The first English translation of Hans Reichenbach's lucid doctoral thesis sheds new light on how Kant's Critique of Pure Reason was understood in some quarters at the time. The source of several themes in his still influential The Direction of Time, the thesis shows Reichenbach's early focus on the interdependence of physics, probability, and epistemology.

​This book deals with the rise of mathematics in physical sciences, beginning with Galileo and Newton and extending to the present day. The book is divided into two parts. The first part gives a brief history of how mathematics was introduced into physics—despite its "unreasonable effectiveness" as famously pointed out by a distinguished physicist—and the criticisms it received from earlier thinkers. The second part takes a more philosophical approach and is intended to shed some light on that mysterious effectiveness. For this purpose, the author reviews the debate between classical philosophers on the existence of innate ideas that allow us to understand the world and also the philosophically based arguments for and against the use of mathematics in physical sciences. In this context, Schopenhauer’s conceptions of causality and matter are very pertinent, and their validity is revisited in light of modern physics. The final question addressed is whether the effectiveness of mathematics can be explained by its “existence” in an independent platonic realm, as Gödel believed. The book aims at readers interested in the history and philosophy of physics. It is accessible to those with only a very basic (not professional) knowledge of physics.

Table of contents

Logical empiricism is a philosophical movement that flourished in the 1920s and 30s in Central Europe and in the 1940s and 50s in the United States. With its stated ambition to comprehend the revolutionary advances in the empirical and formal sciences of their day and to confront anti-modernist challenges to scientific reason itself, logical empiricism was never uncontroversial. Uniting key thinkers who often disagreed with one another but shared the aim to conceive of philosophy as part of the scientific enterprise, it left a rich and varied legacy that has only begun to be explored relatively recently. The Routledge Handbook of Logical Empiricism is an outstanding reference source to this challenging subject area, and the first collection of its kind. Comprising 41 chapters written by an international and interdisciplinary team of contributors, the Handbook is organized into four clear parts: The Cultural, Scientific and Philosophical Context and the Development of Logical Empiricism Characteristic Theses of and Specific Issues in Logical Empiricism Relations to Philosophical Contemporaries Leading Post-Positivist Criticisms and Legacy Essential reading for students and researchers in the history of twentieth-century philosophy, especially the history of analytical philosophy and the history of philosophy of science, the Handbook will also be of interest to those working in related areas of philosophy influenced by this important movement, including metaphysics and epistemology, philosophy of mind and philosophy of language.

This book presents a multidisciplinary guide to gauge theory and gravity, with chapters by the world’s leading theoretical physicists, mathematicians, historians and philosophers of science. The contributions from theoretical physics explore e.g. the consistency of the unification of gravitation and quantum theory, the underpinnings of experimental tests of gauge theory and its role in shedding light on the relationship between mathematics and physics. In turn, historians and philosophers of science assess the impact of Weyl’s view on the philosophy of science. Graduate students, lecturers and researchers in the fields of history of science, theoretical physics and philosophy of science will benefit from this book by learning about the role played by Weyl’s Raum-Zeit-Materie in shaping several modern research fields, and by gaining insights into the future prospects of gauge theory in both theoretical and experimental physics. Furthermore, the book facilitates interdisciplinary exchange and conceptual innovation in tackling fundamental questions about our deepest theories of physics. Chapter “Weyl’s Raum-Zeit-Materie and the Philosophy of Science” is available open access under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License via link.springer.com

This illuminating volume explores the effects of chance on evolution, covering diverse perspectives from scientists, philosophers, and historians. The evolution of species, from single-celled organisms to multicellular animals and plants, is the result of a long and highly chancy history. But how profoundly has chance shaped life on earth? And what, precisely, do we mean by chance? Bringing together biologists, philosophers of science, and historians of science, Chance in Evolution is the first book to untangle the far-reaching effects of chance, contingency, and randomness on the evolution of life. The book begins by placing chance in historical context, starting with the ancients and moving through Darwin to contemporary biology. It documents the shifts in our understanding of chance as Darwin’s theory of evolution developed into the modern synthesis, and how the acceptance of chance in Darwinian theory affected theological resistance to it. Other chapters discuss how chance relates to the concepts of genetic drift, mutation, and parallel evolution—as well as recent work in paleobiology and the experimental evolution of microbes. By engaging in collaboration across biology, history, philosophy, and theology, this book offers a comprehensive overview both of the history of chance in evolution and of our current understanding of the impact of chance on life.

This volume has two primary aims: to trace the traditions and changes in methods, concepts, and ideas that brought forth the logical empiricists’ philosophy of physics and to present and analyze the logical empiricists’ various and occasionally contrary ideas about the physical sciences and their philosophical relevance. These original chapters discuss these developments in their original contexts and social and institutional environments, thus showing the various fruitful conceptions and philosophies behind the history of 20th-century philosophy of science. Logical Empiricism and the Natural Sciences is divided into three thematic sections. Part I surveys the influences on logical empiricism’s philosophy of science and physics. It features chapters on Maxwell’s role in the worldview of logical empiricism, on Reichenbach’s account of objectivity, on the impact of Poincaré on Neurath’s early views on scientific method, Frank’s exchanges with Einstein about philosophy of physics, and on the forgotten role of Kurt Grelling. Part II focuses on specific physical theories, including Carnap’s and Reichenbach’s positions on Einstein’s theory of general relativity, Reichenbach’s critique of unified field theory, and the logical empiricists’ reactions to quantum mechanics. The third and final group of chapters widens the scope to philosophy of science and physics in general. It includes contributions on von Mises’ frequentism; Frank’s account of concept formation and confirmation; and the interrelations between Nagel’s, Feigl’s, and Hempel’s versions of logical empiricism. This book offers a comprehensive account of the logical empiricists’ philosophy of physics. It is a valuable resource for researchers interested in the history and philosophy of science, philosophy of physics, and the history of analytic philosophy.