In The Foundations of Arithmetic, Gottlob Frege contended that the difference between concepts and objects was absolute. He meant that no object could be a concept and no concept an object. Benno Kerry disagreed; he contended that a concept could be an object, and that therefore the difference between concepts and objects was only relative. In this book, Jolley aims to understand the debate between Frege and Kerry. But Jolley's purpose is not so much to champion either side; rather, it is to utilize an understanding of the debate to shed light on the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein-and vice versa. Jolley not only sifts through the debate between Frege and Kerry, but also through subsequent versions of the debate in J. J. Valberg and Wilfred Sellars. Jolley's goal is to show that the central notion of Philosophical Investigations, that of a 'conceptual investigation', is a legacy of the Frege/Kerry debate and also a contribution to it. Jolley concludes that the difference between concepts and objects is as absolute in its way in Philosophical Investigations as it was in The Foundations of Arithmetic and that recognizing the absoluteness of the difference in Philosophical Investigations provides a beginning for a 'resolute' reading of Wittgenstein's book.

This book covers the topic of history and the role that it played in the Austrio-British philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein’s thought. The topic is explored from multiple angles, both chronologically and thematically. Reviewing Wittgenstein’s two magnum opera - the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921) and Philosophical Investigations (1952), this work is an investigation into an under-acknowledged element in Wittgenstein’s thought, one which in many cases acted as an impetus for that life-long process of novel philosophical reflection: History. This volume traces the evolution of Wittgenstein’s thoughts on time and temporality from the Tractatus, through the Investigations, into some key post-Investigations remarks and also examines the motivations behind Wittgenstein’s post-Tractarian return to philosophy and, in particular, the unique methodology he developed in order to serve his renewed purpose. The final chapter seeks to answer the question, What was Wittgenstein trying to achieve with Philosophical Investigations? This book is of interest to philosophers.

This volume sheds a new light on Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein’s master opus, by taking a new approach to its first stretch (sections §§1-88), with special emphasis on its atypical opening. The methodological conviction that subtends the volume is that the highly unconventional form assumed by the book is internal to its content and crucial to its reconception of the relation between logic and language. This disconcerting form is dictated by the new modes of criticism deployed by Wittgenstein as he engages the philosophical tradition in the new terms afforded by the revolutionary “method of language-games”. In the essays collected here, seven authors, including some of the most influential figures in the field, offer close and often unorthodox readings of pivotal passages from the beginning of the book. These readings are also shaped by the conviction that the Philosophical Investigations are hardly intelligible apart from an appreciation of the concerns that they inherit from Wittgenstein’s early work, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. The authors contend that we need to consider the continuities between the early and the later works if we are to disclose the true discontinuities between them.

Cora Diamond follows two major philosophers as they think about thinking, and about our ability to respond to thinking that has gone astray. Acting as both witness to and participant in the encounter, she provides fresh perspective on the value of Wittgenstein’s and Anscombe’s work, and demonstrates what genuinely independent thought can achieve.

By exploring the significance of Wittgenstein’s later texts relating to the philosophy of language, Wittgenstein’s Later Theory of Meaning offers insights that will transform our understanding of the influential 20th-century philosopher. Explores the significance of Wittgenstein’s later texts relating to the philosophy of language, and offers new insights that transform our understanding of the influential 20th-century philosopher Provides original interpretations of the systematic points about language in Wittgenstein’s later writings that reveal his theory of meaning Engages in close readings of a variety of Wittgenstein’s later texts to explore what the philosopher really had to say about ‘kinds of words’ and ‘parts of speech’ Frees Wittgenstein from his reputation as an unsystematic thinker with nothing to offer but ‘therapy’ for individual cases of philosophical confusion

This volume comprises nine lively and insightful essays by leading scholars on the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, focusing mainly on his early work. The essays are written from a range of perspectives and do not belong to any one exegetical school; they approach Wittgenstein's work directly, seeking to understand it in its own terms and by reference to the context in which it was produced. The contributors cover a wide range of aspects of Wittgenstein's early philosophy, but three central themes emerge: the relationship between Wittgenstein's account of representation and Russell's theories of judgment; the role of objects in the tractarian system; and Wittgenstein's philosophical method. Collectively, the essays demonstrate how progress in the understanding of Wittgenstein's work is not to be made by focusing on overarching, ideological issues, but by paying close attention to his engagement with specific philosophical problems.

Ludwig Wittgenstein was the most influential, and arguably the greatest, philosopher of the twentieth century. This fact about his influence is not only a matter of how much he influenced people but also of how many people he influenced. His early work was taken up by some of the pioneers of analytical philosophy. His later work helped spawn another movement within analytic philosophy, that of ordinary language philosophy (sometimes called Oxford philosophy). He is also considered by some to be a key postmodern thinker, and an interest in his work is a distinguishing feature of many post-analytical philosophers who seek to bridge the gap between analytical and so-called continental philosophy. This second edition of Historical Dictionary of Wittgenstein's Philosophy covers the history of this philosophy through a chronology, an introductory essay, and an extensive bibliography. The dictionary section has over 300 cross-referenced entries on every aspect of his work. This book is an excellent access point for students, researchers, and anyone wanting to know more about Wittgenstein’s philosophy.