How effective are democracy clauses of regional integration organizations (RIOs) in promoting democratization and democratic consolidation among member-states? RIOs are increasingly adopting "democracy only" clauses in their treaties, requiring democracy and political stability as a condition of membership. Stable democracy is a collective good for RIO members; without political stability, uncertainty regarding economic exchange increases, undermining the promise of integration. The presence of powerful countries may be necessary for the RIOs to legalize democratic conditionality. In this book, the authors argue that once established democracy clauses exert an independent influence in promoting and defending democratic norms and institutions within the member-states by increasing the transparency and credibility of democratic commitment and sanctions for violation. The findings based on the analysis of 40 RIOs around the world and in-depth analysis of the European Union, the Common Market of the South, and the Economic Community of West African States indicate that RIO democracy clauses help prevent democratic backsliding and coups and stimulate democratization and consolidation. With its global scope, originality, and theoretical rigor, this is the first book to catalogue democracy clauses adopted by RIOs worldwide with a thorough analysis of their effectiveness.

Combining normative analysis and theory-driven empirical research in a comparative framework, this volume clarifies and explains the connections between regional international governance, legitimacy and democracy. It focuses on the quality of democracy and the legitimacy of policy making in multilevel regional systems.

This paper examines the mechanisms by which democracy clauses promote democracy and domestic political stability. It begins by noting that political instability in one country can have a negative spillover and impede the economic success of regional integration. Domestic political instability may also hinder cooperation among member states. Thus, domestic political stability is a collective good for regional integration organization (RIO) member states. Legalizing democratic conditionality helps member states to overcome collective action problems and equips RIOs with the necessary credibility, justification, and tools for intervention in member states' domestic political affairs. In addition, RIOs deepen economic integration among member states, which in turn raises the stakes for the member states to collectively defend democratic institutions and inflates the costs of sanctions for countries under threat. We test the main arguments using data gathered for 40 RIOs in the world. The econometric analyses of RIO coup rates and democratic backsliding rates demonstrate that democracy clauses are indeed effective in preventing coups and backsliding within countries that are members of RIOs with such clauses. Moreover, an analysis of democratic gains indicates that democracy clauses are also effective in the promotion of democracy within RIO member states.

This paper examines the mechanisms by which democracy clauses promote democracy and domestic political stability. It begins by noting that political instability in one country can have a negative spillover and impede the economic success of regional integration. Domestic political instability may also hinder cooperation among member states. Thus, domestic political stability is a collective good for regional integration organization (RIO) member states. Legalizing democratic conditionality helps member states to overcome collective action problems and equips RIOs with the necessary credibility, justification, and tools for intervention in member states' domestic political affairs. In addition, RIOs deepen economic integration among member states, which in turn raises the stakes for the member states to collectively defend democratic institutions and inflates the costs of sanctions for countries under threat. We test the main arguments using data gathered for 40 RIOs in the world. The econometric analyses of RIO coup rates and democratic backsliding rates demonstrate that democracy clauses are indeed effective in preventing coups and backsliding within countries that are members of RIOs with such clauses. Moreover, an analysis of democratic gains indicates that democracy clauses are also effective in the promotion of democracy within RIO member states.

Based on cutting-edge research, this edited volume examines how citizens and political elites perceive the legitimacy of regional integration in Europe and the Americas. It analyses public opinion and political discourse on the EU, NAFTA and MERCOSUR, arguing that legitimation patterns shape the development of regional governance.