This 1996 book describes an exciting theoretical paradigm for visual perception based on experimental and computational insights.

An accessible introduction to constructing and interpreting Bayesian models of perceptual decision-making and action. Many forms of perception and action can be mathematically modeled as probabilistic—or Bayesian—inference, a method used to draw conclusions from uncertain evidence. According to these models, the human mind behaves like a capable data scientist or crime scene investigator when dealing with noisy and ambiguous data. This textbook provides an approachable introduction to constructing and reasoning with probabilistic models of perceptual decision-making and action. Featuring extensive examples and illustrations, Bayesian Models of Perception and Action is the first textbook to teach this widely used computational framework to beginners. Introduces Bayesian models of perception and action, which are central to cognitive science and neuroscience Beginner-friendly pedagogy includes intuitive examples, daily life illustrations, and gradual progression of complex concepts Broad appeal for students across psychology, neuroscience, cognitive science, linguistics, and mathematics Written by leaders in the field of computational approaches to mind and brain

Experimental and theoretical neuroscientists use Bayesian approaches to analyze the brain mechanisms of perception, decision-making, and motor control.

Inference has long been a central concern in epistemology, as an essential means by which we extend our knowledge and test our beliefs. Inference is also a key notion in influential psychological accounts of mental capacities, ranging from problem-solving to perception. Consciousness, on the other hand, has arguably been the defining interest of philosophy of mind over recent decades. Comparatively little attention, however, has been devoted to the significance of consciousness for the proper understanding of the nature and role of inference. It is commonly suggested that inference may be either conscious or unconscious. Yet how unified are these various supposed instances of inference? Does either enjoy explanatory priority in relation to the other? In what way, or ways, can an inference be conscious, or fail to be conscious, and how does this matter? This book brings together original essays from established scholars and emerging theorists that showcase how several current debates in epistemology, philosophy of psychology and philosophy of mind can benefit from more reflections on these and related questions about the significance of consciousness for inference.

Perception is a subject of great current interest and one that is is likely to escalate over coming years. The focus of this book is on conceptual and philosophical issues of perception, including the classic notion of unconscious inferences in perception. The book consists of contributions from a group of international researchers who spent a year together as distinguished fellows at the German Centre for Advanced Study.

The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception is a survey by leading philosophical thinkers of contemporary issues and new thinking in philosophy of perception. It includes sections on the history of the subject, introductions to contemporary issues in the epistemology, ontology and aesthetics of perception, treatments of the individual sense modalities and of the things we perceive by means of them, and a consideration of how perceptual information is integrated and consolidated. New analytic tools and applications to other areas of philosophy are discussed in depth. Each of the forty-five entries is written by a leading expert, some collaborating with younger figures; each seeks to introduce the reader to a broad range of issues. All contain new ideas on the topics covered; together they demonstrate the vigour and innovative zeal of a young field. The book is accessible to anybody who has an intellectual interest in issues concerning perception.

There is an important division in the human mind between perception and reasoning. We reason from information that we have already, but perception is a means of taking in new information. Susanna Siegel argues that these two aspects of the mind become deeply intertwined when beliefs, fears, desires, or prejudice influence what we perceive.