Marriage is an institution that plays a central role in most societies. As it affects decisions regarding labor supply, consumption, reproduction, and other important decisions, marriage receives considerable attention in academic circles. Much research has been done about marriage, principally by sociologists, psychologists, and anthropologists.

Marriage is an institution that plays a central role in most societies. As it affects decisions regarding labor supply, consumption, reproduction, and other important decisions, marriage receives considerable attention in academic circles. Much research has been done about marriage, principally by sociologists, psychologists, and anthropologists.

Marriage and the Economy explores how marriage influences the monetized economy as well as the household economy. Marriage institutions are to the household economy what business institutions are to the monetized economy, and marital status is clearly related to the household economy. Marriage also influences the economy as conventionally measured via its impact on labor supply, workers' productivity, savings, consumption, and government programs such as welfare programs and social security. The macro-economic analyses presented here are based on the micro-economic foundations of cost/benefit analysis, game theory, and market analysis. Micro-economic analysis of marriage, divorce, and behavior within marriages are investigated by a number of specialists in various areas of economics. Western values and laws have been very successful at transforming the way the world does business, but its success at maintaining individual commitments to family values is less impressive. -- from publisher description.

The family is a complex decision unit in which partners with potentially different objectives make consumption, work and fertility decisions. Couples marry and divorce partly based on their ability to coordinate these activities, which in turn depends on how well they are matched. This book provides a comprehensive, modern and self-contained account of the research in the growing area of family economics. The first half of the book develops several alternative models of family decision making. Particular attention is paid to the collective model and its testable implications. The second half discusses household formation and dissolution and who marries whom. Matching models with and without frictions are analyzed and the important role of within-family transfers is explained. The implications for marriage, divorce and fertility are discussed. The book is intended for graduate students in economics and for researchers in other fields interested in the economic approach to the family.

What sort of contract is marriage? What does it offer the parties? What are the difficulties of enforcement, and the result of failed effective enforcement? This book takes an economic approach to marriage and divorce, considering the key role of incentives in family law: it highlights the possible adverse consequences emanating from faulty legal design, while demonstrating that good family law should provide incentives for consistent and honest behavior. Economists, specialists in the economic analysis of law, and academic lawyers discuss recent advances in specialist work on marriage, cohabitation, and divorce. Chapters are grouped around four topics: the contractual perspectives on marriage commitment; the regulatory framework surrounding divorce; bargaining and commitment issues relating to marriage and near-marriage arrangements; and finally empirical work, which focuses on the impact of more liberal divorce laws. This important new study will be of considerable interest to lawyers, policy-makers and economists concerned with family law.

Over the past few decades, matching models, which use mathematical frameworks to analyze allocation mechanisms for heterogeneous products and individuals, have attracted renewed attention in both theoretical and applied economics. These models have been used in many contexts, from labor markets to organ donations, but recent work has tended to focus on "nontransferable" cases rather than matching models with transfers. In this important book, Pierre-André Chiappori fills a gap in the literature by presenting a clear and elegant overview of matching with transfers and provides a set of tools that enable the analysis of matching patterns in equilibrium, as well as a series of extensions. He then applies these tools to the field of family economics and shows how analysis of matching patterns and of the incentives thus generated can contribute to our understanding of long-term economic trends, including inequality and the demand for higher education.

While this book contains numerous facts and empirical findings and touches on policy issues, its main contribution to the existing literature lies in the theoretical perspective it offers. The core of this book is a general equilibrium theory of labor and marriage presented in Chapter 2, which provides the conceptual framework for the rest of the chapters. Two major implications of the theory are sex ratio effects and compensating differentials in marriage. The book demonstrates how a few core concepts, linked via economic analysis, help explain a multitude of findings based on statistical analyses of data from a wide variety of cultures. It is hoped that readers of this book will improve their understanding of how marriage works to help us design better economic and social policies as well as help people live better and happier lives, making the book of interest to not only economists but sociologists and anthropologists as well.