The assumption behind privatisation in eastern Europe and elsewhere is that private ownership improves corporate performance. We focus on comparing the performance of state firms with either private or privatised firms operating under reasonably similar conditions in three countries of eastern Europe. We supplement this comparison by an examination of the relative performance of privatised and state firms in the period before the former were privatised. Our empirical results confirm the hypothesis that the effect of ownership change is particularly pronounced on the revenue side of corporate performance. In general, we find that firms with outsider owners significantly outperform the firms with insider owners on most performance measures, and that the employees are particularly ineffective owners (indeed less effective than the state). Subscribe to publications email alerts.

Data on mid-sized firms i ...

Are resources allocated more efficiently through private ownership than through the public sector? The experiences of eleven newly privatised companies are examined to evaluate this hypothesis. With the Government's pro-privatization policies in place for over a decade, this is a prime time to evaluate theory versus reality.

September 1997 Data on mid-sized firms in three transition economies provide strong evidence that private ownership- for worker ownership- improves corporate performance. And the privatized firms' superior ability to generate revenues allows those firms to sustain or expand employment. Using a large sample of data on mid-sized firms in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, Frydman, Gray, Hessel, and Rapacynski compare the performance of privatized and state firms in the environment of the postcommunist transition. They find strong evidence that private ownership- for worker ownership- improves corporate performance. They find no evidence of the privatization shock that was supposed to afflict the behavior of firms undergoing rapid changes in ownership. Instead, they observe a severe shock from marketization, affecting both state and privatized firms- a shock for which private ownership provides a powerful antidote. Among their other findings: Private ownership is most effective in improving a firm's ability to generate revenues, an area in which entrepreneurship seems to be required. Ownership also affects a firm's ability to remove the rather obvious cost inefficiencies inherited from the past, but this effect is less pronounced, as both state and privatized firms engage in significant cost restructuring. Most important, privatized firms generate significantly more employment gains than state firms. It is their superior ability to generate revenues, rather than competence at cost-cutting, that allows them to sustain or expand employment. This is why privatization is the dominant strategy for expanding employment in transition. Outsider-owned firms perform better than insider-owned firms on most performance measures, but there is enough difference between employee- and manager-owned firms to suggest that putting all insiders under a common umbrella is unjustified. Although the effects of managerial ownership are ambiguous, putting employees in control appears to offer no advantages over state ownership on any measure and creates a distinct disadvantage in terms of employment performance. Among outsider owners, privatization funds seem to do as well at revitalizing the privatized companies as do other outsider owners; in particular, the authors find no evidence that funds are less effective than strategic investors. And foreign investors provide perhaps less of an edge than might have been expected; their impact appears no stronger than that of major domestic outsiders. This paper- product of the Development Research Group- part of a larger effort in the Bank to explore issues of corporate governance in transition economies. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under research project Corporate Governance in Central Europe (RPO 678-42).

Over the past decade economic policy in the UK and elsewhere has been guided by the belief that resources are used more efficiently in the private sector than under state ownership. Consequently, many formerly state-owned companies have been transferred to the private sector. After surveying the theoretical arguments for and against this hypothesis, this book examines the experience of eleven firms, including British Airways, Rolls-Royce and British Telecom. Various indicators are used to measure each firm's performance before and after privatisation to assess whether this policy has brought about improvements in efficiency. The first four chapters provide background material for the empirical work that follows. Chapter 1 outlines the theoretical arguments for and against the idea that private ownership will be more efficient than state control. Chapter 2 provides brief histories of the eleven organisations studied and chapter 3 discusses how their performance can be measured. Chapter 4 reviews the literature on the relative efficiency of public and private ownership. Chapter 5 considers the impact of privatisation on each of the eleven firms' labour and total factor productivity growth. Chapter 6 performs a similar analysis using two standard accounting ratios (value-added and the rate of profit). Chapter 7 assesses the impact of privatisation on technical efficiency using data envelopment analysis. In chapter 8 the impact of ownership on employment, wage levels and the distribution of business income is considered. The penultimate chapter discusses the restructuring that has followed each company's move into the private sector, and the final chapter summarises the results.

Are resources allocated more efficiently through private ownership than through the public sector? The experiences of eleven newly privatised companies are examined to evaluate this hypothesis.