Provides a formal theory of nonmarket failure, analyzing such problems as redundant costs, monopoly, frequency of unanticipated externalities, and bureaucracy in such nonmarket institutions as foundations, universities, and government. A theory of market failures is well established in economics, but the same has not been true for the study of nonmarket failures. Markets or Governments remedies this situation by providing a formal theory of nonmarket failure, analyzing such problems as redundant costs, monopoly, frequency of unanticipated externalities, and bureaucracy in such nonmarket institutions as foundations, universities, and government. This new edition updates the data and results contained in the first edition and includes references and applications of the theory to the ongoing process of system transformation in Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe. The discussion of earlier literature that is relevant to the theory of nonmarket failure has been expanded.

Economic studies historically have either extolled the virtues of perfect markets or decried the market's shortcomings, proposing that governments correct market failure. This book proposes as a counterweight to these views a theory of nonmarket failure, and examines in great detail the shortcomings of government efforts to replace or to regulate markets. It is an unusually thorough analysis that can be used to make more systematic comparisons between markets and governments and to arrive at more intelligent choices between them.After reviewing the existing theory of market shortcomings, Wolf develops a parallel framework for analyzing the shortcomings of government, elaborating the inherent characteristics of government operations and the problems they present. He then considers how these predictable types of nonmarket failure can be taken into account in improving the formulation of public policy. And he compares market and nonmarket alternatives, both in their theoretical and empirical aspects.Wolf concludes that, while both markets and governments have inherent shortcomings, and the choice between them is never a pure one (real-world situations always involve some combination of the two alternatives), markets do a better job than governments. They are more efficient according to both static and dynamic criteria. With respect to equity and other non-efficiency considerations, however, both markets and governments have strengths and weaknesses. Finally, Wolf points out that government can play an important role in improving and extending the functioning of markets. And, perhaps most controversially, he argues that market forces themselves can play an important role in improving thefunctioning of government. They can reduce the incidence of nonmarket failure by injecting market incentives into government operations.Charles Wolf, Jr. is Dean of the RAND Graduate School of Policy Studies and director of the RAND Corporation's Research Program in International Economic Policy. He was chairman of RAND's Economics Department for 12 years, and has written widely in the fields of economics, defense policy, and foreign policy. A RAND Corporation Research Study.

In his first book, the former New York governor and current CNN cohost offers a manifesto on the economy and the public interest. As New York State Attorney General from 1998 to 2006, Eliot Spitzer successfully pursued corporate crime, including stock price inflation, securities fraud, and predatory lending practices. Drawing on those experiences, in this book Spitzer considers when and how the government should intervene in the workings of the market. The 2009 American bank bailout, he argues, was the wrong way: it understandably turned government intervention into a flashpoint for public disgust because it socialized risk, privatized benefit, and left standing institutions too big to fail, incompetent regulators, and deficient corporate governance. That's unfortunate, because good regulatory policy, he claims, can make markets and firms work efficiently, equitably, and in service of fundamental public values. Spitzer lays out the right reasons for government intervention in the market: to guarantee transparency, to overcome market failures, and to guard our core values against the market's unfair biases such as racism. With specific proposals to serve those ends—from improving corporate governance to making firms responsible for their own risky behavior—he offers a much-needed blueprint for the proper role of government in the market. Finally, taking account of regulatory changes since the crash of 2008, he suggests how to rebuild public trust in government so real change is possible. Responses to Spitzer by Sarah Binder, Andrew Gelman, and John Sides, Dean Baker, and Robert Johnson, raise issues of politics, ideology, and policy.

"A clear grasp of economics is essential to understanding why environmental problems arise and how we can address them. ... Now thoroughly revised with updated information on current environmental policy and real-world examples of market-based instruments .... The authors provide a concise yet thorough introduction to the economic theory of environmental policy and natural resource management. They begin with an overview of environmental economics before exploring topics including cost-benefit analysis, market failures and successes, and economic growth and sustainability. Readers of the first edition will notice new analysis of cost estimation as well as specific market instruments, including municipal water pricing and waste disposal. Particular attention is paid to behavioral economics and cap-and-trade programs for carbon."--Publisher's web site.

Vito Tanzi offers a truly comprehensive treatment of the economic role of the state in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries from a historical and world perspective. The book addresses the fundamental question of what governments should do, or have attempted to do, in economic activities in past and recent periods. It also speculates on what they are likely or may be forced to do in future years. The investigation assembles a large set of statistical information that should prove useful to policy-makers and scholars in the perennial discussion of government's optimal economic roles. It will become an essential reference work on the analytical borders between the market and the state, and on what a reasonable 'exit strategy' from the current fiscal crises should be.

An Introduction to International Political Economy Susan Strange, formerly University of Warwick. Professor Strange was well known for her unorthodox and stimulating views on the international political economy. Here she provides the student and scholar with a new model synthesising politics and economics by means of a four-faceted structural analysis of the effects of any kind of political authority (including states) on markets, and, conversely, of market forces on states. This refreshingly new framework of analysis is an ideal introductory text.