An account of the Red Army's advance along the southwest strategic direction during the offensive that followed the Battle of Kursk in July-August 1943.

In mid-December 1942, after encircling the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad, Soviet forces in southern Russia began a series of offensive operations which continued unabated into February 1943. In these offensives the Soviet High Command attempted to smash German resistance and encircle the bulk of two German army groups. For two months the German forces struck back. In a well co-ordinated counterstroke they inflicted a major operational defeat on the Soviets and stabilized the front until the summer. The two-month period of Soviet offensive activity during the winter of 1942-1943 saw the Red Army test new operational and tactical techniques and experiment with forces and methods for conducting mobile armoured warfare. Through victory and defeat the Red Army learnt its lesson well. Out of this period, and the three month period of relative calm that followed, emerged the new Red Army, which would defeat blitzkreig at Kursk and would achieve two years of virtually uninterrupted battlefield success, culminating in their defeat of Nazi Germany.

Against the wishes of Hitler, German forces under Erich von Manstein were forced to retreat following the failure of the Kursk offensive of July 1943. The weakened force only had one possible refuge, behind the wide Dnepr River. The race to the natural defensive line was on, with the Soviets launching one of their largest offensives of the war – with over 2 million men on the move. Expert Eastern Front historian Robert Forczyk describes the dramatic four-month campaign that saw the Red Army not only succeed in crossing the Dnepr at multiple points, but also liberate Kiev, capital of the Ukraine. Revealing new detail about the largest Soviet airborne operation of the war and the increasingly desperate delaying tactics employed by Manstein as catastrophic casualties mounted on both sides, Forczyk charts the course of the battle that confirmed to many observers that the relentless Soviet advance westward could not be halted. Berlin would be next.

This book provides an in-depth study of the Soviet Army during the offensive operations that started with Battle of Stalingrad in December 1942 and went until Spring 1943. The lessons learned by the Soviet Army from these experiences helped design the military steamroller that decimated the German panzer divisions at Kursk in the Summer of 1943.

The Battle of the Dnepr: The Red Army's Forcing of the East Wall, August-December 1943', details a critical period in the Red Army's advance along the southwest strategic direction during the general offensive that followed the fighting in the area of the Kursk salient in July-August 1943. The Germans, who were now on the strategic defensive in the East, sought to fall back and consolidate their front along the line of the Dnepr River. The Red Army's success in overturning these expectations along this particularly important sector is the subject of this study. This is a composite work based upon three studies carried out by the Red Army General Staff's military-historical directorate, which was charged with collecting and analyzing the war's experience. The first is a lengthy internal document, dating from 1946, which was eventually published in Russia in 2007, although heavily supplemented by commentary and other information not contained in the original. The present work omits these additions, while supplying its own commentary in places deemed necessary. Two short articles from another publication round out the collection. The book is divided into two parts. The first deals with the efforts by General N.F. Vatutin's Voronezh (later renamed First Ukrainian) Front to exploit the Soviet victory during the battle of Kursk and to carry the war to the Dnepr River and beyond. This involved pursuing the retreating Germans and attempting to seize crossings over the Dnepr in the Kiev area before the Germans could get across and consolidate their position. Although they were able to seize several small footholds, the Soviets were unable at first to expand them to bridgeheads of operational significance. By shifting their efforts to the bridgehead north of Kiev, the Soviets were eventually able to break out and capture Kiev, although a German counterattack from the Zhitomir area threw them back somewhat. Nevertheless, by the end of the year the Red Army in this area was ready to resume the offensive to retake the Ukrainian right bank. The two articles, which comprise the second part, cover the combat operations of General I.S. Konev's Steppe (later renamed Second Ukrainian) Front through Poltava and Kremenchug and to cross the Dnepr and seize bridgeheads south of Kiev. This is a more narrowly focused tactical-operational study, dealing with the efforts of the front's 37th and 52nd armies to expand their positions on the Ukrainian right bank into operational bridgeheads capable of supporting a larger offensive to the west in 1944.

Against the wishes of Hitler, German forces under Erich von Manstein were forced to retreat following the failure of the Kursk offensive of July 1943. The weakened force only had one possible refuge, behind the wide Dnepr River. The race to the natural defensive line was on, with the Soviets launching one of their largest offensives of the war – with over 2 million men on the move. Expert Eastern Front historian Robert Forczyk describes the dramatic four-month campaign that saw the Red Army not only succeed in crossing the Dnepr at multiple points, but also liberate Kiev, capital of the Ukraine. Revealing new detail about the largest Soviet airborne operation of the war and the increasingly desperate delaying tactics employed by Manstein as catastrophic casualties mounted on both sides, Forczyk charts the course of the battle that confirmed to many observers that the relentless Soviet advance westward could not be halted. Berlin would be next.

With the German defeat at Kursk, the Soviet Stavka (high command) ordered the Western and Kalinin Fronts to launch Operation Suvorov in order to liberate the city of Smolensk. The Germans had held this city for two years and Heeresgruppe Mitte's (Army Group Centre) 4. Armee had heavily fortified the region. The Soviet offensive began in August 1943 and they quickly realized that the German defences were exceedingly tough and that the Western Front had not prepared adequately for an extended offensive. Consequently, the Soviets were forced to pause their offensive after only two weeks, in order to replenish their combat forces and then begin again. The German 4. Armee was commanded by Generaloberst Gotthard Heinrici, one of the Wehrmacht's top defensive experts. Although badly outnumbered, Heinrici's army gamely held off two Soviet fronts for seven weeks. Eventually, the 4. Armee's front was finally broken and Smolensk was liberated on 25 September 1943. However, the Western Front was too exhausted to pursue Heinrici's defeated army, which retreated to the fortified cities of Vitebsk, Orsha and Mogilev; the 4. Armee would hold these cities until the destruction of Army Group Centre in June 1944. Operation Suvorov focuses on a major offensive that is virtually unknown in the West and which set the stage for the decisive defeat of Heeresgruppe Mitte in the next summer offensive.