A Brookings Institution Press and Centre for International Governance Innovation publication The global order is shifting. Even though no major war has intervened to reshape the architecture of the international order, the global financial crisis has accentuated the emergence of an enlarged global leadership. It is clear that change is afoot. The United States may be hanging on as the world's leading power, as the European Union remains an independent force in global politics, but a host of rising states—including China, India, and Brazil—clamor to be heard and take on bigger roles in world forums. Rising States, Rising Institutions features a panel of distinguished scholars who examine the forces at work: Gregory Chin (York University), Daniel W. Drezner(Tufts University), Thomas Hale (Princeton University), Andrew Hurrell (Oxford University), G. John Ikenberry (Princeton University), John Kirton (University of Toronto), Flynt Leverett (New America Foundation), Steven E. Miller (Harvard University), Andrew Moravcsik (Princeton University), Amrita Narlikar (Cambridge University), and Anne-Marie Slaughter (U.S. State Department). Together they analyze different models of international cooperation, the states that have most actively challenged the existing order, and leading and emergent international institutions such as the G-20, the nascent regime for sovereign wealth funds, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the entities organized to foster cooperation in the war on terror.

Research suggests that if the majority of a country's financial institutions are owned by the state, that country will experience slower financial development, less efficient financial systems, less private sector credit, and slower GDP growth. Yet more than 40 percent of the world's population live in countries in which public sector institutions dominate the banking system. In The Role of State-Owned Financial Institutions: Policy and Practice noted experts discuss the challenges presented by state-owned financial institutions and offer cross-disciplinary solutions for policymakers and banking regulators. The issues include: methods for effectively managing, reforming, and privatizing state-owned banks; the fiscal costs and contingent liabilities of state-owned banks; macroeconomic implications and the impact of state-owned banking on access to credit in an economy; guidance for effective supervision of state-owned banks; managerial perspectives on improving products, human resources, and risk; management case studies of different methods of privatization, such as initial public offerings, employee stock ownership plans, and strategic investors Contributors include David Binns (Beyster Institute), Robert Cull (World Bank), Ron Gilbert (ESOP Services), James A. Hanson (World Bank), Richard Hemming (International Monetary Fund), Fred Huibers (ING Research), Arminio Fraga (formerly Central Bank of Brazil), Nicholas Lardy (Institute for International Economics), David Marston (International Monetary Fund), Moody's Global Investor Service, Herman Mulder (ABN-Amro), William Nichol (Deutsche Bank AG), Urjit Patel (Infrastructure Development Finance Company, India), and P. S. Srinivas (World Bank).

As a stunning tide of democratization sweeps across much of the world, countries must cope with increasing problems of economic development, political and social integration, and greater public demand of scarce resources. That ability to respond effectively to these issues depends largely on the institutional choices of each of these newly democratizing countries. With critics of national political institutions in the United States arguing that the American separation-of-powers system promotes ineffectiveness and policy deadlock, many question whether these countries should emulate American institutions or choose parliamentary institutions instead. The essays in this book fully examine whether parliamentary government is superior to the separation-of-powers system through a direct comparison of the two. In addressing specific policy areas—such as innovation and implementation of energy policies after the oil shocks of 1970, management of societal cleavages, setting of government priorities in budgeting, representation of diffuse interest in environmental policy, and management of defense forces—the authors define capabilities that allow governments to respond to policy problems. Do Institutions Matter? includes case studies that bear important evidence on when and how institutions influence government effectiveness. The authors discover a widespread variation among parliamentary systems both in institutional arrangements and in governmental capabilities, and find that many of the failings of policy performance commonly attributed to American political institutions are in fact widely shared among western industrial countries. Moreover, they show how American political institutions inhibit some government capabilities while enhancing others. Changing American institutions to improve some aspects of governmental performance could hurt other widely valued capabilities. The authors draw important guidelines for institutional reformers wh

A long-dominant reading of American politics holds that public policy in the United States is easily captured by special interest groups. Countering this view, Adam Sheingate traces the development of government intervention in agriculture from its nineteenth-century origins to contemporary struggles over farm subsidies. His considered conclusion is that American institutions have not given agricultural interest groups any particular advantages in the policy process, in part because opposing lobbies also enjoy access to policymakers. In fact, the high degree of conflict and pluralism maintained by American institutions made possible substantial retrenchment of the agricultural welfare state during the 1980s and 1990s. In Japan and France--two countries with markedly different institutional characters than the United States--powerful agricultural interests and a historically close relationship between farmers, bureaucrats, and politicians continue to preclude a roll-back of farm subsidies. This well-crafted study not only puts a new spin on agricultural policy, but also makes a strong case for the broader claim that the relatively decentralized American political system is actually less prone to capture and rule by subgovernments than the more centralized political systems found in France and Japan. Sheingate's historical, comparative approach also demonstrates, in a widely useful way, how past institutional developments shape current policies and options.

The effort to improve state institutions in post-conflict societies is a complicated business. Even when foreign intervention is carried out with the best of intentions and the greatest resources, it often fails. What can account for this failure? In Institution Building in Weak States, Andrew Radin argues that the international community’s approach to building state institutions needs its own reform. This innovative book proposes a new strategy, rooted in a rigorous analysis of recent missions. In contrast to the common strategy of foreign interveners—imposing models drawn from Western countries—Radin shows how pursuing incremental change that accommodates local political interests is more likely to produce effective, accountable, and law-abiding institutions. Drawing on extensive field research and original interviews, Radin examines efforts to reform the central government, military, and police in post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Iraq, and Timor-Leste. Based on his own experience in defense reform in Ukraine after 2014, Radin also draws parallels with efforts to improve state institutions outside of post-conflict societies. Institution Building in Weak States introduces a domestic opposition theory that better explains why institution building fails and what is required to make it work. With actionable recommendations for smarter policy, the book offers an important corrective for scholars and practitioners of post-conflict missions, international development, peacebuilding, and security cooperation.

"Constructive engagement" became a catchphrase under the Clinton administration for America's reinvigorated efforts to pull China firmly into the international community as a responsible player, one that abides by widely accepted norms. Skeptics questioned the effectiveness of this policy and those that followed. But how is such socialization supposed to work in the first place? This has never been all that clear, whether practiced by the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Japan, or the United States. Social States is the first book to systematically test the effects of socialization in international relations--to help explain why players on the world stage may be moved to cooperate when doing so is not in their material power interests. Alastair Iain Johnston carries out his groundbreaking theoretical task through a richly detailed look at China's participation in international security institutions during two crucial decades of the "rise of China," from 1980 to 2000. Drawing on sociology and social psychology, this book examines three microprocesses of socialization--mimicking, social influence, and persuasion--as they have played out in the attitudes of Chinese diplomats active in the Conference on Disarmament, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban, the Convention on Conventional Weapons, and the ASEAN Regional Forum. Among the key conclusions: Chinese officials in the post-Mao era adopted more cooperative and more self-constraining commitments to arms control and disarmament treaties, thanks to their increasing social interactions in international security institutions.

The benefits of using technology to remake government seem almost infinite. The promise of such programs as user-friendly "virtual agencies" and portals where citizens can access all sections of government from a single website has excited international attention. The potential of a digital state cannot be realized, however, unless the rigid structures of the contemporary bureaucratic state change along with the times. Building the Virtual State explains how the American public sector must evolve and adapt to exploit the possibilities of digital governance fully and fairly. The book finds that many issues involved in integrating technology and government have not been adequately debated or even recognized. Drawing from a rich collection of case studies, the book argues that the real challenges lie not in achieving the technical capability of creating a government on the web, but rather in overcoming the entrenched organizational and political divisions within the state. Questions such as who pays for new government websites, which agencies will maintain the sites, and who will ensure that the privacy of citizens is respected reveal the extraordinary obstacles that confront efforts to create a virtual state. These political and structural battles will influence not only how the American state will be remade in the Information Age, but also who will be the winners and losers in a digital society.