Public choice is the study of behavior at the intersection of economics and political science. Since the pioneering work of Duncan Black in the 1940s, public choice has developed a rich literature, drawing from such related perspectives as history, philosophy, law, and sociology, to analyze political decision making (by citizen-voters, elected officials, bureaucratic administrators, lobbyists, and other "rational" actors) in social and economic context, with an emphasis on identifying differences between individual goals and collective outcomes. Constitutional political economy provides important insights into the relationship between effective constitutions and the behavior of ordinary political markets. In Readings in Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy, Charles Rowley and Friedrich Schneider have assembled an international array of leading authors to present a comprehensive and accessible overview of the field and its applications. Covering a wide array of topics, including regulation and antitrust, taxation, trade liberalization, political corruption, interest group behavior, dictatorship, and environmental issues, and featuring biographies of the founding fathers of the field, this volume will be essential reading for scholars and students, policymakers, economists, sociologists, and non-specialist readers interested in the dynamics of political economy.

Five of the papers were originally developed at a symposium on government, the economy, and the constitution sponsored by the Policy Sciences Program of Florida State University in March 1986 and subsequently published in the Cato journal, fall 1987. Includes bibliographies and indexes.

Constitutional political economy is a research program that directs inquiry to the working properties of rules and institutions within which individuals interact and to the processes through which these rules and institutions are chosen or come into being. This book makes the case for an approach to constitutional political economy that is grounded in consistent, hard-nosed public choice analysis. Effective institutional design is simply not feasible unless the designers build their structures to withstand rational choice pressures from the political market place. If mean, sensual man is here to stay, then let us, in our better moments, incorporate that knowledge into the institutions that must govern his behavior. A distinguished list of public choice scholars pursue this approach against a varying backcloth of constitutional issues relevant to the United States, Canada, Western Europe, the transition economies and the third world.

"Bristlecone books." Includes bibliographical references and index.

Using public choice economic methods, this Advanced Introduction presents a focused narrative about political decision-making based on the work that has defined the discipline. Each chapter ends with a Notes section to discuss the research on which the chapter is based, with an emphasis on the pioneering work that has shaped the development of public choice. Randall G. Holcombe emphasizes the theoretical foundations of public choice, with the idea that it offers a context within which empirical research can be understood. This book successfully explores the political decision-making process for readers and ensures that they understand how preferences of citizens are aggregated to produce public policies.

This book represents a considerable revision and expansion of Public Choice II (1989). Six new chapters have been added, and several chapters from the previous edition have been extensively revised. The discussion of empirical work in public choice has been greatly expanded. As in the previous editions, all of the major topics of public choice are covered. These include: why the state exists, voting rules, federalism, the theory of clubs, two-party and multiparty electoral systems, rent seeking, bureaucracy, interest groups, dictatorship, the size of government, voter participation, and political business cycles. Normative issues in public choice are also examined including a normative analysis of the simple majority rule, Bergson–Samuelson social welfare functions, the Arrow and Sen impossibility theorems, Rawls's social contract theory and the constitutional political economy of Buchanan and Tullock.

The two volume Oxford Handbook of Public Choice provides a comprehensive overview of the Public Choice literature. Volume 2 covers constitutional political economy and applications of public-choice models to various policy areas. Part V has chapters on the architecture of governance, the theory of dictatorship, and the effects of the institutions of governance. Part VI discusses the politics of public policy, international public choice, public choice and history, and measurement issues. The volume touches on topics such as taxation, redistribution, federalism, and monetary policy. It ends with discussions of various methodological approaches, including extensions of the core models to account for altruism and trust, and overviews of measurement and estimation issues, and the use of experiments in public-choice research.