How can beliefs, which are immaterial, be about things? How can the body be the seat of thought? This book traces the historical roots of the cognitive sciences and examines pre-modern conceptualizations of the mind as presented and discussed in the tradition of commentaries on Aristotle's De anima from 1200 until 1650. It explores medieval and Renaissance views on questions which nowadays would be classified under the philosophy of mind, that is, questions regarding the identity and nature of the mind and its cognitive relation to the material world. In exploring the development of scholastic ideas, concepts, arguments, and theories in the tradition of commentaries on De anima, and their relation to modern philosophy, this book dissolves the traditional periodization into Middle Ages, Renaissance and early modern times. By placing key issues in their philosophico-historical context, not only is due attention paid to Aristotle's own views, but also to those of hitherto little-studied medieval and Renaissance commentators.

'Representation in Mind' is the first book in the new series 'Perspectives on Cognitive Science' and includes well known contributors in the areas of philosophy of mind, psychology and cognitive science. The papers in this volume offer new ideas, fresh approaches and new criticisms of old ideas. The papers deal in new ways with fundamental questions concerning the problem of mental representation that one contributor, Robert Cummins, has described as "THE problem in philosophy of mind for some time now". The editors' introductory overview considers the problem for which mental representation has been seen as an answer, sketching an influential framework, outlining some of the issues addressed and then providing an overview of the papers. Issues include: the relation between mental representation and public, non-mental representation; misrepresentation; the role of mental representations in intelligent action; the relation between representation and consciousness; the relation between folk psychology and explanations invoking mental representations

Our experience of the spatial world is a unitary one; we perceive objects and layouts, we remember them and act on them, and we can even talk about them with ease. Despite this impression of seamlessness, spatial representations in human adults appear to be specialized in domain-dependent manner, engaging different properties and computational mechanisms for different functions. In this book, the authors present evidence that this domain-specific specialization in cognitive function emerges early in development and is reflected in patterns of breakdown that occur under genetic defect. The authors focus on spatial representation in children and adults with Williams syndrome, a relatively rare genetic syndrome that gives rise to an unusual profile of severely impaired spatial representation together with spared language. Results from a variety of spatial domains -- including object representation, motion perception, action, navigation, and spatial language -- appear to display a strikingly uneven profile of sparing and deficit within spatial representations, consistent with the idea that specialization of function drives development and breakdown. These findings raise a crucial question: Can specific genes target specific aspects of cognitive structure? Looking deeper into the patterns of performance across spatial domains, the book explores the notion that understanding patterns of normal development across domains is crucial to understanding unusual development. Using insights from normal development, the authors propose a speculative hypothesis that explains the emergence of the William syndrome profile, and how complex cognitive outcomes can arise from the deletion of a small set of genes.

Our thoughts are meaningful. We think about things in the outside world; how can that be so? This is one of the deepest questions in contemporary philosophy. Ever since the 'cognitive revolution', states with meaning-mental representations-have been the key explanatory construct of the cognitive sciences. But there is still no widely accepted theory of how mental representations get their meaning. Powerful new methods in cognitive neuroscience can now reveal information processing in the brain in unprecedented detail. They show how the brain performs complex calculations on neural representations. Drawing on this cutting-edge research, Nicholas Shea uses a series of case studies from the cognitive sciences to develop a naturalistic account of the nature of mental representation. His approach is distinctive in focusing firmly on the 'subpersonal' representations that pervade so much of cognitive science. The diversity and depth of the case studies, illustrated by numerous figures, make this book unlike any previous treatment. It is important reading for philosophers of psychology and philosophers of mind, and of considerable interest to researchers throughout the cognitive sciences.

This volume pulls together interdisciplinary research on cognitive representations in the mind and in the world. It will appeal to graduate-level cognitive scientists, technologists, philosophers, linguists, and educators.

The author argues that the process of incrementally constructing perceptual representations, solving the binding problem (determining which properties go together), and, more generally, grounding perceptual representations in experience arise from the nonconceptual capacity to pick out and keep track of a small number of sensory individuals. He proposes a mechanism in early vision that allows us to select a limited number of sensory objects, to reidentify each of them under certain conditions as the same individual seen before, and to keep track of their enduring individuality despite radical changes in their properties--all without the machinery of concepts, identity, and tenses. This mechanism, which he calls FINSTs (for "Fingers of Instantiation"), is responsible for our capacity to individuate and track several independently moving sensory objects--an ability that we exercise every waking minute, and one that can be understood as fundamental to the way we see and understand the world and to our sense of space.

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