From the time the Third Army became operational on August 1, 1944, until the guns fell silent on May 8, 1945, Lt. Gen. George S. Patton's troops covered more ground and took more enemy prisoners than any other Allied army in northwest Europe. Brig. Gen. Otto P. Weyland's XIX Tactical Air Command (TAC) provided air support every step of the way. Their combined success is something of an anomaly; air-ground relationships are notoriously confrontational and plagued with inter-service competition. How did Patton and Weyland work together to achieve such astounding success? Drawing on exclusive access to official records, David N. Spires finds that this success was due to four key developments: the maturation of tactical aviation doctrine, effective organizational procedures, a technical revolution in equipment, and, above all, the presence of pragmatic men of goodwill who made the system work. He focuses on the highly effective personal relationship between Patton and Weyland -- men who respected, trusted, and fully relied on each other and their respective subordinates. This collaboration extended all the way down the chain of command: Patton's ground troops and Weyland's airmen trained together in England, and so by the time they entered combat, they operated together as a single unit. Contrary to conventional wisdom, air-ground relationships in the field can be cooperative rather than confrontational. Today's air and ground officers can continue to benefit from the amazing success of the Third Army and the XIX TAC.

As the United States Third Army's tanks moved through Avranches, no one, not even the Third Army's commander, Lieutenant General George S. Patton, could have foreseen that it was the start of one of the most successful offensives of World War II--an offensive that received a great deal of help from the air. As Patton later wrote to the chief of the Army Air Forces, "For about 250 miles I have seen the calling cards of the fighter-bombers, which are bullet marks in the pavement and burned tanks and trucks in the ditches." This book covers the units in the Ninth Air Force, which gave close air support to the Third Army, and the Third Army's campaign in France from August to November 1944, with special emphasis on how support from the air helped the Third Army continue pushing toward the German border. The difficult logistics of the operation are discussed in detail: Both the Ninth Air Force and the Third Army were hurt by a lack of materiel, especially gasoline, and this affected the offensive.

Presents a case study of one air-ground team's experience with the theory and practice of tactical air power employed during the climactic World War 2 campaigns against the forces of Nazi Germany.

Presents a case study of one air-ground team's experience with the theory and practice of tactical air power employed during the climactic World War 2 campaigns against the forces of Nazi Germany.

Illustrated with 3 charts, 28 maps and 88 photos. This insightful work by David N. Spires holds many lessons in tactical air-ground operations. Despite peacetime rivalries in the drafting of service doctrine, in World War II the immense pressures of wartime drove army and air commanders to cooperate in the effective prosecution of battlefield operations. In northwest Europe during the war, the combination of the U.S. Third Army commanded by Lt. Gen. George S. Patton and the XIX Tactical Air Command led by Brig. Gen. Otto P. Weyland proved to be the most effective allied air-ground team of World War II. The great success of Patton’s drive across France, ultimately crossing the Rhine, and then racing across southern Germany, owed a great deal to Weyland’s airmen of the XIX Tactical Air Command. This deft cooperation paved the way for allied victory in Western Europe and today remains a classic example of air-ground effectiveness. It forever highlighted the importance of air-ground commanders working closely together on the battlefield.

Gen George S. Patton Jr. remains one of the most storied commanders of World War II. Patton’s spectacularly successful drive across France in August-September 1944 as commander of the US Third Army was perhaps his greatest campaign. Drawing heavily on declassified ULTRA intelligence reports, the records of XIX Tactical Air Command, and postwar interrogations of German commanders, Maj Bradford J. Shwedo’s XIX Tactical Air Command and ULTRA: Patton’s Force Enhancers in the 1944 Campaign in France sheds new light on Patton’s generalship and suggests that Patton’s penchant for risk and audacity may have been less the product of a sixth sense than of his confidence in ULTRA and tactical airpower. Timely and highly accurate ULTRA intelligence afforded Patton knowledge of German capabilities and enabled him to shape his operations to exploit mounting German weakness. Airpower provided top cover, punched through German concentrations, guarded Patton’s right flank, and furnished crucial airlift support while disrupting enemy lines of communication. Whatever Patton’s personal intuitive gifts, he deserves full marks for skillfully integrating the ground scheme of maneuver, airpower, and intelligence into the overall strategy of the Third Army and XIX TAC from Normandy to within 50 miles of the German border in less than 45 days. General Patton’s masterful employment of armor, airpower, and intelligence in a campaign fought more than 50 years ago is a textbook example of the sophisticated fusion of airpower, ground power, and information in the planning and execution of a fast-moving military operation. It is also a case study in flexibility, innovation, and boldness at the operational level of war. For all those reasons, Patton’s campaign in France merits the attention of latter-day air and ground warriors who must meet the security challenges of the twenty-first century.