Taiwan has a special status for the United States, as both a leading high-technology economic partner and a place of political and security concern. The authors look at both the quantitative and qualitative evidence on the potential effects of a US-Taiwan free trade agreement (FTA), both for maximizing US economic benefits and for securing a prosperous and secure future for Taiwan. Their analysis indicates that the direct economic benefits of a prospective FTA would be modest and that the FTA could be most valuable to the United States if it leads Taiwan toward greater regional integration.

In this conference volume, distinguished economists and trade policymakers address the US initiatives to enter into free trade negotiations with a broad range of countries in the Asia-Pacific region, the Western Hemisphere, and Africa. The sheer number of these initiatives is unprecedented and has provoked major policy questions concerning US interests in the negotiations, the setting of priorities among the many contenders for concluding free trade agreements (FTAs) with the United States, the objectives of those trading partners, and the implications that these agreements could have for broader initiatives such as the Doha Round in the World Trade Organization and the Free Trade Area of the Americas. The papers in the volume were presented during a conference on FTAs and US trade policy, sponsored by the Institute in May 2003. The editor, Jeffrey Schott, summarizes the policy implications drawn from the conference papers and discussions, which are organized around several topics: the conceptual case for FTAs and how they have worked in the past; what FTAs imply for the broader global system; the specific agreements that are already being pursued (Australia, Central America, Morocco, southern Africa) or considered (ASEAN, Brazil, Egypt, Korea, and Taiwan). The volume includes a technical appendix with results of GTAP and gravity model simulations of the trade and welfare effects of the prospective agreements.

China and Taiwan have built one of the most intertwined and important economic relationships in the world, and yet that relationship is not mutually open, compliant with World Trade Organization norms, or even fully institutionalized. What's more, despite massive trade and investment flows, the boundary between the two is a serious flashpoint for potential conflict. But leaders in Beijing and Taipei have committed to normalize and deepen their economic intercourse and open a new post-Cold War era in their relationship. While the political significance of this gambit has captured attention worldwide, the scope of opening intended and the bilateral, regional, and global effects likely to ensue are as yet poorly understood. This volume attempts to remedy that uncertainty with careful modeling combined with a qualitative assessment of the implications of the cross-strait economic opening now agreed in an Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). The study explores the implications for Taiwan and China, for their neighbors, and for the United States if this undertaking is fully implemented by 2020.

Taiwan has a special status for the United States, as both a leading high-technology economic partner and a place of political and security concern. The authors look at both the quantitative and qualitative evidence on the potential effects of a US-Taiwan free trade agreement (FTA), both for maximizing US economic benefits and for securing a prosperous and secure future for Taiwan. Their analysis indicates that the direct economic benefits of a prospective FTA would be modest and that the FTA could be most valuable to the United States if it leads Taiwan toward greater regional integration.

Taiwan "is becoming the most dangerous flash point in the world for a possible war that involves the United States, China, and probably other major powers," warn Robert D. Blackwill, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy, and Philip Zelikow, University of Virginia White Burkett Miller professor of history. In a new Council Special Report, The United States, China, and Taiwan: A Strategy to Prevent War, the authors argue that the United States should change and clarify its strategy to prevent war over Taiwan. "The U.S. strategic objective regarding Taiwan should be to preserve its political and economic autonomy, its dynamism as a free society, and U.S.-allied deterrence-without triggering a Chinese attack on Taiwan." "We do not think it is politically or militarily realistic to count on a U.S. military defeat of various kinds of Chinese assaults on Taiwan, uncoordinated with allies. Nor is it realistic to presume that, after such a frustrating clash, the United States would or should simply escalate to some sort of wide-scale war against China with comprehensive blockades or strikes against targets on the Chinese mainland." "If U.S. campaign plans postulate such unrealistic scenarios," the authors add, "they will likely be rejected by an American president and by the U.S. Congress." But, they observe, "the resulting U.S. paralysis would not be the result of presidential weakness or timidity. It might arise because the most powerful country in the world did not have credible options prepared for the most dangerous military crisis looming in front of it." Proposing "a realistic strategic objective for Taiwan, and the associated policy prescriptions, to sustain the political balance that has kept the peace for the last fifty years," the authors urge the Joe Biden administration to affirm that it is not trying to change Taiwan's status; work with its allies, especially Japan, to prepare new plans that could challenge Chinese military moves against Taiwan and help Taiwan defend itself, yet put the burden of widening a war on China; and visibly plan, beforehand, for the disruption and mobilization that could follow a wider war, but without assuming that such a war would or should escalate to the Chinese, Japanese, or American homelands. "The horrendous global consequences of a war between the United States and China, most likely over Taiwan, should preoccupy the Biden team, beginning with the president," the authors conclude.

At publication date, a free ebook version of this title will be available through Luminos, University of California Press’s Open Access publishing program. Visit www.luminosoa.org to learn more. China’s relation to Taiwan has been in constant contention since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in October 1949 and the creation of the defeated Kuomintang (KMT) exile regime on the island two months later. The island’s autonomous sovereignty has continually been challenged, initially because of the KMT’s insistence that it continue to represent not just Taiwan but all of China—and later because Taiwan refused to cede sovereignty to the then-dominant power that had arisen on the other side of the Taiwan Strait. One thing that makes Taiwan so politically difficult and yet so intellectually fascinating is that it ­­is not merely a security problem, but a ganglion of interrelated puzzles. The optimistic hope of the Ma Ying-jeou administration for a new era of peace and cooperation foundered on a landslide victory by the Democratic Progressive Party, which has made clear its intent to distance Taiwan from China’s political embrace. The Taiwanese are now waiting with bated breath as the relationship tautens. Why did détente fail, and what chance does Taiwan have without it? Contributors to this volume focus on three aspects of the evolving quandary: nationalistic identity, social economy, and political strategy.