Mobilizing more revenue is a priority for sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries. Countries have to finance their development agendas, and weak revenue mobilization is the root cause of fiscal imbalances in several countries. This paper reviews the experience of low-income SSA countries in mobilizing revenue in recent decades, with two broad aims: identify empirical norms of how much and how fast countries have been able to mobilize more revenue and empirical determinants (panel estimates) of revenue mobilization. The paper finds that (i) the frequency distribution of changes in revenue ratios for SSA low-income countries (LICs) peaks at a pace of about 1⁄2-2 percentage points of GDP in the short-to-medium term and at a pace of about 2-31⁄2 percentage points of GDP over the longer term, and that (ii) almost all SSA-LICs managed to increase revenue ratios by more than 2 percentage points of GDP in the short-to-medium term, at least once in the last two decades. The sustainability of large increases in revenue ratios can be an issue, in particular for fragile countries. The panel estimates suggest that structural factors, such as per capita GDP, share of agriculture in GDP, inflation, degree of openness, and rents received from natural resources, are important determinants of tax revenue.

Mobilizing more revenue is a priority for sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries. Countries have to finance their development agendas, and weak revenue mobilization is the root cause of fiscal imbalances in several countries. This paper reviews the experience of low-income SSA countries in mobilizing revenue in recent decades, with two broad aims: identify empirical norms of how much and how fast countries have been able to mobilize more revenue and empirical determinants (panel estimates) of revenue mobilization. The paper finds that (i) the frequency distribution of changes in revenue ratios for SSA low-income countries (LICs) peaks at a pace of about ½-2 percentage points of GDP in the short-to-medium term and at a pace of about 2-3½ percentage points of GDP over the longer term, and that (ii) almost all SSA-LICs managed to increase revenue ratios by more than 2 percentage points of GDP in the short-to-medium term, at least once in the last two decades. The sustainability of large increases in revenue ratios can be an issue, in particular for fragile countries. The panel estimates suggest that structural factors, such as per capita GDP, share of agriculture in GDP, inflation, degree of openness, and rents received from natural resources, are important determinants of tax revenue.

Effective domestic revenue mobilization has gained renewed urgency, especially in the light of the need to recover from the COVID-19 pandemic. In taxation debates, the 'informal sectors' have hitherto been assumed to be a part of the problem and implicitly mistaken for lucrative tax bases. First, I critically interrogate current conceptualizations of informality to highlight how the informality that materially affects revenue mobilization goes beyond the hitherto narrow focus on the visible informal sectors. I then demonstrate that informality is only one among many factors negatively associated with tax revenue mobilization in sub-Saharan Africa. I also maintain that better scores on government quality and technology adoption in government systems can play a role in mitigating informality, but a limited one because deeper structural factors sustain informality. I argue for a re-articulation of the concept of informality when it is included in revenue mobilization research, including frank discussions on perennial measurement and data quality issues. Simultaneity in policy strategies is necessary, given that informality is multifaceted. It seems more appropriate to prioritize the securing of livelihoods and the building of local fiscal contracts, including on a quid-pro-quo basis, than tax surveillance, especially given that those who operate in shadow economies tend to be outside national safety nets.

The region is seeing a modest growth uptick, but this is not uniform and the medium-term outlook remains subdued. Growth is projected to rise to 3.4 percent in 2018, from 2.8 percent in 2017, on the back of improved global growth, higher commodity prices, and continued strong public spending. About 3⁄4 of the countries in the region are predicted to experience faster growth. Beyond 2018, growth is expected to plateau below 4 percent, modestly above population growth, reflecting continued sluggishness in the oil-exporting countries and sustained growth in non-resource-intensive countries. A number of countries (Burundi, DRC, South Sudan, and parts of the Sahel) remain locked in internal conflict resulting in record levels of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons, with adverse spillovers to neighboring countries.

This study examines the effect of ICT on tax revenue mobilisation in 23 sub-Saharan African countries between 2000 and 2020. To address our objectives, it utilises a feasible generalised least squares approach that accounts for both heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation challenges. Particularly, six measures of ICT (import of ICT goods, export of ICT goods, ICT trade, internet penetration, mobile phone penetration, and aggregate ICT index) and six tax measures (total tax, direct tax, indirect tax, taxes on income, profit, and capital gains, taxes on goods and services, and taxes on international trade) are explored in the study. The scatterplot result shows that several countries are characterised by low levels of ICT development and tax revenue mobilisation. From the FGLS estimation, the findings reveal that the import of ICT goods facilitates tax revenue mobilisation, while the export of ICT goods undermines tax revenue collection. However, the overall ICT trade supports tax revenue mobilisation. Additionally, the levels of internet and mobile phone penetrations promote the mobilisation of tax revenue. At the disaggregated level, while importation of ICT goods inadequately enhances direct tax revenue, export of ICT goods has a drag effect on direct tax revenue mobilisation. More so, internet and mobile penetrations majorly amplify direct tax revenue mobilisation in the region. Similarly, the aggregate ICT index promotes direct tax revenue mobilisation. Further evidence reveals that importation of ICT goods, internet and phone penetrations, and the aggregate ICT index magnify mobilisation of tax revenue, whereas exportation of ICT goods and ICT trade inhibit indirect tax revenue mobilisation. On the components of taxes, export of ICT goods, import of ICT goods, and ICT trade are TIPC-retarding, while internet and mobile phone subscriptions enhance both taxes on income, profit and capital gains, as well as taxes on goods and services. From the findings, policies promoting the expansion of ICT infrastructure are urgently needed to boost revenue collection in the region.

The region is seeing a modest growth uptick, but this is not uniform and the medium-term outlook remains subdued. Growth is projected to rise to 3? percent in 2018, from 2? percent in 2017, on the back of improved global growth, higher commodity prices, and continued strong public spending. About ¾ of the countries in the region are predicted to experience faster growth. Beyond 2018, growth is expected to plateau below 4 percent, modestly above population growth, reflecting continued sluggishness in the oil-exporting countries and sustained growth in non-resource-intensive countries. A number of countries (Burundi, DRC, South Sudan, and parts of the Sahel) remain locked in internal conflict resulting in record levels of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons, with adverse spillovers to neighboring countries.