After a historical and conceptual overview of the changing face of nihilism in the last century, Carr examines Nietzsche's diagnosis of nihilism as modernity's major crisis. She then compares the responses to nihilism given by the early Karl Barth and by Richard Rorty. To some, nihilism is losing its crisis connotations and becoming simply an unobjectionable characteristic of human life. Carr argues that this transformation ultimately absolutizes community preference and reflects an increasing inability to criticize and change the existing structures of thought. The author contends that the uncritical acceptance of nihilism, which characterizes much of postmodernism, ironically culminates in its complete opposite—dogmatism.

After a historical and conceptual overview of the changing face of nihilism in the last century, Carr examines Nietzsche's diagnosis of nihilism as modernity's major crisis. She then compares the responses to nihilism given by the early Karl Barth and by Richard Rorty. To some, nihilism is losing its crisis connotations and becoming simply an unobjectionable characteristic of human life. Carr argues that this transformation ultimately absolutizes community preference and reflects an increasing inability to criticize and change the existing structures of thought. The author contends that the uncritical acceptance of nihilism, which characterizes much of postmodernism, ironically culminates in its complete opposite--dogmatism.

A reassessment of the controversial, yet still influential nineteenth-century German philosopher that explores the contentious issue of whether he was, as his critics frequently claim, a nihilist.Max Stirner (1806-1856) is often regarded as an enfant terrible of nineteenth-century German philosophy, but he has continued to exert an influence despite his marginalization as a nihilist. This study is the first to tackle head-on the question of whether Stirner can indeed reasonably be described as a nihilist. Although he is not known ever to have used the word "nihilism" or any of its derivatives, he was first accused of being a nihilist immediately after the publication of his magnum opus Der Einzige und sein Eigentum (translated in most English editions as The Ego and His Own) in 1844. Since then, the allegation has been repeated by well over a hundred writers and critics, with the result that it has become something of a truism. The book aims, first, to establish a clear understanding of the multifarious meanings of the term nihilism; second, to examine the accusations leveled at Stirner in the light of those meanings; and third, to assess not only the fairness and accuracy of the imputation of nihilism but also its usefulness in understanding Stirner as a thinker. It thus provides new insights into Stirner's thought, challenges the orthodox view of him as a philosophical pariah, reassesses his ideas and their place in the history of philosophy, and addresses the recurrent issue of his contemporary relevance.ngs of the term nihilism; second, to examine the accusations leveled at Stirner in the light of those meanings; and third, to assess not only the fairness and accuracy of the imputation of nihilism but also its usefulness in understanding Stirner as a thinker. It thus provides new insights into Stirner's thought, challenges the orthodox view of him as a philosophical pariah, reassesses his ideas and their place in the history of philosophy, and addresses the recurrent issue of his contemporary relevance.ngs of the term nihilism; second, to examine the accusations leveled at Stirner in the light of those meanings; and third, to assess not only the fairness and accuracy of the imputation of nihilism but also its usefulness in understanding Stirner as a thinker. It thus provides new insights into Stirner's thought, challenges the orthodox view of him as a philosophical pariah, reassesses his ideas and their place in the history of philosophy, and addresses the recurrent issue of his contemporary relevance.ngs of the term nihilism; second, to examine the accusations leveled at Stirner in the light of those meanings; and third, to assess not only the fairness and accuracy of the imputation of nihilism but also its usefulness in understanding Stirner as a thinker. It thus provides new insights into Stirner's thought, challenges the orthodox view of him as a philosophical pariah, reassesses his ideas and their place in the history of philosophy, and addresses the recurrent issue of his contemporary relevance.

This book is our century's most comprehensive and wise treatment of nihilism in all of its guises, comparing favorably with Rosen, Cavell, and indeed with Spengler. Crosby argues that our culture is genuinely haunted by nihilism expressing itself in the fideism of fundamentalism as well as in the debilitating alienation from all orientation. This results from a one-sided development of Western culture. Unlike most writers on this topic, Crosby acknowledges many sources colluding to frame the culture of nihilism, including "the death of God," the objectification of nature, the meaninglessness of suffering in a mechanical universe, the ephemerality of time in a world where value does not accumulate, the arbitrariness of historicized reason, the reduction of value to will, and the alienation of the Cartesian ego. These sources are reviewed in the first two parts of the book with the result that the phenomenon of nihilism becomes understandable. In its third and fourth parts, Crosby provides a critical analysis of the religious and philosophical forces leading to nihilism by discussing authors from the early modern period through Dostoyevsky, Sartre, Russell, and Derrida. He shows that these forces are skewed and impoverished and should not be allowed to determine our situation. The comprehensive attention to detail and the multi-perspectival interpretation demonstrates as well as asserts the richness of the culture that puts nihilism in its place. Part Five, finally, rephrases the criticism of the sources of nihilism in positive ways. Part Four in particular is a tour de force of philosophical argument. Its richness of nuance, plurality of views examined, and adroitness of critical interpretation provide cumulatively a powerful, non-nihilistic reading of the philosophic tradition. The force of the argument derives from its comprehensive, cumulative character. Crosby distinguishes and relates five areas of nihilism: political, moral, epistemological, cosmic, and existential. Throughout the book, he illustrates and examines these as they are expressed in literature and art, in daily life and practical affairs, and in philosophy. The book is richly erudite in its marshalling of consciousness from so many domains.

This book examines the relationship between nihilism and postmodernism in relation to the sublime, and is divided into three parts: history, theory, and praxis. Arguing against the simplistic division in literary criticism between nihilism and the sublime, the book demonstrates that both are clearly implicated with the Enlightenment. Postmodernism, as a product of the Enlightenment, is therefore implicitly related to both nihilism and the sublime, despite the fact that it is often characterised as either nihilistic or sublime. Whereas prior forms of nihilism are 'modernist' because they seek to codify reality, postmodernism creates a new formulation of nihilism - 'postmodern nihilism' - that is itself sublime. This is explored in relation to a broad survey of postmodern literature in two chapters, the first on aesthetics and the second on ethics. It offers a coherent thesis for reappraising the relationship between nihilism and the sublime, and grounds this argument with frequent references to postmodern literature, making it a book suitable for both researchers and those more generally interested in postmodern literature.