A systematic critical survey of American strategic thinking and the strategic culture in which it is formed. In particular, this book seeks to interrogate the theory and strategy of nuclear deterrence, and its relationship to the concept of missile defence. Drawing widely on the theoretical literature in international relations and strategic studies, it identifies the key groups that have competed over America's nuclear policy post-1945 and examines how the concept of missile defence went through a process of gestation and intellectual contestation, leading to its eventual legitimization in the late 1990s. Steff sheds light on the individuals, groups, institutions and processes that led to the decision by the Bush administration to deploy a national missile defence shield. Additionally, Steff systematically examines the impact deployment had on the calculations of Russia and China. In the process he explains that their reactions under the Bush administration have continued into the Obama era, revealing that a new great power security dilemma has broken out. This, Steff shows, has led to a decline in great power relations as a consequence.

The National Defense Authorization Act of 2016 mandates a review of missile defeat policy, strategy, and capability to be completed by January 2018. This upcoming Missile Defeat Review (MDR) represents an opportunity for the Trump administration to articulate a vision for the future of air and missile defense. This collection of expert essays explores how the strategic environment for missile defense and defeat has evolved since 2010 and offers recommendations to help guide and inform the MDR’s development.

With the end of the Cold War and the visibility of U.S. Patriot missile defenses during the 1991 Gulf War, the cost and benefits of ballistic missile defense systems (BMD) need to be re-evaluated. In this detailed and balanced study, David Denoon assesses new types of short-range and intercontinental missile defenses. In the post Cold War era, two fundamental changes have made missile defense for the United States and its military forces more compelling: The United States and Russia no longer see each other as direct threats and there has been a dramatic proliferation of ballistic missile capability in the Third World. Consequently, U.S. forces deployed overseas are more likely to be at risk and, eventually, the United States itself could become vulnerable to missile threats. With these changes in mind, David Denoon analyzes the current BMD dilemma, arguing that active defenses against missiles should be seen as a form of insurance against catastrophe. He assesses the likelihood of missile attacks and the appropriate level of investment for the United States to defend against such attacks. The book provides an assessment of deterrence and the performance of the Patriot missiles during the 1991 Gulf War, critiques the Strategic Defense Initiative, and analyzes the prospects for new types of short-range and intercontinental missile defenses.

Why adopt a poststructural lens for the reading of the military strategy of national missile defence (NMD)? No doubt, when contemplating an attack on US territory by intercontinental ballistic missiles, consulting Michel Foucault and critical international relations theory scholars may not seem the obvious route to take. The answer to this lies in another question: why has there been so much interest and continuous investment in NMD deployment when there is such ambiguity surrounding the status of threat to which it responds, controversy over its technological feasibility and concern about its cost? Posed in this manner, the question cannot be answered on its own terms – the terms given in official accounts of NMD that justify the system’s significance on the basis of strategic feasibility studies and conventional threat predictions guided by worst-case scenarios. Instead, this book argues that the preferences leading to NMD deployment must be understood as satisfying requirements beyond strategic approaches and issues. In turning towards the interpretative modes of inquiry provided by critical social theory and poststructuralism, this book contests the conventional wisdom about NMD and suggests reading the strategy in terms of US identity. Presented as an analysis of discourses on threats to national security, around which the need for NMD deployment is predominantly framed, this book is an effort to let the two fields of critical international relations theory and US foreign policy speak directly to each other. It seeks to do so by showing how the concept of identity can be harnessed to an analysis of a contemporary military-strategic practice.

This book discusses most recent developments in the area of US ballistic missile defense with an eye on its battlefield capacities since the Kuwait war, analyzed from the perspective of deterrence postures encompassing the key post-Cold War security challenges (Middle East, Far East, Eastern Europe). The analyzed cases of missile defense engagements included (after the Desert Storm), Operation Iraqi Freedom, Israeli operations against Hamas and Yemen war. The theoretical base of the book relied on the waves of deterrence theory since the early years of the nuclear age through the deployment of thermonuclear warheads, nuclear plenty and the late Cold War revisions of deterrence paradigms. The main body of the book is exploring the historical and probabilistic evidence on missile defense accuracy in various scenarios of its employment and differing layered short, medium and long range systems of the US counter-ballistic technologies. Historically, the missile defense investments since the early thermonuclear range were challenging the Mutual Assured Destruction paradigm. Notably, after partial marginalization of US long range missile defense concepts of the 1960s, seen as incompatible with 1972 Anti-ballistic missile treaty between the US and USSR, missile defense constructions were reinvigorated through Reagan's 1983 Strategic Defense Initiative, while post-1976 Patriot tactical air and missile defense were gradually winning arms contracts, as in the post Cold War age the value of extended deterrence grew. New post-Cold War missile defense investments included the Middle Eastern US allies, as well as Japan and South Korea threatened by DPRK nuclear and ballistic experiments. Importantly, the value of extended missile defense engagements became broader visible in the era of New Cold War between Russia and the West, when new Aegis Ashore bases in Romania and Poland proved the theater range missile defense capacity of new NATO members. Grzegorz Nycz, Ph.D. is adjunct professor at the Pedagogical University of Cracow's Institute of Political Science. He graduated from Jagiellonian University and Cracow University of Economics. Ryoichi Sasakawa Young Leaders Fellowship Fund Fellow 2007/2008. His research refers to U.S. security and foreign policy, with a special focus on nuclear deterrence and ballistic missile defense postures. His recent publications include monographs on strategic balance and U.S. national security policy and texts in periodicals related to ballistic missile defense investments, as well as U.S. military-political engagements in Eastern Europe, Middle East and East Asia in the time of the "New Cold War" between Russia and the West.

2019 Missile Defense Review - January 2019 According to a senior administration official, a number of new technologies are highlighted in the report. The review looks at "the comprehensive environment the United States faces, and our allies and partners face. It does posture forces to be prepared for capabilities that currently exist and that we anticipate in the future." The report calls for major investments from both new technologies and existing systems. This is a very important and insightful report because many of the cost assessments for these technologies in the past, which concluded they were too expensive, are no longer applicable. Why buy a book you can download for free? We print this book so you don't have to. First you gotta find a good clean (legible) copy and make sure it's the latest version (not always easy). Some documents found on the web are missing some pages or the image quality is so poor, they are difficult to read. We look over each document carefully and replace poor quality images by going back to the original source document. We proof each document to make sure it's all there - including all changes. If you find a good copy, you could print it using a network printer you share with 100 other people (typically its either out of paper or toner). If it's just a 10-page document, no problem, but if it's 250-pages, you will need to punch 3 holes in all those pages and put it in a 3-ring binder. Takes at least an hour. It's much more cost-effective to just order the latest version from Amazon.com This book includes original commentary which is copyright material. Note that government documents are in the public domain. We print these large documents as a service so you don't have to. The books are compact, tightly-bound, full-size (8 1/2 by 11 inches), with large text and glossy covers. 4th Watch Publishing Co. is a HUBZONE SDVOSB. https: //usgovpub.com

Defense against nuclear attack—so natural and seemingly so compelling a goal—has provoked debate for at least twenty years. Ballistic missle defense systems, formerly called antiballistic missile systems, offer the prospect of remedying both superpowers' alarming vulnerability to nuclear weapons by technological rather than political means. But whether ballistic missile defenses can be made to work and whether it is wise to build them remain controversial. The U.S.-Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 restricts testing and deployment of ballistic missile defenses but has not prohibited more than a decade of research and development on both sides. As exotic new proposals are put forward for space-based directed-energy systems, questions about the effectiveness and wisdom of missile defense have again become central to the national debate on defense policy. This study, jointly sponsored by the Brookings Institution and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, examines the strategic, technological, and political issues raised by ballistic missile defense. Eight contributors take an analytical approach to their areas of expertise, which include the relationship of missile defense to nuclear strategy, the nature and potential applications of current and future technologies, the views on missile defense in the Soviet Union and among the smaller nuclear powers, the meaning of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty for today's technology, and the present role and historical legacy of ballistic missile defense in the context of East-West relations. The volume editors give a comprehensive introduction to this wide range of subjects and an assessment of future prospects. In the final chapter, nine knowledgeable observers offer their varied personal views on the ballistic missile defense question.