Two top economists outline distinctive approaches to post-crisis financial reform. Over the last few years, the financial sector has experienced its worst crisis since the 1930s. The collapse of major firms, the decline in asset values, the interruption of credit flows, the loss of confidence in firms and credit market instruments, the intervention by governments and central banks: all were extraordinary in scale and scope. In this book, leading economists Randall Kroszner and Robert Shiller discuss what the United States should do to prevent another such financial meltdown. Their discussion goes beyond the nuts and bolts of legislative and regulatory fixes to consider fundamental changes in our financial arrangements. Kroszner and Shiller offer two distinctive approaches to financial reform, with Kroszner providing a systematic analysis of regulatory gaps and Shiller addressing the broader concerns of democratizing and humanizing finance. After brief discussions by four commentators (Benjamin M. Friedman, George G. Kaufman, Robert C. Pozen, and Hal S. Scott), Kroszner and Shiller each offer a response to the other's proposals, creating a fruitful dialogue between two major figures in the field.

This volume focuses on constructing a safer and more efficient financial system based on the lessons learned from the financial debacles of the 1980s. The first essay discusses the economic and political forces both propelling and opposing widespread banking reform. The next two essays describe the intellectual history of the deposit insurance reform provisions of FDICIA, arguably the most important banking legislation since the Banking Act of 1933, discuss the weaknesses and strengths of these provisions and make recommendations for improving the effectiveness of the reforms. Theoretical and empirical evidence is then summarized and evaluated with respect to the costs and benefits of regulators granting forbearance to economically insolvent institutions. An analysis is given of the whys and hows of privatizing federal deposit insurance in case the reforms in FDICIA prove ineffective. An examination follows of the causes and consequences of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) debacle of the early 1990s and the implications for the supervision of foreign banks in the United States and elsewhere. Next the broader issue is discussed of whether U.S. financial markets affect the behavior of U.S. corporate managers, particularly whether they encourage managerial myopia. Without concluding whether such myopia exists, policy options are examined that would make financial markets more conducive to longer-term planning, including permitting banks to invest in corporate equity and thus monitor firms as owners as well as creditors.

Reforming U.S. financial market regulation: hearing before the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, United States Senate, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, first session, November 18, 2009.

"In the wake of the global financial crisis that began in 2008, offers a systematic overview of recent developments in regulatory frameworks in advanced and emerging-market countries, outlining challenges to improving regulation, markets, and access in developing economies"--Provided by publisher.

Reforming U.S. financial market regulation: hearing before the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, United States Senate, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, first session, November 18, 2009.

Reforming U.S. financial market regulation : hearing before the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, United States Senate, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, first session, November 18, 2009.