This book brings the international context of the 1968 crisis in Czechoslovakia to the center of attention. It brought together experts from within as well as from without Central Europe to kindle an international discussion on the Prague spring, its origins, its unfolding, its aftermath, and, most importantly, the international context.

The Warsaw Pact is generally regarded as a mere instrument of Soviet power. In the 1960s the alliance nevertheless evolved into a multilateral alliance, in which the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact members gained considerable scope for manoeuvre. This book examines to what extent the Warsaw Pact inadvertently provided its members with an opportunity to assert their own interests, emancipate themselves from the Soviet grip, and influence Soviet bloc policy. Laurien Crump traces this development through six thematic case studies, which deal with such well known events as the building of the Berlin Wall, the Sino-Soviet Split, the Vietnam War, the nuclear question, and the Prague Spring. By interpreting hitherto neglected archival evidence from archives in Berlin, Bucharest, and Rome, and approaching the Soviet alliance from a radically novel perspective, the book offers unexpected insights into international relations in Eastern Europe, while shedding new light on a pivotal period in the Cold War.

This study represents the unexpected outcome of an enquiry into the resources for the study of the medieval history of East Central Europe. While reading sources for a planned survey of medieval Poland, Bo hemia, Hungary, and Croatia, it became apparent to me that many current presentations of the history of Bohemia and Moravia were not based on viable evidence. Sources pertaining to the lives of Saint Cyril and Saint Methodius, as well as those for the study of Moravia, had been subjected to unwarranted interpretations or emendations, other sources of significance had been entirely omitted from considera tion, and finally, crucial formulations concerning Cyril and Methodius and Moravian history had been made in recent historiography without any basis in sources. Hen:e this study: an exercise in confronting the axioms of modern histori( 'graphy, philology and archaeology with the testimony of sources. My study is more of all introduction to the problems of Moravia's history than a set of fim 1 definitions and solutions. It will lead, ne cessarily, to a series of enquiries into the early history of several nations of East Central Europe, of the Church history of that region, and of various disciplines connected with the study of the Cyrillo-Methodian legacy.

This fascinating book assesses Prussian military thinker Carl von Clausewitz's famous theory on warfare in relation to historical and modern-day conflict—and future trends. Carl von Clausewitz's On War is arguably the most important single work ever written on the theory of warfare and military strategy. In Clausewitz Reconsidered, two prominent military historians assess his theories, examining their viability at a time when asymmetric warfare and "war" conducted by and against nonstate actors is increasingly common and state control often ephemeral. The basis of the book's analysis is an examination of war over the last four centuries, since the Thirty Years' War, including the Cold War and subsequent conflicts. What is discovered is that war is far more endemic and brutal today than when Clausewitz tried to explain it. This volume explores that paradox and shows that if anything, we can anticipate further uncontrolled violence. The authors conclude that Clausewitz and On War have assumed a status akin to holy writ, but are obviously dated. The aim of Clausewitz Reconsidered is to bring the master's theories up to date, providing the current generation with a new basis for thought and analysis.

The Gallipoli Campaign is generally viewed as a disastrous failure of the First World War, inadequately redeemed by the heroism of the soldiers and sailors who were involved in the fighting. But before the first landings were made, the concept of a strike at the Dardanelles seemed to offer a short cut to victory in a war without prospect of end. The venture, and what was required of the men undertaking it who were enduring heavy casualties, eminently deserve reconsideration in the centenary year of the campaign. What fuelled and what drained morale during the eight months of extraordinary human endeavour? A balanced evaluation of the Gallipoli gamble, and of the political and military leadership, are the challenging tasks which Peter Liddle sets himself in his new study of the campaign and the experience of the men who served in it.