"On January 6 we witnessed what many of us consider a failed insurrection at the US Capitol. But others think this was political violence in service of the preservation of our democracy. When did our political views become extreme? When did guns and violence become a feature of American politics? Nathan Kalmoe and Lily Mason have been researching the increase in radical partisanship in American politics and the associated increasing propensity to support or engage in violence through a series of surveys and survey experiments for several years. Kalmoe and Mason argue that many Americans have become increasingly radical in their identification with their political party and more inclined to view partisans of the other party negatively as people. Their reactions to opposing political views give little room for respect or compromise and make increasing numbers of Americans more likely to either participate in political violence or to view those who do so on behalf of their party favorably. They also find that radical partisans are more apt to be receptive to messages from radical political leaders and less receptive to conflicting information and views. Radical partisanship and political violence are not new to the United States. In most of the 20th century we experienced less radical partisanship, with measures of attitudes towards partisans of other parties that were not as extreme as we see now but this has not been the case throughout much of American history, as witness the fight over slavery that led to the Civil War as well as the violence associated with racism after the fall of reconstruction to the present day"--

The psychology behind political partisanship: “The kind of research that will change not just how you think about the world but how you think about yourself.” —Ezra Klein, Vox Political polarization in America has moved beyond disagreements about matters of policy. For the first time in decades, research has shown that members of both parties hold strongly unfavorable views of their opponents. This is polarization rooted in social identity, and it is growing. The campaign and election of Donald Trump laid bare this fact of the American electorate, its successful rhetoric of “us versus them” tapping into a powerful current of anger and resentment. With Uncivil Agreement, Lilliana Mason looks at the growing social gulf across racial, religious, and cultural lines, which have recently come to divide neatly between the two major political parties. She argues that group identifications have changed the way we think and feel about ourselves and our opponents. Even when Democrats and Republicans can agree on policy outcomes, they tend to view one other with distrust and to work for party victory over all else. Although the polarizing effects of social divisions have simplified our electoral choices and increased political engagement, they have not been a force that is, on balance, helpful for American democracy. Bringing together theory from political science and social psychology, Uncivil Agreement clearly describes this increasingly “social” type of polarization, and adds much to our understanding of contemporary politics.

What happens when partisanship is pushed to its extreme? In With Ballots and Bullets, Nathan P. Kalmoe combines historical and political science approaches to provide new insight into the American Civil War and deepen contemporary understandings of mass partisanship. The book reveals the fundamental role of partisanship in shaping the dynamics and legacies of the Civil War, drawing on an original analysis of newspapers and geo-coded data on voting returns and soldier enlistments, as well as retrospective surveys. Kalmoe shows that partisan identities motivated mass violence by ordinary citizens, not extremists, when activated by leaders and legitimated by the state. Similar processes also enabled partisans to rationalize staggering war casualties into predetermined vote choices, shaping durable political habits and memory after the war's end. Findings explain much about nineteenth century American politics, but the book also yields lessons for today, revealing the latent capacity of political leaders to mobilize violence.

Drawing on extensive research and national survey data, sociologist Donald I. Warren here presents an in-depth analysis of the Middle American Radicals, who they are, what they believe, the major targets of their grievances, and the likelihood of their political mobilization. The evidence indicates that as many as one in five Americans shares the Radical Center perspective, including people who outwardly seem to have very little in common by way of economic, occupational, or education status. Of particular significance are the findings concerning potential support for the various presidential candidates and for a third national political party.

In this revisionary study, Barbara Foley challenges prevalent myths about left-wing culture in the Depression-era U.S. Focusing on a broad range of proletarian novels and little-known archival material, the author recaptures an important literature and rewrites a segment of American cultural history long obscured and distorted by the anti-Communist bias of contemporaries and critics. Josephine Herbst, William Attaway, Jack Conroy, Thomas Bell and Tillie Olsen, are among the radical writers whose work Foley reexamines. Her fresh approach to the U.S. radicals' debates over experimentalism, the relation of art to propaganda, and the nature of proletarian literature recasts the relation of writers to the organized left. Her grasp of the left's positions on the "Negro question" and the "woman question" enables a nuanced analysis of the relation of class to race and gender in the proletarian novel. Moreover, examining the articulation of political doctrine in different novelistic modes, Foley develops a model for discussing the interplay between politics and literary conventions and genres. Radical Representations recovers a literature of theoretical and artistic value meriting renewed attention form those interested in American literature, American studies, the U. S. left, and cultural studies generally.

Today, in growing numbers, from kitchen tables to nonprofit organizations to corporate boards, Americans are turning away from the bickering and division of politics as usual and turning toward a new politics-what activist-turned-attorney Mark Satin christens here as "radical middle" politics.Instead of the usual blame games, the radical middle appreciates the genuine and often very reasonable concerns of the left and right, which many of those disillusioned with political partisanship will find refreshing. As the nation heads into the 2004 presidential election, the radical middle dares to propose bold and innovative solutions to problems that affect us all, from health care reform to corporate accountability to the fight against terrorism.Radical Middle offers an innovative yet practical handbook that addresses many of the most vexing social problems of our time. A whole new movement is on the march-the radical middle movement-and this is its manifesto. It shows how to understand politics, how to quiet the din of overheated rhetoric, and how to make modern politics reflect the true expression of rational and creative people everywhere.

The growing ideological gulf between Democrats and Republicans is one of the biggest issues in American politics today. Our legislatures, composed of members from two sharply disagreeing parties, are struggling to function as the founders intended them to. If we want to reduce the ideological gulf in our legislatures, we must first understand what has caused it to widen so much over the past forty years. Andrew B. Hall argues that we have missed one of the most important reasons for this ideological gulf: the increasing reluctance of moderate citizens to run for office. While political scientists, journalists, and pundits have largely focused on voters, worried that they may be too partisan, too uninformed to vote for moderate candidates, or simply too extreme in their own political views, Hall argues that our political system discourages moderate candidates from seeking office in the first place. Running for office has rarely been harder than it is in America today, and the costs dissuade moderates more than extremists. Candidates have to wage ceaseless campaigns, dialing for dollars for most of their waking hours while enduring relentless news and social media coverage. When moderate candidates are unwilling to run, voters do not even have the opportunity to send them to office. To understand what is wrong with our legislatures, then, we need to ask ourselves the question: who wants to run? If we want more moderate legislators, we need to make them a better job offer.