In July 1918, as the carnage of World War I continued, President Woodrow Wilson deployed U.S. troops to join other Allied forces in civil war-ravaged Russia. Ostensibly a mission to guard czarist military supplies and the Trans-Siberian Railroad, the true purpose of the Allied intervention was to help topple the nascent Bolshevik government. Dispatched to some of the most remote regions of the Russian wilderness-from the frigid port city of Archangel to Lake Baikal to Vladivostok-the U.S. troops encountered fierce resistance from Red Army units, partisans, and peasants. Using previously classified official records and the letters and diaries of Americans who served there, Robert L. Willett describes the suffering of the hundreds of American soldiers who fought and died in subzero conditions, both in combat and from disease. Expertly researched and provocatively written, this book is the first to describe in detail the experiences of the American doughboys who fought in this little-known campaign-a tragically misguided military action that established a legacy of distrust that defined U.S.-Soviet relations for the next seven decades.

"[This book] is a red flag to restore our historical consciousness about U.S.-Russian relations, and how denying this consciousness is leading to a repetition of past follies"--Amazon.com.

"This fascinating volume is a major contribution to our understanding of the Russian Revolution, from World War I to consolidation of the Bolshevik regime. The seven myths include the exaggeration of Rasputin's influence; a purported conspiracy behind the February Revolution; the treasonous Bolshevik dependence on German support; the multiple Anastasia pretenders to the royal inheritance; the antisemitic claims about 'Judeo-Bolsheviks'; distortions about America’s intervention in the civil war; and the 'inevitability' of Bolshevism. In each case the authors analyze the facts, uncover the origins of the myth, and trace its later perseverance (even in contemporary Russia). To assist readers, the volume includes three reference guides (people, terms, dates), nine maps, and twenty-nine illustrations. The result is immensely valuable for undergraduate courses in Russian history." —Gregory L. Freeze, Raymond Ginger Professor of History, Brandeis University

At the end of World War I, the U.S. Army 339th Infantry--nicknamed the "Polar Bears"--was deployed to northern Russia to prevent Allied supplies stockpiled near the port city of Archangel from falling into the hands of the Bolsheviks. Drawing on firsthand accounts from men in the regiment, their 18-month campaign is narrated from the point of view of the riflemen, NCOs and officers of companies I and M. Each chapter highlights an individual soldier's experience fighting the Red Army and the Arctic winter, a quarter century before the Cold War.

This in-depth exploration of five industries in the Kola Peninsula examines Soviet power and its interaction with the natural world.

“An intriguing and carefully argued entry into a small and often overlooked discussion of American political maneuvering at the end of World War I.” —Library Journal In a little-known episode at the height of World War I, President Woodrow Wilson dispatched thousands of American soldiers to Siberia. Carl J. Richard convincingly shows that Wilson’s original intent was to enable Czechs and anti-Bolshevik Russians to rebuild the Eastern Front against the Central Powers. But Wilson continued the intervention for a year and a half after the armistice in order to overthrow the Bolsheviks and to prevent the Japanese from absorbing eastern Siberia. As Wilson and the Allies failed to formulate a successful Russian policy at the Paris Peace Conference, American doughboys suffered great hardships on the bleak plains of Siberia. Richard argues that Wilson’s Siberian intervention ironically strengthened the Bolshevik regime it was intended to topple. Its tragic legacy can be found in the seeds of World War II—which began with an alliance between Germany and the Soviet Union, the two nations most aggrieved by Allied treatment after World War I—and in the Cold War, a forty-five year period in which the world held its collective breath over the possibility of nuclear annihilation. One of the earliest U.S. counterinsurgency campaigns outside the Western Hemisphere, the Siberian intervention was a harbinger of policies to come. Richard notes that it teaches invaluable lessons about the extreme difficulties inherent in interventions and about the absolute need to secure widespread support on the ground if such campaigns are to achieve success, knowledge that U.S. policymakers tragically ignored in Vietnam and have later struggled to implement in Iraq and Afghanistan.