Surging South of Baghdad is the first in-depth study of counterinsurgency operations in Iraq during the troop surge. Dale Andrade examines the war in the Multi-National Division-Center, an area of operations established in the spring of 2007 to focus on the insurgent sanctuaries and supply lines south of the Iraqi capital. Before the surge, the territory was a backwater, used by al-Qaeda and other insurgent groups to recruit new fighters, construct roadside bombs, and transport both to the ongoing fighting in Baghdad. One of the five new brigades that “surged” into Iraq went to this region, more than doubling the number of U.S. forces already there and forming the southern anchor of the battle to sever this crucial link with the insurgents in the capital. The fighting south of Baghdad became something of a microcosm of the surge overall, an example of the necessity to combine troop strength with sound planning in order to defeat insurgents living among the population. This volume, completed only a short time after the event, provides a valuable perspective for the ongoing counterinsurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan.

This book covers this crucial period in the Iraq war from the perspective of a single division operating in the region south of the Iraqi capital. This account offers a snapshot of the surge, its successes and shortcomings, and shows how the Army coped with the changing demands of the modern combat environment.--[Foreword].

Surging South of Baghdad is the first in-depth study of counterinsurgency operations in Iraq during the troop surge. Dale Andrade examines the war in the Multi-National Division-Center, an area of operations established in the spring of 2007 to focus on the insurgent sanctuaries and supply lines south of the Iraqi capital. Before the surge, the territory was a backwater, used by al-Qaeda and other insurgent groups to recruit new fighters, construct roadside bombs, and transport both to the ongoing fighting in Baghdad. One of the five new brigades that "surged" into Iraq went to this region, more than doubling the number of U.S. forces already there and forming the southern anchor of the battle to sever this crucial link with the insurgents in the capital. The fighting south of Baghdad became something of a microcosm of the surge overall, an example of the necessity to combine troop strength with sound planning in order to defeat insurgents living among the population. This volume, completed only a short time after the event, provides a valuable perspective for the ongoing counterinsurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan.

With full color maps and illustrations. Center of Military History publication 59-2-1. Global War on Terrorism Series. This first in-depth study of counterinsurgency operations in Iraq during the troop surge examines the war in the Multi-National Division-Center, an area of operations established in the spring of 2007 to focus on the insurgent sanctuaries and supply lines south of the Iraqi capital. It provides a valuable perspective for the ongoing counterinsurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan.

By late 2006, 31/2 years after the dramatic capture of Baghdad by U.S. and coalition forces, the war in Iraq was going badly. Sectarian tensions had erupted into violence and American public support for the war was at an all-time low. For better or worse, the George W. Bush administration decided to gamble on a troop increase, sending thirty thousand additional U.S. troops to Iraq in order to stop the bloodshed and bring stability to Baghdad and the surrounding area. By June 2007, they were all in place, and the so-called surge began. "Surging South of Baghdad" covers this crucial period in the Iraq war from the perspective of a single division operating in the region south of the Iraqi capital. Before the surge, this slice of territory between the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers had become an insurgent safe haven where the enemy cached weapons and built bombs that fueled sectarian violence in Baghdad. Placing the 3d Infantry Division there bolstered a flagging coalition presence in the area and began the process of stabilization and rebuilding. This account offers a snapshot of the surge, its successes and shortcomings, and shows how the Army coped with the changing demands of the modern combat environment. Although organized and trained as a heavy conventional unit, the 3d Infantry Division readily adapted to its mission south of Baghdad, combining firepower and maneuver with civic action and economic rejuvenation. The story of its deployment during 2007 and 2008 is one of fierce combat and insidious roadside bombs as well as mediating between feuding sectarian groups and performing humanitarian missions. Counterinsurgency in the twenty-first century demands this seemingly contradictory combination.