With tensions between Russia and the West at an all-time high, Russian military reforms have taken a new direction in what appears to be preparation for large-scale war. In this context, now more than ever, there is an increased need to understand the past and future directions of Russian military reform and what it means for the West. In Military Reform and Militarism in Russia, Aleksandr Golts takes a hard look at the evolution of the Russian military from the collapse of the Soviet Union to its present involvement in wars in eastern Ukraine and Syria. This book is a follow-on to his study of military reform, or more precisely its failure, under President Boris Yeltsin and during the first term of President Vladimir Putin. Golts focuses on the evolution of military reform inside Russia since 2005; additionally, he examines the new phenomenon of Russian militarism and its origins in a Russian system that is hostile to both civilian control as well as civil society. The work reaches an important milestone in new works on Russian security in the age of Putin by explaining why Russian society has supported the concept of militarism in Russia. This important book traces the roots of Russian militarism since the age of Ivan the Terrible, providing new understanding as to why this new phenomenon has emerged in Russia under Putin. Golts also examines the current state of Russian military reforms through the prism of Russian history by exploring the historic struggle between the "technocrats" who pushed force modernization and the "magicians" who still believe in mass armies and want to prepare for a general war. This in turn has modern-day repercussions for the West as it will determine how Putin will use the Russian military abroad and in a potential future confrontation with NATO.

This book examines reform of the Russian military since the end of the Cold War. It explores the legacy of the Soviet era, explaining why - at the time of the fall of the Soviet Union - radical reform was long overdue in the wake of changing military technology, new economic and political realities, and the emergence of new threats and challenges. It discusses the problems encountered by Gorbachev in his attempts to promote military reform in the late 1980s, and goes on to analyse in detail the mixed fortunes of the policies of his successors, Yeltsin and Putin. It describes how the onset of war in Chechnya in 1994 provided clear evidence of the weaknesses of the Russian military in modern conflicts, and shows that although the Chechnya debacle did provide some impetus for reforms in the armed forces in 1997-98, the momentum was not continued under the Putin government. It argues that Putin’s policies of bolstering central control over all aspects of decision making has left untouched many key problems facing the Russian military, including infighting between different force structures, lack of transparency and independent scrutiny over defence spending, and absence of consensus on the main threats to Russia and optimum force posture. Moreover, it argues that in his attempts to concentrate all means of control to a corrupt and inefficient Kremlin bureaucracy, Putin has deprived himself of all alternative channels of independent scrutiny, control and oversight, thus exacerbating the problems that continue to plague the Russian military.

Despite over a dozen years of talk, the Soviet and now Russian military has not undergone a true military reform. What did happen was a form of degeneration and disintegration, but not a methodically planned and directed transformation and/or adaptation to new conditions. Consequently, defense policy, in all of its ramifications, has remained essentially unreformed and remains an impediment to Russia's accommodation to today's strategic realities. This study presents an assessment of Russian defense policy as Russia has begun, in late 1997 and 1998, to grapple with the enormous challenges that inhere in the process of military reform. The outcome of what can only be a protracted process will have profound implications, not only for Russia, but for its neighbors and partners, chief among them being the United States. Given the coincidence of this reform process with what many believe to be a revolution in military affairs and the continuing urgency of reducing nuclear threats, the ongoing observation of Russian military policies remains very important for the United States.

The very title of this monograph is quite ambiguous. On the one hand, only 3 years are left until the 21st century. This is too short a time to forecast or propose any serious change in a huge and complicated organization like the armed forces of a great power. On the other hand, each century lasts 100 years, and without a crystal ball it is impossible to predict the evolution of armed forces over such a long period, least of all at a time of dynamic and revolutionary shifts in the world's technologies, economics, the geopolitical scene, and the relative military balance between nations. Hence, in addressing the prospects for Russia's armed forces, it seems realistic to discuss the future some 10-15 years ahead, to 2010. This is an appropriate timeframe for the fulfillment of large cycles of economic and military development in Russia and in other major states. It allows consideration of the possible realignment of principal international coalitions, and it provides time to implement major weapons programs. Accordingly, with a timeframe of 10-15 years, future trends are sufficiently imbedded in present reality to be discussed without entering the world of science fiction. Present policy choices may tangibly affect developments in 10-15 years. Besides, as presently being considered, the Russian military reform initiative is planned to proceed through its first two stages through the year 2005. What happens in that process will define how the Russian military proceeds from 2005 through 2010, the third stage of the reform initiative. Within this temporal framework, the following monograph discusses Russia's military alternatives appropriate to its new security requirements, projected economic conditions, technological capabilities, and possible changes in the international situation which might affect Russia and its relationship with other major powers. Even at that, many issues relevant to the subject, like industrial and financial projections, problems of defense conversion, possible advances in military technology, demographic considerations, the draft and mobilization, have to be left out or discussed only superficially. All of these issues are part of the comprehensive notion of military reform; something larger than the narrow notion of reforming the armed forces. In this monograph, based strictly on unclassified sources, the latter topic will be the subject of analysis.

This edited volume explores patriotism and the growing role of militarism in today’s Russia. During the last 20-year period, there has been a consistent effort in Russia to consolidate the nation and to foster a sense of unity and common purpose. To this end, Russian authorities have activated various channels, from educational programmes and youth organizations to media and popular culture. With the conflict in Ukraine, the manipulation of public sentiments – feeling of pride and perception of threat – has become more systemic. The traditional view of Russia being Other for Europe has been replaced with a narrative of enmity. The West is portrayed as a threat to Russia’s historical-cultural originality while Russia represents itself as a country encircled by enemies. On the other hand, these state-led projects mixing patriotism and militarism are perceived sceptically by the Russian society, especially the younger generations. This volume provides new insights into the evolution of enemy images in Russia and the ways in which societal actors perceive official projections of patriotism and militarism in the Russian society. The contributors of the volume include several experts on Russian studies, contemporary history, political science, sociology, and media studies.

Military reform has featured prominently on the agenda of many countries since the end of the Cold War necessitated a re-evaluation of the strategic role of the armed forces, and nowhere more publicly than in Russia. Not since the 1920s have the Russian Armed Forces undergone such fundamental change. President Boris Yeltsin and his successor Vladimir Putin have both grappled with the issue, with varying degrees of success. An international team of experts here consider the essential features of Russian military reform in the decade since the disintegration of the USSR. Fluctuations in the purpose and priorities of the reform process are traced, as well as the many factors influencing change. Chapters analyse the development of Russia's security policy, structural reform of the services, the social impact of military service and experience of military conflict in Chechnya. Critical evaluations of the impact of social change on the Russian Armed Forces' capabilities and expectations complement the analysis of the on-going debate. Russian Military Reform, 1992-2002 will prove invaluable to all those interested in civil-military relationships and international security as well as to students of military theory and practice.