Kuypers combines rhetorical theory and framing analysis in an examination of the interaction of the press and the president during international crisis situations in the post-Cold War world. Three crises are examined: Bosnia, Haiti, and the North Korean nuclear capability issue. Kuypers effectively demonstrates the changed nature of presidential crisis rhetoric since the end of the Cold War. Kuypers employs a new historical/critical approach to analyze both the press and the Clinton administration's handling of three international crisis situations. Using case studies of Bosnia, Haiti, and the alleged North Korean nuclear buildup in 1993, he examines contemporary presidential crisis communication and the agenda-setting and agenda-extension functions of the press. The importance of this study lies in its timeliness; President Clinton is the first atomic-age president not to have the Cold War meta-narrative to use in legitimating international crises. Prior studies in presidential crisis rhetoric found that the president received broad and consistent support during times of crisis. Kuypers found that the press often advanced an oppositional frame to that used by the Clinton administration. The press frames were found to limit the options of the President, even when the press supported a particular presidential strategy. This is a major study that will be of interest to scholars and researchers of the press, the modern presidency, and American foreign policy.

The Presidency and the Rhetoric of Foreign Crisis examines presidential crisis management--or the way U.S. presidents portray foreign crises to the American public--as a potent tool for the accumulation, and at times the forfeiture, of political power. Arguing that it is largely through presidential communication that foreign crises become "real" for American citizens, Bostdorff does not claim that presidents fabricate crises but rather that they vigorously advance their version of the crisis to the American public in order to rally support for their foreign policies. Bostdorff contends that presidential language can heighten the significance of events that otherwise would attract little public attention--such as a coup on the tiny Caribbean island of Grenada--and thereby persuade citizens to support U.S. military intervention and to view the commander in chief as a decisive, victorious leader. To prove her assertions, Bostdorff presents case studies from six successive administrations. Beginning with Kennedy and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, she examines Johnson and the Gulf of Tonkin, Nixon and Cambodia, Ford and the Mayaguez, Carter and Iran, and Reagan and Grenada. Concluding with an evaluation of Bush and Panama, Bostdorff identifies the recurring themes that defined crisis rhetoric, explains how that rhetoric encourages particular public reactions, and raises disturbing questions about the implications for the American polity.

Jason A. Edwards explores the various rhetorical choices and strategies employed by former President Bill Clinton to discuss foreign policy issues in a new, post-Cold War era. Edwards argues that each American president has situated himself within the same foreign policy paradigm, drawing upon the same set of ideas and utilizing the same basic vernacular to discuss foreign policy. He describes how former presidents-and President Clinton, in particular-made modifications to this paradigm, leaving a rhetorical signature that tells us as much about the nature of their presidency as it does about the international environment they faced. With the end of the Cold War came the end of a relatively stable international order. This end sparked intense debates about the new direction of American foreign policy. As Bill Clinton took office, he developed a new lexicon of words in order to discuss America's changing role in the world and other major international issues of the time without being able to fall into Cold War-era rhetoric. By examining the nuances and unique contributions President Clinton made to American foreign policy rhetoric, Edwards shows how his distinct rhetorical signature will influence future administrations.

Over the past century, presidential constructions of crises have spurred recurring redefinitions of U.S. interests, as crusading advance has alternated with realist retrenchment. For example, Harry Truman and George W. Bush constructed crises that justified liberal crusades in the Cold War and War on Terror. In turn, each was followed by realist successors, as Dwight Eisenhower and Barack Obama limited U.S. commitments, but then struggled to maintain popular support. To make sense of such dynamics, this book synthesizes constructivist and historical institutionalist insights regarding the ideational overreactions that spur shifts across crusading excesses and realist counter-reactions. Widmaier juxtaposes what Daniel Kahneman terms the initial "fast thinking" popular constructions of crises that justify liberal crusades, the "slow thinking" intellectual conversion of such views in realist adjustments, and the tensions that can lead to renewed crises. This book also traces these dynamics historically across five periods – as Wilson’s overreach limited Franklin Roosevelt to a reactive pragmatism, as Truman’s Cold War crusading incited Eisenhower’s restraint, as Kennedy-Johnson Vietnam-era crusading led to Nixon’s revived realism, as Reagan’s idealism yielded to a Bush-Clinton pragmatism, and as George W. Bush’s crusading was followed by Obama’s restraint. Widmaier concludes by addressing theoretical debates over punctuated change, historical debates over the scope for consensus, and policy debates over populist or intellectual excesses. This work will be of great interest to students and scholars of U.S. Foreign Policy

Rhetoric and history intersected dramatically during the Cold War, which was, above all else, a war of words. This volume, which combines the work of historians and communication scholars, examines the public discourse in Cold War America from a number of perspectives including how rhetoric shaped history and policies and how rhetorical images invited interpretations of history. The book opens with Norman Graebner's wideranging analysis of the rhetorical background of the Cold War. Frank Costigliola then parses Stalin's speech of February, 1946, an address that many in the West took as a declaration of war by the USSR. The development of NSC68 in 1950, often referred to as America's "blueprint" for fighting the Cold War, is the subject of Robert P. Newman's review. Shawn J. ParryGiles and J. Michael Hogan then focus on American propaganda responses to the perceived Soviet threat. H. W. Brands, Randall B. Woods, and Rachel L. Holloway examine the effects of liberal ideology and rhetoric on domestic and foreign policy decisions. Robert J. McMahon and Robert L. Ivie raise the issue of what it has meant to be the "leader of the Free World" and what the task of postCold War rhetoric will be in this regard. Scholars concerned with the role of words in public life and in the study of history will find challenging material in this interdisciplinary volume. Historians, speech communication scholars, and political scientists with an interest in the Cold War will similarly find grist for further milling.

Kuypers charts the potential effects the printed presses and broadcast media have upon the messages of political and social leaders when they discuss controversial issues. Examining over 800 press reports on race and homosexuality from 116 different newspapers, Kuypers meticulously documents a liberal political bias in mainstream news. This book asserts that such a bias hurts the democratic process by ignoring non-mainstream left positions and vilifying many moderate and most right-leaning positions, leaving only a narrow brand of liberal thought supported by the mainstream press. This book argues that the mainstream press in America is an anti-democratic institution. By comparatively analyzing press reports, as well as the events that occasioned the coverage, Kuypers paints a detailed picture of the politics of the American press. He advances four distinct reportorial practices that inject bias into reporting, offering perspectives of particular interest to scholars, students, and others involved with mass communication, journalism, and politics in the United States.

A fresh account of the US presidential rhetoric embodied in Cold War international travel. Crowds swarm when US presidents travel abroad, though many never hear their voices. The presidential body, moving from one secured location to another, communicates as much or more to these audiences than the texts of their speeches. In The World is Our Stage, Allison M. Prasch considers how presidential appearances overseas broadcast American superiority during the Cold War. Drawing on extensive archival research, Prasch examines five foundational moments in the development of what she calls the “global rhetorical presidency:” Truman at Potsdam, Eisenhower’s “Goodwill Tours,” Kennedy in West Berlin, Nixon in the People’s Republic of China, and Reagan in Normandy. In each case, Prasch reveals how the president’s physical presence defined the boundaries of the “Free World” and elevated the United States as the central actor in Cold War geopolitics.