This book discusses court-oriented legal reforms across Asia with a focus on the creation of ‘new courts’ over the last 20 years. Contributors discuss how to judge new courts and examine whether the many new courts introduced over this period in Asia have succeeded or failed. The ‘new courts’ under scrutiny are mainly specialist courts, including those established to hear cases involving intellectual property disputes, bankruptcy petitions, commercial contracts, public law adjudication, personal law issues and industrial disputes. The justification of the trend to ‘judicialize’ disputes has seen the invocation of Western-style rule of law as necessary for the development of the market economy, democratization, good governance and the upholding of human rights. This book also includes critics of court building who allege that it serves a Western agenda rather than serving local interests, and that the emphasis on judicialization marginalises alternative local and traditional modes of dispute resolution. Adopting an explicitly comparative perspective, and contrasting the experiences of important Asian states - China, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Vietnam, Brunei, Thailand and Indonesia - this book considers critical questions including: Why has the ‘new-court model’ been adopted, and why do international development agencies and nation-states tend to favour it? What difficulties have the new courts encountered? How have the new courts performed? What are the broader implications of the trend towards the adoption of judicial solutions to economic, social and political problems? Written by world authorities on court development in Asia, this book will not only be of interest to legal scholars and practitioners, but also to development specialists, economists and political scientists.

New democracies around the world have adopted constitutional courts to oversee the operation of democratic politics. Where does judicial power come from, how does it develop in the early stages of democratic liberalization, and what political conditions support its expansion? This book answers these questions through an examination of three constitutional courts in Asia: Taiwan, Korea, and Mongolia. In a region that has traditionally viewed law as a tool of authoritarian rulers, constitutional courts in these three societies are becoming a real constraint on government. In contrast with conventional culturalist accounts, this book argues that the design and functioning of constitutional review are largely a function of politics and interests. Judicial review - the power of judges to rule an act of a legislature or national leader unconstitutional - is a solution to the problem of uncertainty in constitutional design. By providing insurance to prospective electoral losers, judicial review can facilitate democracy.

A comparative, systematic and critical analysis of constitutional courts and constitutional review in Asia.

Analyzes courts in fourteen selected Asian jurisdictions to provide the most up-to-date and comprehensive interdisciplinary book available.

Over the last two decades courts have become major players in the political landscape in Asia. This book assesses what is driving this apparent trend toward judicialization in the region. It looks at the variations within the judicialization trend, and how these variations affect political practice and policy outcomes. The book goes on to examine how this new trend is affecting aspects of the rule of law, democratic governance and state-society relations. It investigates how the experiences in Asia add to the debate on the judicialization of politics globally; in particular how judicial behaviour in Asia differs from that in the West, and the implications of the differences on the theoretical debate.

This book illuminates how law and politics interact in the judicial doctrines and explores how democracy sustains and is sustained by the exercise of judicial power.

Courts around the globe have become central players in governance, those in Southeast Asia have been no exception. This Element analyses the historical foundations, patterns, and drivers of judicialization of politics by mapping critical junctures that have shaped the emergence of modern courts in the region and providing a basic typology of courts and politics that extends the analysis to the contemporary situation. It also offers a new relational theory that helps explain the dynamics of judicial recruitment, decision-making, court performance-and ultimately perceptions of judicial legitimacy. In a region where power is often concentrated among oligarchs and clientelist political dynamics persist, it posits that courts are best comprehended as institutional hybrids. These hybrids seamlessly blend formal and informal practices, with profound implications for how Southeast Asian courts are molding both the rule of law and political governance.