This is a print on demand edition of a hard to find publication. The Future Combat System (FCS) was a multi-year, multi-billion dollar program at the heart of the Army¿s transformation efforts. It was to be the Army¿s major R&D, and acquisition program consisting of 14 manned and unmanned systems tied together by an extensive commun. and info. network. The FCS program has been characterized as a high-risk venture due to the advanced technologies involved and the challenge of networking all of the FCS subsystems together. Contents of this report: (1) Program Origins; (2) Program Overview; Current FCS Program Status; Army¿s Modernization Strategy; Budget Issues; (3) Issues for Congress: MGV Cancellation; Army Modernization Strategy and Spin Outs; Proposed Ground Combat Vehicles. Illustrations.

The Future Combat System (FCS) is the U.S. Army's multiyear, multibilliondollar program at the heart of the Army's transformation efforts. It is to be the Army's major research, development, and acquisition program consisting of 18 manned and unmanned systems tied together by an extensive communications and information network. FCS is intended to replace such current systems as the M-1 Abrams tank and the M-2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle with advanced, networked combat systems. The FCS program has been characterized by the Army and others as a high- risk venture due to the advanced technologies involved as well as the challenge of networking all of the FCS subsystems together so that FCSequipped units can function as intended. The FCS program exists in a dynamic national security environment which could significantly influence the program's outcome. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and potential defense budget cuts could play a role in shaping the FCS program. The revised FCS program timeline -- including four "Spin-Outs" whereby equipment is to be tested first by a FCS evaluation brigade and then introduced into the current force -- has extended the program's timeline by four years and has added additional funding requirements, but it has also served to reduce some of the risk associated with this admittedly high-risk venture. The overall FCS program budget has risen steadily since the program's inception and because the program is still in its early stages, its full costs are not yet known. The FCS program is managed by a lead systems integrator group consisting of major defense contractors Boeing and Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC). Although widely criticized, the Army adopted this program management approach because it maintains it did not have the required acquisition, scientific, and engineering staff to manage a program of this complexity and scope. The program's recent conversion from an Other Transaction Authority (OTA) agreement to a Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) contract -- in part due to congressional pressure -- raises concerns regarding increasing program costs as well as the Army's ability to take on a larger role in overseeing and executing this highly complex and technologically risky program. The FCS is experiencing a number of program development issues - with some technologies advancing quicker than anticipated, others progressing along predicted lines, while still others not meeting the Army's expectations. Congress, in its authorization, appropriation, and oversight roles may wish to review the FCS program in terms of its capabilities and program costs. This report will be updated as the situation warrants.

The Future Combat System (FCS) was a multiyear, multibillion dollar program at the heart of the Army's transformation efforts. It was to be the Army's major research, development, and acquisition program, consisting of 14 manned and unmanned systems tied together by an extensive communications and information network. FCS was intended to replace current systems such as the M-1 Abrams tank and the M-2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle. The FCS program has been characterized by the Army and others as a high-risk venture because of the advanced technologies involved and the challenge of networking all of the FCS subsystems together so that FCS-equipped units could function as intended. On April 6, 2009, Secretary of Defense Gates announced that he intended to significantly restructure the FCS program. The Department of Defense (DoD) would then plan to accelerate the spin out of selected FCS technologies to all brigade combat teams (BCTs). Gates also recommended cancelling the manned ground vehicle (MGV) component of the program, which was intended to field eight separate tracked combat vehicle variants built on a common chassis that would eventually replace the M-1 Abrams tank, the M-2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle, and the M-109 Paladin self-propelled artillery system. In October 2009, the Army announced a new BCT modernization strategy to implement Gates's restructuring announcement. Some of the key tenets of this strategy are as follows: deliver capability packages consisting of key FCS technologies and warfighter urgent requirements in 2-year increments; get some FCS spin-outs -- capabilities from the FCS program aimed at the current force -- to the field in the FY2011-FY2012 capabilities package; upgrade select core Army systems; fully integrate MRAP Vehicles into formations; and develop a Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) concept focused on building a versatile platform incorporating combat lessons learned, and field the system by 2017.

The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) is a Department of Defense (DoD) program that would play a significant role in the U.S. Army's proposed Future Combat System (FCS) program. JTRS, envisioned as a family of software programmable radios, has been described as the "backbone" of the FCS and is intended to link the 18 manned and unmanned systems that would constitute FCS. Two JTRS sub-programs managed by the Army -- Cluster One and Cluster Five -- have experienced developmental difficulties, delays, and cost overruns that call into question their viability. This report will be updated on a periodic basis. This report reviews the history of the JTRS procurement; current issues, including size and weight constraints and limited range, security, interoperability with legacy radio systems, Cluster One stop work order, JTRS alternatives, and Boeing's retention of Cluster One contract; experimentation and spin out one; program restructuring; program budget issues; recent Congressional actions; and issues for Congress, including the viability of the Cluster One Program, security, and JTRS alternatives. For a more detailed description of the FCS program, see CRS Report RL32888, "The Army's Future Combat System (FCS): Background and Issues for Congress," by Andrew Feickert.

This report looks at budget requests for the Army's Future Combat System (FCS) program, Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) program, and brigade combat teams (BCTs). It ends with a discussion of potential issues for Congress.