In struggling to regain France's leading position in Europe, the French leadership under Charles de Gaulle sought on the one hand an independent nuclear force, and, on the other, a strengthening of Europe with a Franco-German alliance at its core. Both of these policies provoked friction with the United States; both will now have to be revised, the author asserts, after the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a powerful, reunited Germany.

It was logical to expect that the European Economic and Monetary Union would lead ineluctably to an autonomous European defense; the very size of the European Union seems to demand it. The EU eventually will reach the point where its economic and demographic weight will far exceed that of the United States. Can it not be expected too that the EU will seek to make this weight felt internationally? Cogan tracks the halting creation of an independent European military structure, a third way between national armies and ATO, since the Iron Curtain's fall. With the Cold War's end and subsequent western engagements in Central and Eastern Europe, it is no longer a question of whether NATO and the EU compare; they now must relate. They have to coordinate their planning and force postures so as to avoid duplication of resources and efforts. Although NATO's integrated command structure theoretically was an anomaly with the end of the Cold War, it nevertheless turned out to be the case in Bosnia, and later Kosovo, that nothing was possible until the Americans intervened. The virtue of integrated command -- American participation and know-how -- was once again seen as crucially important, despite the increasingly anachronistic deficit of sovereignty for Western Europe in defense matters. In the long run, Europe's economic power must be balanced by its military and diplomatic might.

Little attention has been paid to the murky, ultra-business of gathering intelligence among and forming estimates about friendly powers, and friendly or allied military forces. How rarely have scholars troubled to discover when states entered into coalitions or alliances mainly and explicitly because their intelligence evaluation of the potential partner concluded that making the alliance was, from the originator's national security interest, the best game in town. The twentieth century has been chosen to enhance the coherence of and connections between, the subject matter of this under-explored part of intelligence studies.

This book seeks to demystify the persistence of the Anglo-American Special Relationship (AASR) in the post-Cold War era by constructing a new theory of alliance persistence. This theory of alliance persistence not only has stronger explanatory power than the predominant model of interests and sentiments, but also opens a new way for understanding what factors have prevented the AASR from collapsing. This innovative new volume fills the gap in AASR literature by focusing on the important role of institutionalization in sustaining the AASR, a factor that has been significantly overlooked in existing academic research.

How do we plan under conditions of uncertainty? The perspective of military planners is a key organizing framework: do they see themselves as preparing to administer a peace, or preparing to fight a future war? Most interwar volumes examine only the 1920s and the 1930s. This new volume goes back, and forward in time, to draw on a greater expanse of history in order to tease out lessons for contemporary planners. These chapters are grouped into four periods: 1815-1856, 1871-1914, 1918-1938, and post-Second World War. They progress from low-tech to high-tech concerns, for example, the first period examines armies, while the second period examines navies, the third asseses navies combined with air forces, and finally for the Kaiser chapter explores nuclear issues and decision-making.

Even before it led opposition to the recent war on Iraq, France was considered the most difficult of the United States' major European allies. Each side tends to irritate the other, not least at the negotiating table, where Americans complain of French pretensions and arrogance, and the French fulminate against U.S. hegemonisme and egoisme. But, whether they like it or not, the two nations are going to have to deal with one another for a long time to come. Charles Cogan's timely and insightful study can't guarantee to make those encounters more fruitful, but it will help France's negotiating counterparts understand how and why French officials behave as they do. With impressive objectivity and authority, Cogan first explores the cultural and historical factors that have shaped the French approach and then dissects its key elements. Mixing rationalism and nationalism, rhetoric and brio, self-importance and embattled vulnerability, French negotiators often seem more interested in asserting their country's "universal" mission than in reaching agreement. Three recent case studies illustrate this distinctively French mélange. Yet agreement is by no means always elusive. Cogan offers practical suggestions for making negotiations more cooperative and productive--although he also emphasizes the long-term damage inflicted by the crisis over Iraq. Drawing on candid interviews with many of today's leading players on the French, American, British, and German sides, this engaging volume will inform and stimulate both seasoned practitioners and academics as well as students of France and the negotiating process. This book is the recipient of the Prix Ernest Lémonon from L'Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques, 2006

Why do Britain, France, and Italy provide or refuse military support for U.S.-led uses of force? This book provides a unique, multiple-case study analysis of transatlantic burden-sharing. Sixty original interviews with top policymakers and analysts provide insight into allies' decisions regarding the Kosovo War, Afghanistan, and the Iraq War.