In this work, the author contends that contrary to prevailing notions, Plato's 'Crito' does not show an allegiance between Socrates & the state that condemned him. Weiss brings to light numerous indications that Socrates & the Laws are not partners.

Classic from the year 2008 in the subject Philosophy - Philosophy of the 19th Century, - entries in the bibliography, language: English, abstract: First published in 1861. There are few circumstances among those which make up the present condition of human knowledge, more unlike what might have been expected, or more significant of the backward state in which speculation on the most important subjects still lingers, than the little progress which has been made in the decision of the controversy respecting the criterion of right and wrong. From the dawn of philosophy, the question concerning the summum bonum, or, what is the same thing, concerning the foundation of morality, has been accounted the main problem in speculative thought, has occupied the most gifted intellects, and divided them into sects and schools, carrying on a vigorous warfare against one another. And after more than two thousand years the same discussions continue, philosophers are still ranged under the same contending banners, and neither thinkers nor mankind at large seem nearer to being unanimous on the subject, than when the youth Socrates listened to the old Protagoras, and asserted (if Plato's dialogue be grounded on a real conversation) the theory of utilitarianism against the popular morality of the so-called sophist. ...]

In The Socratic Paradox and Its Enemies, Roslyn Weiss argues that the Socratic paradoxes—no one does wrong willingly, virtue is knowledge, and all the virtues are one—are best understood as Socrates’ way of combating sophistic views: that no one is willingly just, those who are just and temperate are ignorant fools, and only some virtues (courage and wisdom) but not others (justice, temperance, and piety) are marks of true excellence. In Weiss’s view, the paradoxes express Socrates’ belief that wrongdoing fails to yield the happiness that all people want; it is therefore the unjust and immoderate who are the fools. The paradoxes thus emerge as Socrates’ means of championing the cause of justice in the face of those who would impugn it. Her fresh approach—ranging over six of Plato’s dialogues—is sure to spark debate in philosophy, classics, and political theory. “Regardless of whether one agrees or disagrees with Weiss, it would be hard not to admire her extraordinarily penetrating analysis of the many overlapping and interweaving arguments running through the dialogues.”—Daniel B. Gallagher, Classical Outlook “Many scholars of Socratic philosophy . . . will wish they had written Weiss's book, or at least will wish that they had long ago read it.”—Douglas V. Henry, Review of Politics

This book offers a controversial interpretation of Plato's Apology of Socrates. By paying unusually close attention to what Socrates indicates about the meaning and extent of his irony, David Leibowitz arrives at unconventional conclusions about Socrates' teaching on virtue, politics, and the gods; the significance of his famous turn from natural philosophy to political philosophy; and the purpose of his insolent 'defense speech'. Leibowitz shows that Socrates is not just a colorful and quirky figure from the distant past but an unrivaled guide to the good life - the thoughtful life - who is as relevant today as in ancient Athens. On the basis of his unconventional understanding of the dialogue as a whole, and of the Delphic oracle story in particular, Leibowitz shows that the Apology is the key to the Platonic corpus, indicating how many of the disparate themes and apparently contradictory conclusions of the other dialogues fit together.

Between Socrates and the Many: A Study of Plato’s Crito is foremost concerned with Plato’s character, Crito. By focusing on its namesake, Hoffpauir draws attention to aspects of the Crito that may otherwise go unnoticed or underrated: justice, as most know it, seems unjust, and justice, as Socrates knows it, seems impossible; love of one’s own, as most know it, limits one’s own good and the city’s good; and concern for the body and hatred of suffering undermine virtue. Through a consideration of the problems evinced by Crito—problems not peculiar to him or to his Athens—readers may gain a newfound appreciation of why Socrates’ arguments about living well fail. More importantly, by considering why Socrates must advance these arguments in the first place, readers may come to appreciate the strength of man’s natural resistance to that which is necessary for civilized life. Although Crito initially comes to sight as in-between Socrates and the many, as one who shares in the opinions of both, in the end, Crito reveals that all that is in-between Socrates and the many is an unbridgeable chasm.