Bruno de Finetti (1906–1985) is the founder of the subjective interpretation of probability, together with the British philosopher Frank Plumpton Ramsey. His related notion of “exchangeability” revolutionized the statistical methodology. This book (based on a course held in 1979) explains in a language accessible also to non-mathematicians the fundamental tenets and implications of subjectivism, according to which the probability of any well specified fact F refers to the degree of belief actually held by someone, on the ground of her whole knowledge, on the truth of the assertion that F obtains.

This Element has two main aims. The first one (sections 1-7) is an historically informed review of the philosophy of probability. It describes recent historiography, lays out the distinction between subjective and objective notions, and concludes by applying the historical lessons to the main interpretations of probability. The second aim (sections 8-13) focuses entirely on objective probability, and advances a number of novel theses regarding its role in scientific practice. A distinction is drawn between traditional attempts to interpret chance, and a novel methodological study of its application. A radical form of pluralism is then introduced, advocating a tripartite distinction between propensities, probabilities and frequencies. Finally, a distinction is drawn between two different applications of chance in statistical modelling which, it is argued, vindicates the overall methodological approach. The ensuing conception of objective probability in practice is the 'complex nexus of chance'.

This book is designed to explain the technical ideas that are taken for granted in much contemporary philosophical writing. Notions like denumerability, modal scope distinction, Bayesian conditionalization, and logical completeness are usually only elucidated deep within difficult specialist texts. By offering simple explanations that by-pass much irrelevant and boring detail, Philosophical Devices is able to cover a wealth of material that isnormally only available to specialists. The book contains four sections, each of three chapters. The first section is about sets and numbers, starting with the membership relation and ending with the generalized continuum hypothesis. The second is about analyticity, a prioricity, and necessity. The third is about probability, outlining the difference between objective and subjective probability and exploring aspects of conditionalization and correlation. The fourth deals with metalogic, focusing on the contrast between syntax andsemantics, and finishing with a sketch of Gödels theorem. Philosophical Devices will be useful for university students who have got past the foothills of philosophy and are starting to read more widely, but it does not assume any prior expertise. All the issues discussed are intrinsically interesting, and often downright fascinating. It can be read with pleasure and profit by anybody who is curious about the technical infrastructure of contemporary philosophy.

In this new edition of Probability and Evidence, first published in 1972, one of the foremost analytical philosophers of the twentieth century addresses central questions in epistemology and the philosophy of science. Based on Ayer's influential Dewey Lectures of 1970, Probability and Evidence contains revised versions of the lectures and two additional essays. This new edition includes Graham Macdonald's extensive introduction explaining the book's importance and influence in contemporary philosophy.

This work presents the basic concepts of probability to philosophy students who are new to this area of the subject.

The Twentieth Century has seen a dramatic rise in the use of probability and statistics in almost all fields of research. This has stimulated many new philosophical ideas on probability. Philosophical Theories of Probability is the first book to present a clear, comprehensive and systematic account of these various theories and to explain how they relate to one another. Gillies also offers a distinctive version of the propensity theory of probability, and the intersubjective interpretation, which develops the subjective theory.

Foundational questions in logic, mathematics, computer science and physics are constant sources of epistemological debate in contemporary philosophy. To what extent is the transfinite part of mathematics completely trustworthy? Why is there a general `malaise' concerning the logical approach to the foundations of mathematics? What is the role of symmetry in physics? Is it possible to build a coherent worldview compatible with a macroobjectivistic position and based on the quantum picture of the world? What account can be given of opinion change in the light of new evidence? These are some of the questions discussed in this volume, which collects 14 lectures on the foundation of science given at the School of Philosophy of Science, Trieste, October 1989. The volume will be of particular interest to any student or scholar engaged in interdisciplinary research into the foundations of science in the context of contemporary debates.