A data-driven investigation of the interaction between politics and finance in emerging markets, focusing on Latin America. Politics matter for financial markets and financial markets matter for politics, and nowhere is this relationship more apparent than in emerging markets. In Banking on Democracy, Javier Santiso investigates the links between politics and finance in countries that have recently experienced both economic and democratic transitions. He focuses on elections, investigating whether there is a "democratic premium"--whether financial markets and investors tend to react positively to elections in emerging markets. Santiso devotes special attention to Latin America, where over the last three decades many countries became democracies, with regular elections, just as they also became open economies dependent on foreign capital and dominated bond markets. Santiso's analysis draws on a unique set of primary databases (developed during his years at the OECD Development Centre) covering an entire decade: more than 5,000 bank and fund manager portfolio recommendations on emerging markets. Santiso examines the trajectory of Brazil, for example, through its presidential elections of 2002, 2006, and 2010 and finds a decoupling of financial and political cycles that occurred also in many other emerging economies. He charts this evolution through the behavior of brokers, analysts, fund managers, and bankers. Ironically, Santiso points out, while some emerging markets have decoupled politics and finance, in the wake of the 2008-2012 financial crisis many developed economies (Europe and the United States) have experienced a recoupling between finance and politics.

This book offers a comprehensive analysis of the ways that politics and financial markets impact one another. In this relationship, politics is the ultimate controlling force. The kinds and prices of financial instruments that get traded and the individuals and institutions that get to trade them, not to mention the rules under which everyone trades, are all matters decisively influenced by an array of political variables - sometimes for the better, but all too often for the worse. The fault for this political skewing of the markets chiefly lies with democracy. Through its commitment to equality and its inclination towards fiscal profligacy, democracy hinders the markets from acting as a greater force for social good. To fix this skewing of finance, democracy’s troubling tendencies must be squarely faced and curbed by a return to its monetary roots. Democracy must reinstall gold at the monetary foundations of our financial markets.

This book, first published in 2000, provides in-depth explanations behind the successes and failures of the economic policies of social democratic governments.

The authors of this book argue that post-war fiscal and monetary policies in the U.S. are prone to more frequent and more destabilizing domestic and international financial crises. So, in the aftermath of the one that erupted in 2008, they propose that now we are sleepwalking into another, which under the prevailing institutional circumstances could develop into a worldwide financial Armageddon. Thinking ahead of such a calamity, this book presents for the first time a model of democratic governance with privately produced money based on the case of Athens in Classical times, and explains why, if it is conceived as a benchmark for reference and adaptation, it may provide an effective way out from the dreadful predicament that state managed fiat money holds for the stability of Western-type democracies and the international financial system. As the U.S. today, Athens at that time reached the apex of its military, economic, political, cultural, and scientific influence in the world. But Athens triumphed through different approaches to democracy and fundamentally different fiscal and monetary policies than the U.S. Thus the readers will have the opportunity to learn about these differences and appreciate the potential they offer for confronting the challenges contemporary democracies face under the leadership of the U.S. The book will find audiences among academics, university students, and researchers across a wide range of fields and subfields, as well as legislators, fiscal and monetary policy makers, and economic and financial consultants.

As of the latest national elections, it costs approximately $1 billion to become president, $10 million to become a Senator, and $1 million to become a Member of the House. High-priced campaigns, an elite class of donors and spenders, superPACs, and increasing corporate political power have become the new normal in American politics. In Capitalism v. Democracy, Timothy Kuhner explains how these conditions have corrupted American democracy, turning it into a system of rule that favors the wealthy and marginalizes ordinary citizens. Kuhner maintains that these conditions have corrupted capitalism as well, routing economic competition through political channels and allowing politically powerful companies to evade market forces. The Supreme Court has brought about both forms of corruption by striking down campaign finance reforms that limited the role of money in politics. Exposing the extreme economic worldview that pollutes constitutional interpretation, Kuhner shows how the Court became the architect of American plutocracy. Capitalism v. Democracy offers the key to understanding why corporations are now citizens, money is political speech, limits on corporate spending are a form of censorship, democracy is a free market, and political equality and democratic integrity are unconstitutional constraints on money in politics. Supreme Court opinions have dictated these conditions in the name of the Constitution, as though the Constitution itself required the privatization of democracy. Kuhner explores the reasons behind these opinions, reveals that they form a blueprint for free market democracy, and demonstrates that this design corrupts both politics and markets. He argues that nothing short of a constitutional amendment can set the necessary boundaries between capitalism and democracy.

An original and empirically grounded analysis of the Gulf monarchies and their role in shaping the political economy of the Middle East.

When Mexico's peso crisis occurred in December 1994, all of Latin America experienced the 'tequila effect'. In January 1998, after seven months of financial turmoil in East Asia, Alan Greenspan, the usually reticent Chairman of the US Federal Reserve Bank, noted that such 'vicious cycles...may, in fact, be a defining characteristic of the new high-tech international financial system'. This book examines the impact of the new, highly liquid portfolio capital flows on governments, opposition, politicians, business and the workforce in such emerging market countries as Mexico, Brazil, Russia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand and Indonesia. Hailed as 'exemplary and innovative', 'fine-grained and accessible' and 'a must read', this collection of original essays in newly available in paperback.