In The Dictator's Army, Caitlin Talmadge presents a compelling new argument to help us understand why authoritarian militaries sometimes fight very well—and sometimes very poorly. Talmadge's framework for understanding battlefield effectiveness focuses on four key sets of military organizational practices: promotion patterns, training regimens, command arrangements, and information management. Different regimes face different domestic and international threat environments, leading their militaries to adopt different policies in these key areas of organizational behavior.Authoritarian regimes facing significant coup threats are likely to adopt practices that squander the state's military power, while regimes lacking such threats and possessing ambitious foreign policy goals are likely to adopt the effective practices often associated with democracies. Talmadge shows the importance of threat conditions and military organizational practices for battlefield performance in two paired comparisons of states at war: North and South Vietnam (1963–1975) and Iran and Iraq (1980–1988). Drawing on extensive documentary sources, her analysis demonstrates that threats and practices can vary not only between authoritarian regimes but also within them, either over time or across different military units. The result is a persuasive explanation of otherwise puzzling behavior by authoritarian militaries. The Dictator's Army offers a vital practical tool for those seeking to assess the likely course, costs, and outcomes of future conflicts involving nondemocratic adversaries, allies, or coalition partners.

Explains how dictatorships rise, survive, and fall, along with why some but not all dictators wield vast powers.

In this riveting anatomy of authoritarianism, acclaimed journalist William Dobson takes us inside the battle between dictators and those who would challenge their rule. Recent history has seen an incredible moment in the war between dictators and democracy—with waves of protests sweeping Syria and Yemen, and despots falling in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya. But the Arab Spring is only the latest front in a global battle between freedom and repression, a battle that, until recently, dictators have been winning hands-down. The problem is that today’s authoritarians are not like the frozen-in-time, ready-to-crack regimes of Burma and North Korea. They are ever-morphing, technologically savvy, and internationally connected, and have replaced more brutal forms of intimidation with subtle coercion. The Dictator’s Learning Curve explains this historic moment and provides crucial insight into the fight for democracy.

Explains the theory of political survival, particularly in cases of dictators and despotic governments, arguing that political leaders seek to stay in power using any means necessary, most commonly by attending to the interests of certain coalitions.

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Why do democracies win wars? This is a critical question in the study of international relations, as a traditional view--expressed most famously by Alexis de Tocqueville--has been that democracies are inferior in crafting foreign policy and fighting wars. In Democracies at War, the first major study of its kind, Dan Reiter and Allan Stam come to a very different conclusion. Democracies tend to win the wars they fight--specifically, about eighty percent of the time. Complementing their wide-ranging case-study analysis, the authors apply innovative statistical tests and new hypotheses. In unusually clear prose, they pinpoint two reasons for democracies' success at war. First, as elected leaders understand that losing a war can spell domestic political backlash, democracies start only those wars they are likely to win. Secondly, the emphasis on individuality within democratic societies means that their soldiers fight with greater initiative and superior leadership. Surprisingly, Reiter and Stam find that it is neither economic muscle nor bandwagoning between democratic powers that enables democracies to win wars. They also show that, given societal consent, democracies are willing to initiate wars of empire or genocide. On the whole, they find, democracies' dependence on public consent makes for more, rather than less, effective foreign policy. Taking a fresh approach to a question that has long merited such a study, this book yields crucial insights on security policy, the causes of war, and the interplay between domestic politics and international relations.

Before becoming one of the longest-ruling dictators of the twentieth century, Francisco Franco commanded troops in the kinds of wars that have since become all too familiar. He not only waged vicious counterinsurgency campaigns against Muslim warlords and defiant tribes in Morocco, but he also led a multinational force to victory in Europe's "dress rehearsal" for World War II--the Spanish Civil War. Born into a military family in 1892, Francisco Franco first made a name for himself leading attacks against rebellious Moroccan warlords and tribesmen and by 1926 was promoted to brigadier general. His role in the ruthless suppression of the 1934 revolution by coal miners in Asturias sealed his reputation for brutality, although Franco saw it as simply carrying out an order in the most efficient manner possible. In 1936, as head of Spain's formidable Army of Africa, Franco joined a military revolt against the Popular Front government of the republic. He quickly secured the support of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, touching off more than two years of bloody civil war. Within months of the wars outbreak he became generalissimo and head of state of the rebel camp, and in 1939 Britain and France recognized him as the legitimate ruler of Spain. He then outlasted fellow dictators Hitler and Stalin by decades, dying in 1975 at the helm of the same regime he had established in Spain before the Second World War. In this engaging and concise introduction to the generalissimo's life on and off the battlefield, Geoffrey Jensen makes clear how Franco's military experiences helped shape the character of his dictatorship and its repressive policies.