This volume examines how Imperial Russia's armed forces sought to adapt to the challenges of modern warfare. From Peter the Great to Nicholas II, rulers always understood the need to maintain an army and navy capable of preserving the empire's great power status. Yet they inevitably faced the dilemma of importing European military and technological innovations while keeping out political ideas that could challenge the autocracy's monopoly on power. Within the context of a constant race to avoid oblivion, the impulse for military renewal emerges as a fundamental and recurring theme in modern Russian history.

In the 1830s Russia was facing a crisis. The army was poorly organized, the administration was underdeveloped, inefficient, and corrupt, and the state was too poor to bear the strain. This crisis was the principal driving force behind Russia's reforms of the 1830s, and Nicholas' policies can only be understood within the context of that crisis. Within this context, Frederick Kagan's The Military Reforms of Nicholas I , examines Nicholas' fundamental reorganization of the Russian military administration from 1832-1836, bringing about the birth of the modern Russian army.

This psychologically penetrating revisionist account of the life and rule of Rusia's 18th-century Tsar-reformer develops an important theme - that is, what happens when the drive for "progress" is linked to an autocratic, expansionist impulse rather than to a larger goal of human emancipation? And, what has been the price of power - both for Peter and for Russia?

All the Tsar’s Men examines how institutional reforms designed to prepare the Imperial Russian Army for the modern battlefield failed to prevent devastating defeats in both the 1905 Russo-Japanese War and World War I. John W. Steinberg argues that the General Staff officers who devised new educational and doctrinal reforms had the experience, dedication, and leadership skills to defend the empire in the new age of warfare but were continually impeded by institutionalized inefficiency and rigid control from their superiors. These officers, he explains, were operating within a command structure unwilling to grant them the autonomy necessary to effect significant reform, which proved disastrous for the army and—ultimately—the empire.

The early modern Russian army emerged from contacts with Mongols, the Caucasus, and Siberia, yet held its own against adversaries such as Sweden, Turkey, and China.

Accessible to students, tourists and general readers alike, this book provides a broad overview of Russian history since the ninth century. Paul Bushkovitch emphasizes the enormous changes in the understanding of Russian history resulting from the end of the Soviet Union in 1991. Since then, new material has come to light on the history of the Soviet era, providing new conceptions of Russia's pre-revolutionary past. The book traces not only the political history of Russia, but also developments in its literature, art and science. Bushkovitch describes well-known cultural figures, such as Chekhov, Tolstoy and Mendeleev, in their institutional and historical contexts. Though the 1917 revolution, the resulting Soviet system and the Cold War were a crucial part of Russian and world history, Bushkovitch presents earlier developments as more than just a prelude to Bolshevik power.

In the 1830s Russia was facing a crisis. The army was poorly organized, the administration was underdeveloped, inefficient, and corrupt, and the state was too poor to bear the strain. This crisis was the principal driving force behind Russia's reforms of the 1830s, and Nicholas' policies can only be understood within the context of that crisis. Within this context, Frederick Kagan's text examines Nicholas' fundamental reorganization of the Russian military administration from 1832-1836, bringing about the birth of the modern Russian army.