Puzzled by the disjunction between global trends and US foreign policy since the end of the Cold War, mostly American scholars of political science, law, and economics explore the causes and consequences of US ambivalence to multilateral cooperation. They consider such dimensions as the growing influence of domestic factors, US grand strategy, the chemical weapons convention, and the International Criminal Court. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

The authors explore international reactions to U.S. conduct in world affairs.

The long-standing, but unresolved debate of the virtues and values of multilateralism vs. unilateralism in American foreign policy is critically important in today's complicated world. To understand the history of each approach is to understand their opportunities and challenges for the future. The Best Laid Plans answers two central questions. First, why did the United States embrace the principles and practices of liberal multilateralism during World War II? Second, why did it cling to this vision of world order despite the outbreak of the Cold War in the late 1940s, as the 'One World' that had been anticipated by U.S. postwar planners split into two rival global camps? The book contends that neither the U.S. turn to liberal multilateralism nor the persistence of this orientation during the Cold War can be attributed solely or even primarily to the global power structure or crude considerations of material self interest. Rather, Stewart Patrick argues that a combination of enduring identity commitments and new ideas, based on the lessons of recent, cataclysmic events, shaped the policy preferences of American central decision-makers in the Roosevelt and Truman administrations. Although the book is steeped in history, its conclusions have tremendous relevance for the contemporary era, when the United States once again finds itself at the apex of world power, and debates are rife about the role of multilateral cooperation in the realization of U.S. foreign policy objectives.

Multilateralism has long been a study of contrasts. Nationalist impulses, diverging and shifting goals, and a lack of enforcement methods have plagued the international organizations that facilitate multilateralism. Yet the desire to seek peace, reduce poverty, and promote the global health of people and the planet pushes states to work together. These challenges, across time and the globe, have brought about striking, yet diverging, results. Here, Kathryn Lavelle offers a history of multilateralism from its origins in the nineteenth century to the present. Lavelle focuses on the creation and evolution of major problem-solving organizations, examines the governmental challenges they have confronted and continue to face from both domestic and transnational constituencies, and considers how non-governmental organizations facilitate their work. Comprehensive, accessible, and narrative-driven, The Challenges of Multilateralism should appeal to students with interests in global development, public health, trade, international finance, humanitarian law, and security studies.

Robert J. Pauly, Jr examines the history of US foreign policy toward the Greater Middle East in general and focuses specifically on the fundamental economic, military and political causes of the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf crisis. He investigates to what extent these causes were internal and external in origin, looks at the principal actors in the crisis, and determines whether and how these actors have continued to drive unfolding events in the Persian Gulf ever since. The volume explores in detail the role of American leaders since 1989, including how far the US should collaborate with Europe to pursue both American and collective Western economic, military and political interests in the Gulf. It also considers the prospects for the future of American-led nation-building operations in Iraq and the outlook for the eventual liberal democratization of the Greater Middle East.

The pattern of multilateral engagement and unilateral retrenchment in American foreign policy from the Cold War through the Clinton, Bush, and Obama years presents a puzzle. What accounts for the unilateralist turn? Is it a passing aberration attributable to the neoconservative ideology of the Bush administration? What then of the disengagement evident earlier during Clinton’s presidency, or its continuation under Obama? Was the U.S. investment in multilateral institutions following World War II an anomaly? Or is the more recent retreat from international institutions the irregularity? Skidmore traces U.S. unilateralism to the structural effects of the end of the Cold War, both domestically and abroad, to argue that the United States was more hegemonic than multilateralist—a rule-maker, not a rule-taker. An "institutional bargain" existed under the Cold War threat from the Soviets, but absent those imperatives the United States has been less willing to provide collective goods through strong international institutions and other states are less willing to defer to U.S. exemptions. On the home front, the post-Cold War political environment has made it more difficult for presidents to resist the appeals of powerful interests who are threatened by multilateral commitments. This book demonstrates that American unilateralism has deeper roots and more resilience than many expect. The unilateral temptation can only be overcome through new political bargains domestically and internationally that permit multilateral engagement, even the absence of great power rivalry.

The book provides a novel analytical perspective on regional multilateralism in South Asia and its neighbouring regions and covers the genesis, evolution and status quo of the four major regional organizations.