The power of national and transnational constitutional courts to issue binding rulings in interpreting the constitution or an international treaty has been endlessly discussed. What does it mean for democratic governance that non-elected judges influence politics and policies? The authors of Judicial Power - legal scholars, political scientists, and judges - take a fresh look at this problem. To date, research has concentrated on the legitimacy, or the effectiveness, or specific decision-making methods of constitutional courts. By contrast, the authors here explore the relationship among these three factors. This book presents the hypothesis that judicial review allows for a method of reflecting on social integration that differs from political methods, and, precisely because of the difference between judicial and political decision-making, strengthens democratic governance. This hypothesis is tested in case studies on the role of constitutional courts in political transformations, on the methods of these courts, and on transnational judicial interactions.

In this era of polarized politics, three stories about judges have emerged. When describing their own work, judges often say that they are neutral legal umpires. When describing opposing judges, partisan political actors regularly denounce them for undermining democratic values and imposing their own preferences. Scholars have long told a third story, in which judges are political actors who spend more time conforming to rather than challenging the democratic will. Drawing on a sweeping survey of litigation regarding abortion, affirmative action, gay rights, and gun rights during the Clinton, Bush, and Obama eras, Keck argues that each of these stories captures part of the significance of courts in polarized times, but that each, standing alone, is more misleading than helpful. In polarized America, advocates on both the left and the right engage in litigation more-or-less constantly to achieve their ends. But, Keck shows, neither side has consistently won, or consistently lost. Instead, judges have responded to this unending litigation, at different times and in different ways, as umpires, as activist tyrants, and as followers of whoever won the last election. For example, federal courts are indeed polarized on partisan lines, but across all four issues, this polarization is less extreme on the courts than it is in Congress. As for the undemocratic judge story, here too Keck s findings are hardly black and white. While some decisions can be characterized as thwarting the popular will, there are just as many in which the judges and the public seem to be pushing in the same direction. Ultimately Keck concludes that the time to fear courts is not when they start protecting rights, but when they start protecting only or mostly those rights favored by Republicans (or by Democrats). Keck s rigorous analysis of these judicial controversies is sure to engender interest both inside and outside the academy and be hailed as a landmark study of judicial review."

Leading authorities present the latest cutting edge research on state judicial elections. Starting with recent transformations in the electoral landscape, including those brought about by U.S. Supreme Court rulings, this volume provides penetrating analyses of partisan, nonpartisan, and retention elections to state supreme courts, intermediate appellate courts, and trial courts. Topics include citizen participation, electoral competition, fundraising and spending, judicial performance evaluations, reform efforts,attack campaigns, and other organized efforts to oust judges. This volume also evaluates the impact of judicial elections on numerous aspects of American politics, including citizens’ perceptions of judicial legitimacy, diversity on the bench, and the consequences of who wins on subsequent court decisions. Many of the chapters offer predictions about how judicial elections might look in the future. Overall, this collection provides a sharp evidence-based portrait of how modern judicial elections actually work in practice and their consequences for state judiciaries and the American people.

Among the societies that experienced a political transition away from authoritarianism in the 1980s, South Korea is known as a paragon of 'successful democratization.' This achievement is considered to be intimately tied to a new institution introduced with the 1987 change of regime, intended to safeguard fundamental norms and rights: the Constitutional Court of Korea. While constitutional justice is largely celebrated for having achieved both purposes, this book proposes an innovative and critical account of the court's role. Relying on an interpretive analysis of jurisprudence, it uncovers the ambivalence with which the court has intervened in the major dispute opposing the state and parts of civil society after the transition: (re)defining enmity. In response to this challenge, constitutional justice has produced both liberal and illiberal outcomes, promoting the rule of law and basic rights while reinforcing the mechanisms of exclusion bounding South Korean democracy in the name of national security.

This Research Handbook is a multi-faceted, comparative analysis of how law and political systems interact around the world. Chapters include analyses of judicial deference, congressional support, democratic representation, politicization of courts, public support, and judicialization across multiple jurisdictions in the United States and abroad. Chapters also investigate transnational courts and the linkages between international and domestic law and politics.