This new IISS Strategic Dossier examines the recent development of Moscow’s armed forces and military capabilities. It analyses the aspirations underpinning Russia’s military reform programme and its successes as well as its failures. The book also provides insights into Russia’s operational use of its armed forces, including in the intervention in Syria, the goals and results of recent state armament programmes, and the trajectory of future developments. This full-colour volume includes more than 50 graphics, maps and charts and over 70 images, and contains chapters on: Russia's armed forces since the end of the Cold War Strategic forces Ground forces Naval forces Aerospace forces Russia’s approach to military decision-making and joint operations Economics and industry At a time when Russia’s relations with many of its neighbours are increasingly strained, and amid renewed concern about the risk of an armed clash, this dossier is essential reading for understanding the state,capabilities and future of Russia’s armed forces.

Russia's Armed Forces suffered badly following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The result was a hollowed-out military. Today, however, Russia once again has a capable military built on the back of sustained defence investment and reforms. While far smaller than Soviet military, Moscow's conventional armed forces again provide its leaders with a credible tool to threaten to use or exert military power. This book explores and evaluates the impact of modernisation on Russia's army, navy, air force, and its strategic forces, examining the key equipment improvements and structural changes that have been put in place. Each of the main arms of Russia's military is dealt with in a dedicated chapter detailing the effects of the reforms and renewed defence expenditure, and the resulting improvements in capability. Russia's recent combat experience in the Syrian civil war is considered as are the lessons senior military officials are drawing from the intervention. The text brings together Russian and Western military specialists in their respective fields to provide authoritative analysis of Russia's military capabilities today, to measure the extent of Moscow's progress, and to evaluate the implications of Russia's now credible military.

Russian annexation of Crimea and the subsequent air campaign over Syria took the world by surprise. The capabilities and efficiency of Moscow’s armed forces during both operations signalled to the world that Russia was back in business as a significant military actor on the international stage. In this cutting-edge study, Bettina Renz provides an in-depth and comprehensive analysis of Russia’s military revival under Putin’s leadership. Whilst the West must adjust to the reality of a modernised and increasingly powerful Russian military, she argues that the renaissance of Russian military might and its implications for the balance of global power can only be fully understood within a wider historical context. Assessing developments in Russian Great Power thinking, military capabilities, Russian strategic thought and views on the use of force throughout the post-Soviet era, the book shows that, rather than signifying a sudden Russian military resurgence, recent developments are consistent with longstanding trends in Russian military strategy and foreign policy.

The authors assess how Russian military forces are postured and resourced and how they are likely to operate. They also discuss the goals and effects of Russian military reform efforts, including initiatives that span all of the Russian armed forces’ services and independent branches. Touching on most of Russia’s armed forces’ major capabilities, the authors conclude with a look at how those capabilities are being integrated in practice.

This monograph examines the recent process of organizational change in the Russian ground forces. It begins by charting the whole post-Soviet military reform debate. This debate was dominated, on the one hand, by those seeking to make the armed forces more professional, flexible, and adroit -- and thus better suited to the security demands of a major 21st-century power -- and, on the other hand, by senior military figures wedded to the concepts of mass and a conscript based military. It was actually only after the war with Georgia in 2008, and when military opposition was weakened, that change within the ground forces could begin in earnest. New command tiers were established, divisions became brigades, and the idea of absorbing professional soldiers into the ground forces was refined. The problems of generating a suitable corps of non-commissioned officers, of training suitable officers, and of marrying equipment to strategic need are all issues covered here. This work concludes with the thought that even though the changes being introduced in the ground forces look dramatic, they cannot be implemented overnight. The road towards fundamental change where Russia's ground forces are concerned will be quite a long one.

In Crimea, Donbass, Aleppo, and over the English Channel, Russia is using its still-modernizing military to (re)gain territory, secure geopolitical access and influence, convey geopolitical strength domestically and internationally, and test the political resolve of others. While the Russians pose a real military threat to the United States and many European countries, the U.S. Army should ensure it prepares against Russian -and not Soviet - forces. This paper builds on tactical and operational analyses of how Russians approach war against a competing power to outline strategic implications for the U.S. Army. The paper concludes that understanding how Russians approach war, while keeping Russian successes and problems in context, will allow U.S. leaders to pursue military and political policies that maintain respect for this resurgent Russian power without overestimating Russia's military capabilities.This compilation also includes a reproduction of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.1. Russia Can and Will Prosecute a Different Type of Warfare than the United States * 2. Russia's Military Believes Nuclear War Could Be a Reality * 3. Russia's Post-2008 Military Modernization is Real, but it was Undertaken and Appears More Dramatic for a Host of Reasons * 4. Alternative Arguments * 5. Recommendations for the U.S. Army With Respect to Competing Powers * 6. ConclusionTo be able to deter, and defeat if needed, the Russian military, the U.S. Army must understand how Russians approach warfare - including how they man, train, equip, and organize their military - in addition to the Armed Forces' ongoing combat operations. Recent publications provide excellent tactical and operational analyses of the Russian military, including the Foreign Military Studies Office's (FMSO) 2017 report on The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces (hereafter, RWW). In particular, RWW identifies important details on the Armed Forces' composition, structure, way of fighting, and modernization plans, stemming in part from Russia's real and perceived threats. The RWW also describes major reforms Russia began two months after it invaded Georgia in 2008.

Russia's political leaders are currently pushing a state- and society-wide process of modernization. The Russian military, a deeply conservative institution, is being asked to accept fundamental changes that threaten the very livelihoods of those being asked to implement them. New structures can be created and new equipment and technologies procured, but the crucial element is the degree to which such changes are accepted by the human element. This is often the most difficult aspect in any process of organizational change. It is no wonder that the military modernization process is progressing slowly in Russia. The Russian ground forces will not be very different in the next few years than they are now. Time and future investment will eventually produce the more refined army that a host of Russian politicians have wished to see. But it will take time and investment.