Britain's New Labour government claims to support the cause of human rights. At the same time, it claims that we can have no rights without responsibility and that dependency on the state is irresponsible. The ethics of welfare offers a critique of this paradox and discusses the ethical conundrum it implies for the future of social welfare.

Moral philosophers agree that welfare matters. But they disagree about what it is, or how much it matters. Wayne Sumner presents an original theory of welfare, investigating its nature and discussing its importance. He considers and rejects all notable theories of welfare, both objective and subjective, including hedonism and theories founded on desire or preference. His own theory connects welfare closely with happiness or life satisfaction. Reacting against the value pluralism that currently dominates moral philosophy, he advances welfare as the only basic ethical value. He concludes by discussing the implications of this thesis for ethical and political theory. Written in clear, non-technical language, and including a definitive survey of other work in this area, Sumner's book is essential reading for moral philosophers, political theorists, and welfare economists.

The book explores the extent to which rights to welfare are related to human inter-dependency on the one hand and the ethics of responsibility on the other. Its intention is to kick-start a fresh debate about the moral foundations of social policy and welfare reform. The ethics of welfare: explores the concepts of dependency, responsibility and rights and their significance for social citizenship; draws together findings from a range of recent research that has investigated popular, political, welfare provider and welfare user discourses; discusses, in a UK context, the relevance of the recent Human Rights Act for social policy; presents arguments in favour of a human rights based approach to social welfare. The book is essential reading for anyone concerned about the future of welfare. It is aimed at students and academics in social policy, social work, sociology, politics and law. It will also interest policy makers and welfare professionals, particularly those concerned with welfare benefits and social care.

This overview of the poverty problem begins by summarizing our current situation, with emphasis on its spiritual dimensions. It then places these issues within the American historical context. The core of the book is the presentation of alternative ways of looking at the problem and of trying to deal with it, with particular emphasis on the ethical principles that shape each alternative.

This innovative history of welfare economics challenges the view that welfare economics can be discussed without taking ethical values into account. Whatever their theoretical commitments, when economists have considered practical problems relating to public policy, they have adopted a wider range of ethical values, whether equality, justice, freedom, or democracy. Even canonical authors in the history of welfare economics are shown to have adopted ethical positions different from those with which they are commonly associated. Welfare Theory, Public Action, and Ethical Values explores the reasons and implications of this, drawing on concepts of welfarism and non-welfarism developed in modern welfare economics. The authors exemplify how economic theory, public affairs and political philosophy interact, challenging the status quo in order to push economists and historians to reconsider the nature and meaning of welfare economics.

What kind of life best ensures human welfare? Since the ancient Greeks, this question has been as central to ethical philosophy as to ordinary reflection. But what exactly is welfare? This question has suffered from relative neglect. And, as Stephen Darwall shows, it has done so at a price. Presenting a provocative new "rational care theory of welfare," Darwall proves that a proper understanding of welfare fundamentally changes how we think about what is best for people. Most philosophers have assumed that a person's welfare is what is good from her point of view, namely, what she has a distinctive reason to pursue. In the now standard terminology, welfare is assumed to have an "agent-relative normativity." Darwall by contrast argues that someone's good is what one should want for that person insofar as one cares for her. Welfare, in other words, is normative, but not peculiarly for the person whose welfare is at stake. In addition, Darwall makes the radical proposal that something's contributing to someone's welfare is the same thing as its being something one ought to want for her own sake, insofar as one cares. Darwall defends this theory with clarity, precision, and elegance, and with a subtle understanding of the place of sympathetic concern in the rich psychology of sympathy and empathy. His forceful arguments will change how we understand a concept central to ethics and our understanding of human bonds and human choices.

The focus of this textbook is on the link between ethics and economic policy analysis. Basic philosophical concepts are systematically described, followed by conventional welfare economic theory and policy, and applications to some topical economic problems such as income distribution and sustainable development.