The fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL) provides an update and revision of monetary theory to address puzzles raised by the failure of both the new Keynesian theory (commonly used by central bankers) and neoclassical monetarism (in particular, the quantity theory of money as interpreted by Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz)—puzzles such as the low inflation that followed the sustained expansionary monetary policies post-2008. We aim to summarize and explain the FTPL as developed by Eric Leeper, John Cochrane, and others. The FTPL builds on neoclassical monetarism by observing that government liabilities—bonds, notes, bills, and currency—derive their value from the assets that back these liabilities. These assets are chiefly the present value of future tax revenues, minus government spending other than that part of spending used to service the liabilities themselves. This net “profit” of the government is called the primary surplus. This primary surplus can be expressed in real terms (a quantity of goods and services, rather than a money amount). The total real value of the bonds is thus the total real value of the assets backing the bonds: the present value of all future real primary surpluses (which we shorten to PVFS, present value of future surpluses). In a very important sense, the FTPL harkens back to commodity-based theories of money, except now the “commodity” is the real value of future surpluses earned by the government. We can then solve for the price level. It is simply the nominal value of the bonds (the face value or number of bonds issued) divided by the real value of the bonds (the PVFS). If the nominal value of the bonds is held constant and the underlying asset (PVFS) becomes less valuable, prices go up. If the PVFS becomes more valuable, prices go down. We thus calculate the value of “money” (including government liabilities of all maturities) the way one would calculate the value of any security: through discounted cash flow analysis. Note that this approach is consistent with the QTM because, if money is defined in the traditional way as currency and demand deposits and we now hold the PVFS (the backing of the money) constant, then the price level is proportional to the amount of money in circulation. The FTPL is a more complete theory, however, because (1) it incorporates all government liabilities, not traditional money alone, and (2) because it is forward-looking and dynamic rather than considering only conditions in the present.

A comprehensive account of how government deficits and debt drive inflation Where do inflation and deflation ultimately come from? The fiscal theory of the price level offers a simple answer: Prices adjust so that the real value of government debt equals the present value of taxes less spending. Inflation breaks out when people don’t expect the government to fully repay its debts. The fiscal theory is well suited to today’s economy: Financial innovation undermines money demand, and central banks don’t control the money supply or aggressively change interest rates, invalidating classic theories, while large debts and deficits threaten inflation and constrain monetary policy. This book presents a comprehensive account of this important theory from one of its leading developers and advocates. John Cochrane aims to make fiscal theory useful as a conceptual framework and modeling tool, and for analyzing history and policy. He merges fiscal theory with standard models in which central banks set interest rates, giving a novel account of monetary policy. He generalizes the theory to explain data and make realistic predictions. For example, inflation decreases in recessions despite deficits because discount rates fall, raising the value of debt; specifying that governments promise to partially repay debt avoids classic puzzles and allows the theory to apply at all times, not just during periods of high inflation. Cochrane offers an extensive rethinking of monetary doctrines and institutions through the eyes of fiscal theory, and analyzes the era of zero interest rates and post-pandemic inflation. Filled with research by Cochrane and others, The Fiscal Theory of the Price Level offers important new insights about fiscal and monetary policy.

The Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL) is the claim that, in a popular class of theoretical models, the price level is sometimes determined by fiscal policy rather than monetary policy. The models where this claim has been established assume that all decisions are made by an infinitely-lived representative agent. We present an alternative, arguably more realistic model, populated by sixty-two generations of people. We calibrate our model to an income profile from U.S. data and we show that the FTPL breaks down. In our model, the price level and the real interest rate are indeterminate, even when monetary and fiscal policy are both active. Our findings challenge established views about what constitutes a good combination of fiscal and monetary policies.

Martin Bronfenbrenner in the Journal of Finance had this to say when the book was first released: "A thoughtful, scholarly, and systematic treatise on the economics of inflation. If this reviewer were asked to hang a course on inflation theory upon one single text, it would almost certainly be this one." The principal concern of this book is to set out the elements that enter into problems of analyzing inflation. This detailed, readable review of contemporary theory on the problems of inflation fills an important gap in the literature on macro-economics that: 1) assesses the implications of inflationary processes for economic policy; 2) synthesizes a general framework within which to illustrate inflationary processes; 3) reconciles the approaches of "demand inflation" and "cost inflation"; and 4) analyzes the determination and behavior of the general price level in an exchange economy.

In 2001, Martin Leibowitz organized an Equity Risk Premium (ERP) Forum for CFA Institute, in which the participants discussed issues related to the ERP and made estimates for the future. This forum was repeated by Leibowitz, Brett Hammond, and Laurence Siegel in 2011, setting a precedent for a decennial forum. Siegel organized and moderated the discussion in 2021, and the proceedings from that event make up the current book. The participants in 2021 were (in alphabetical order) Robert Arnott, Clifford Asness, Mary Ida Compton, Elroy Dimson, William Goetzmann, Roger Ibbotson, Antti Ilmanen, Martin Leibowitz, Rajnish Mehra, Thomas Philips, and Jeremy Siegel. Each participant made a presentation, which was then discussed by the whole group. Finally, a roundtable discussion involving all of the participants was moderated by Laurence Siegel. Ibbotson and Dimson discussed historical returns in different countries. Ibbotson focused on the United States, while Dimson took a global industrial-country view. The history goes back almost a century (Ibbotson) or more than a century (Dimson), providing a look at how returns have evolved over a wide variety of conditions. Ibbotson also presented his method for making probabilistic forecasts of returns. Dimson, who is British, showed that “American exceptionalism” is one way to understand the results. Asness looked at the effectiveness of Robert Shiller’s CAPE (cyclically adjusted price-earnings ratio) valuation measure for forecasting. Valuations rose over the period he studied, and a lively discussion was had about why this may have occurred. Arnott focused on the growth rate of dividends, which has been very slow in per-share terms, and argued (with much debate from the other participants) that buybacks are only a partial substitute for dividends. Leibowitz, also looking at valuation as the lodestone of return forecasts, set forth a “growth adjustment” that brought his forecast in line with those made by others. Compton, a consultant to pension plans, discussed the challenges of communicating lower expected returns to clients. She also emphasized that expected returns “don’t always come true,” they’re just someone’s best forecast. Ilmanen broke up the expected return into its component parts: dividends, real growth, inflation, and so forth. Doing this, he said, allows one to debate the estimates for each part and ascertain how accurate each of the estimates is. Philips started by presenting a method for forecasting bond returns. He then turned to equities, for which he compared forecasts with subsequent realizations using a variety of forecast methods. Mehra discussed a number of issues related to the existence of premiums (equity risk, value, small cap, and so forth) and concluded that, although some of these are unstable, the ERP is highly stable. Jeremy Siegel advocated a “back to basics” approach using dividend and earnings yields, dividend and earnings growth rates, payout ratios, and price-to-earnings ratios. He emphasized that earnings can be calculated in a number of different way, and said that accounting practices have become more conservative over the years. Goetzmann concluded the session by reporting that one company, a water mill in France, had almost 600 years of historical return data and that an asset pricing model could be tested using those data. According to this model, the stock price is the present value of expected future dividends and is supported by the evidence. In sum, because of high valuations and low interest rates, the participants expect lower total returns in the future than in the past. A forward-looking ERP of 4% to 5% was the consensus of the group.

High public debt often produces the drama of default and restructuring. But debt is also reduced through financial repression, a tax on bondholders and savers via negative or belowmarket real interest rates. After WWII, capital controls and regulatory restrictions created a captive audience for government debt, limiting tax-base erosion. Financial repression is most successful in liquidating debt when accompanied by inflation. For the advanced economies, real interest rates were negative 1⁄2 of the time during 1945–1980. Average annual interest expense savings for a 12—country sample range from about 1 to 5 percent of GDP for the full 1945–1980 period. We suggest that, once again, financial repression may be part of the toolkit deployed to cope with the most recent surge in public debt in advanced economies.