The Battle of Le Hamel on 4 July 1918 was an Allied triumph, and strategically very important in the closing stages of WWI. A largely Australian force, commanded by the brilliant Sir John Monash, fought what has been described as the first modern battle - where infantry, tanks, artillery and planes operated together as a coordinated force. Monash planned every detail meticulously, with nothing left to chance. Integrated use of tanks, planes, infantry, wireless (and even carrier pigeons!) was the basis, and it went on from there, down to the details: everyone used the same maps, with updated versions delivered by motorbike despatch riders to senior commanders, including Monash. Each infantry battalion was allocated to a tank group, and they advanced together. Supplies and ammunition were dropped as needed from planes. The losses were relatively few. In the words of Monash: 'A perfected modern battle plan is like nothing so much as a score for an orchestral composition, where the various arms and units are the instruments, and the tasks they perform are their respective musical phrases.' Monash planned for the battle to last for 90 minutes - in the end it went for 93. What happened in those minutes changed for the rest of the war the way the British fought battles, and the tactics and strategies used by the Allies. Peter FitzSimons brings this Allied triumph to life, and tells this magnificent story as it should be told.

This study examines the Allied evacuation of 130,000 men, nearly 10,000 animals, and huge quantities of weapons and equipment from the Gallipoli Peninsula in 1915. A synopsis of the eight months preceding the evacuation illustrates the myriad problems facing the Allies during the ill-fated campaign to secure the Dardanelles straits. The study analyzes the decision to evacuate and the subsequent planning, preparation, and execution of the amphibious withdrawal. The Allies were able to conduct the withdrawal with no lives lost from enemy action and no man left behind. The study concludes that the successful evacuation of the Anzac, Suvla, and Helles beachheads was the result of close coordination, tactical ingenuity, disciplined troops, bold leadership, and good fortune: qualities essential to any amphibious operation. Though there is much to be learned from the Allied failures on the Gallipoli peninsula, so is there equally much to be learned from the brilliant success of its evacuation.

Dr Peter Pedersen’s scholarly study of Sir John Monash remains the finest analysis of Australia’s best known military leader. In 1918 the Australian Corps under Monash’s command played a leading role in the Allied advance to victory on the Western Front. Its successes in the battles of Hamel and Amiens, the taking of Mont St Quentin and Péronne and the breaching of the Hindenburg Line are among the most prominent landmarks in Australia’s military history. Monash was central to these pivotal achievements. This book traces Monash’s development as a commander from his pre-war militia service to his wartime experience at Gallipoli and on the Western Front. It examines in detail how each stage of his military career influenced his approach to command and the tactical problems he faced as the wartime commander of an infantry brigade and division and, ultimately, the Australian Corps. The influence of his education and civilian training are also examined in this meticulous study. What emerges from this nuanced and sophisticated assessment of Monash as a soldier is a superb portrayal of how a commander works and what he could achieve under conditions so inimical to the exercise of command as those that prevailed on the Western Front. Along the way, Dr Pedersen establishes Monash’s place among his contemporaries, British and Australian, and provides the definitive answer to the question ‘Just how good was Monash?’ Published for the centenary of the great victories of 1918, this new and updated edition of Dr Pedersen’s classic work is a timely study of Australia’s finest general.

Originally published in 1984, this book tells the story of sixteen of Australia’s most eminent military men, as they performed under the stress of strategy-making and in the heat of battle. In scrutinising critical periods in the careers of such men as Brudenell White, Chauvel, Monash, Gordon Bennett, Blamey and Scherger, it addresses a number of fascinating questions: Is there an Australian style of command? How well have Australian officers been prepared for high command? How have Australian commanders handled the problems of coalition way or co-operation with allies? How have political direction, organisational structures and entrenched defence policy affected the performance of commanders in the field? Each re-evaluation compares performance with reputation. Some of the figures examined are familiar (What was the real basis of Monash’s reputation as a commander? Was Blamey worthy of the field-marshal’s baton?); some are given an appraisal long denied them. This roll-call of some of Australia’s greatest warriors presents a fascinating picture of the realities of war at the top. Each of the sixteen lives examined presents a revealing account of the conditions under which crucial military decisions are made and carried out – on the battlefield, at headquarters, in victory and defeat. The Commanders will appeal not only to students of military affairs but to everyone interested in Australian history and biography.

This 12-volume set contains titles originally published between 1957 and 1992. International in scope, the set looks at security and military history covering several battles, particularly the first and second world wars. Highlighting the difference between theory and practice, it also explores the people involved in the policy making and strategy of war, and the leaders tasked with carrying those decisions out.