In this revised edition of his acclaimed 1985 volume, incorporating newly declassified secret Russian as well as American materials, Raymond Garthoff reexamines the historical development of American-Soviet relations from 1969 through 1980. The book takes into account both the broader context of world politics and internal political considerations and developments, and examines these developments as experienced by both sides. Despite a long history as rivals and adversaries, the U.S. and the Soviet Union reached a ditente in relations in 1972. From 1975 to 1979, however, this ditente gradually eroded until it collapsed in the wake of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Garthoff recounts how differences in ideology, perceptions, aims, and interests were key determinants of both U.S. and Soviet policies. Involvements in Europe, with China, and in the third world further entangled their relations. And each saw the other not only as harboring hostile intentions but also as building military and other capabilities to support such aims. Ditente--as well as confrontation--remained an alternative only within the constraints of a continuing cold war. Praise for the first edition: "A gold mine of information." The New York Times Book Review "A monumental contribution offering insightful, rarely considered comparisons of Soviet and American perspectives." Library Journal Praise for the revised edition: "This unprecedented, detailed volume adds invaluable new information to the public knowledge and the historical record." Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin

A critical issue in the origins of the Cold War—the development of Soviet—American conflict over Eastern Europe from 1941 to 1945—is the subject of Lynn Etheridge Davis's book. Disagreeing with those writers who argue that conflict arose from the determination of the United States to obtain economic markets in Europe or from imprecise assessments of Soviet security interests, the author describes how the United States made an initial commitment to the Atlantic Charter principles in 1941, then continued to promote the creation of representative governments in Eastern Europe without clearly identifying American interests or foreseeing the consequences of these actions. Using recently released documents of the Departments of State and War, Professor Davis explains how the views of U.S. officials on postwar peace precluded approval of Soviet efforts to establish a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe through the imposition of Communist regimes. She describes how American officials interpreted Soviet actions as intent to expand into Western Europe and how the subsequent undermining of Allied cooperation around the world led to the Cold War. Originally published in 1974. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

"Here Winkler argues that in contrast to conventional diplomatic channels, Soviet and American naval offices, sharing bonds inherent in seamen, were able to put ideology aside and speak frankly. Working together, they limited incidents that might have had unfortunate consequences."--BOOK JACKET.

This report is intended to provide a brief historical perspective of the evolution of the interacademy program during the past half-century, recognizing that many legacies of the Soviet era continue to influence government approaches in Moscow and Washington and to shape the attitudes of researchers toward bilateral cooperation in both countries (of special interest is the changing character of the program during the age of perestroika (restructuring) in the late 1980s in the Soviet Union); to describe in some detail the significant interacademy activities from late 1991, when the Soviet Union fragmented, to mid-2003; and to set forth lessons learned about the benefits and limitations of interacademy cooperation and to highlight approaches that have been successful in overcoming difficulties of implementation.

For half a century, the United States and the Soviet Union were in conflict. But how and where did the Cold War begin? Jamil Hasanli answers these intriguing questions in At the Dawn of the Cold War. He argues that the intergenerational crisis over Iranian Azerbaijan (1945–1946) was the first event that brought the Soviet Union to a confrontation with the United States and Britain after the period of cooperation between them during World War II. Based on top-secret archive materials from Soviet and Azerbaijani archives as well as documents from American, British, and Iranian sources, the book details Iranian Azerbaijan's independence movement, which was backed by the USSR, the Soviet struggle for oil in Iran, and the American and British reactions to these events. These events were the starting point of the longer historical period of unarmed conflict between the Soviets and the West that is now known as the Cold War. This book is a major contribution to our understanding of the Cold War and international politics following WWII.