'A compulsive page-turner ... a triumph of brilliant storytelling ... an instant classic that is an awesome, remarkable and exuberant achievement' Simon Sebag Montefiore Winner of the Wolfson History Prize and shortlisted for the Duff Cooper Prize In the summer of 1812 Napoleon, the master of Europe, marched into Russia with the largest army ever assembled, confident that he would sweep everything before him. Yet less than two years later his empire lay in ruins, and Russia had triumphed. This is the first history to explore in depth Russia's crucial role in the Napoleonic Wars, re-creating the epic battle between two empires as never before. Dominic Lieven writes with great panache and insight to describe from the Russians' viewpoint how they went from retreat, defeat and the burning of Moscow to becoming the new liberators of Europe; the consequences of which could not have been more important. Ultimately this book shows, memorably and brilliantly, Russia embarking on its strange, central role in Europe's existence, as both threat and protector - a role that continues, in all its complexity, into our own lifetimes.

Napoleon and Russia tells, for the first time, the full story of Napoleon and his crucial relationship with Russia, from the 1790s and Bonaparte's rise to power, through the period of Austerlitz, Tilsit and the Russian invasion, to the Emperor's fall and its aftermath. In doing so, it not only puts the critical events of 1812 in their proper context as part of an even greater tale - of peace as well as war, friendship as well as enmity - but also provides fresh insight into the Napoleonic period as a whole, questioning many of the assumptions about the era prevalent in the English-speaking world. The tale boasts a cast of fascinating characters to rival any novel: the rulers, Napoleon himself, Catherine the Great, 'Mad' Tsar Paul and the enigmatic Alexander I; generals such as Ney, Murat, Davout, Suvorov, Kutuzov and Barclay de Tolly; statesmen like Talleyrand, Caulaincourt, Czartoryski and Rumiantsev; and, of course, the ordinary soldiers who fought some of the most intriguing, bloody and important campaigns in history. This is an enthralling story of fundamental importance in the history of Europe and, indeed, the world.

"Napoleon is a torrent which as yet we are unable to stem,” said Field-Marshal Prince Mikhail Kutuzov in September 1812, and then he predicted, “Moscow will be the sponge that will suck him dry.” Three months earlier, on June 24, 1812, Napoleon had made his fateful crossing of the Niemen River into Lithuania with an army of 500,000 men, which by December would be depleted by war, the weather, starvation, and disease to a mere 10,000. Sucked dry, indeed. The final six months of 1812 made of Napoleon’s boldest imperial dream his most disastrous military campaign, which historian and biographer Alan Palmer recounts here with narrative immediacy, colorful detail, analytic skill, and striking insight. He follows the French forces in their long, dusty haul from Vilna to Vitebsk to Viasma; from the frightful slaughter at Borodino to Moscow’s deserted, burning streets—and then the horrors of the grueling winter retreat. But Palmer also looks beyond the savagery of blizzards and battles to bring to his vast canvas an overall picture of a campaign that tragically cost Napoleon nearly half a million men and shaped the greatest catastrophe of his career. Illustrations and maps are included.

Born into a noble family with a strong military tradition, Armand de Caulaincourt had been Napoleon’s Ambassador to Russia; Minister for Foreign Affairs; political advisor; and during the disastrous Russian campaign, his personal aide. In this unique document—the first English translation of the original French manuscript—the French statesman presents a comprehensive picture of the supreme crisis of Napoleon’s career, with graphic accounts of the French army’s advance into Russia, the occupation of Moscow, and the horrors of retreat. “By far the most important addition to Napoleonic documentation published in modern times.”—The London Times “When General de Caulaincourt laid down his pen he had completed, whether he knew it or not, a masterpiece.”—The New York Times A superb biography, history, and memoir in one unforgettable volume, the work will fascinate students, teachers, scholars, and history buffs alike.

“An impressive source book on the conflict, high on information and data.”—Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research September 7, 1812, is by itself one of the most cataclysmic days in the history of war: 74,000 casualties at the Battle of Borodino. And this was well before the invention of weaspons of mass destruction like machine guns or breech-loading rifles. In this detailed study of one of the most fascinating military campaigns in history, George Nazfiger includes a clear exposition on the power structure in Europe at the time leading up to Napoleon’s fateful decision to attempt what turned out to be impossible: the conquest of Russia. Also featured are complete orders of battle and detailed descriptions of the opposing forces.

Drawn from innumerable sources, this book provides a concise history of the reasons for, the campaigns, and the conclusion of Napoleon's ill-fated attempt to conquer Russia. Unlike other accounts, this book offers a more accessible version of events and separates fact from fiction to provide an insight into Napoleon's motives and reasons for his eventual failure.

Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821) is one of the most illustrated political and military figures of the last two millennia. He has remained in the memory of the world as a legend that the passage of the years has failed to blur. On the contrary, Napoleon Bonaparte widely continues to be considered the personification of human genius. Originally published in this English translation in 1942, leading Russian historian Evgeny Tarle details Napoleon’s military campaign to invade Russia in the early nineteenth century. “The campaign of 1812 was more frankly imperialistic than any other of Napoleon’s wars; it was more directly dictated by the interests of the French upper middle class. The war of 1796-7, the conquest of Egypt in 1798-9, the second Italian campaign, and the recent defeat of the Austrians could still be justified as necessary measures of defence against the interventionists. The Napoleonic press called the Austerlitz campaign ‘self-defence’ against Russia, Austria, and England. The average Frenchman considered even the subjugation of Prussia in 1806-7 no more than a just penalty inflicted on the Prussian court for the arrogant ultimatum sent by Frederick-William III to the ‘peace-loving’ Napoleon, constantly harried by troublesome neighbours. Napoleon never ceased to speak of the fourth conquest of Austria in 1809 as a ‘defensive’ war, provoked by Austrian threats. Only the invasion of Spain and Portugal was passed over in discreet silence. “The War of 1812 was a struggle for survival in the full sense of the word—a defensive struggle against the onslaughts of the imperialist vulture.”—E. V. Tarle