? Do we want an activist central bank with wide discretion or a limited central bank guided by a monetary rule? What are the risks populism poses for the conduct of monetary policy, Fed independence, and central bank credibility? And can the Fed control inflation if populism and fiscal QE become pervasive? The distinguished contributors to this volume address those questions in a clear and compelling manner that will help improve both policymakers' and the public's understanding of the complex relationship between politics, policy, and the rule of law.

Contents: (1) Overview: Financial Architecture; Economic Performance; (2) The Financial Crisis and the European Union; (3) Phase I ¿ Build-up; (4) Phase II ¿ Liquidity Issues: Central Bank Operations; Interest Rates; Currency Swap Facilities; Depositor Guarantees; (5) Phase III ¿ Solvency and Deleveraging: The ¿European Framework for Action¿; ¿Bad Banks¿; (6) Phase IV ¿ Fiscal Intervention; European Economic Recovery Plan; Germany; France; United Kingdom; (7) Outlook. Charts and tables.

With the start of EMU, the Eurosystem has taken over monetary policy for the 11 countries of the Euro-area. But the division of powers within the Eurosystem, between the European Central Bank and the constituent National Central Banks, is not satisfactory. This volume provides an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the Eurosystem and offers concrete proposals concerning the decision-making organs, balance sheets and the distribution of seigniorage.