China’s maritime “gray zone” operations represent a new challenge for the U.S. Navy and the sea services of our allies, partners, and friends in maritime East Asia. There, Beijing is waging what some Chinese sources term a “war without gunsmoke.” Already winning in important areas, China could gain far more if left unchecked. One of China’s greatest advantages thus far has been foreign difficulty in understanding the situation, let alone determining an effective response. With contributions from some of the world’s leading subject matter experts, this volume aims to close that gap by explaining the forces and doctrines driving China’s paranaval expansion, operating in the “gray zone” between war and peace. The book covers China’s major maritime forces beyond core gray-hulled Navy units, with particular focus on China’s second and third sea forces: the “white-hulled” Coast Guard and “blue-hulled” Maritime Militia. Increasingly, these paranaval forces, and the “gray zone” in which they typically operate, are on the frontlines of China’s seaward expansion.

This book addresses the issues raised by Chinese and North Korean maritime ‘gray zone’ activities in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. For years, China has been harassing its neighbors in South China Sea and East China Sea, employing both coast guard and maritime militia forces, in the name of safeguarding Chinese sovereignty. This behavior is frequently characterized as constituting ‘gray zone’ activity. As the term suggests, this refers to a state of conflict that falls between peace and war. Interestingly, the Yellow Sea, which is geographically much closer to China than South China Sea or East China Sea, has been comparatively quiet. However, there is a danger that the PRC has the capability to replicate its gray zone activities in this area. Worse, North Korea has also been engaging in carefully-calibrated provocations there. This book addresses pressing questions about these activities and offers: (1) a conceptual framework to understand maritime gray zone operations and Beijing and Pyongyang’s approach, with an unprecedented focus on the Yellow Sea; (2) a comprehensive, fully updated fleet force structure for the PRC’s Coast Guard, together with projections regarding how the Coast Guard is likely to develop in the future; (3) an extensive organizational analysis of the PRC’s Maritime Militia that surveys the many units relevant to Yellow Sea operations, some revealed publicly for the first time; and (4) a detailed assessment of North Korean maritime ‘gray zone’ activities. This book will be of great interest to students of naval strategy, maritime security, Asian politics, and international security.

This edited volume examines the political and security issues influencing and shaping the developing maritime order in the Indo Pacific. If focuses specifically on the impact of China’s maritime expansion upon the policies and strategies of the regional states as well as the major players. The chapters examine the interaction of these players, paying particular attention to Japan, as the originator of the Indo Pacific idea and promoter of security cooperation and regionalism. It also covers the responses of the ASEAN claimants, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines as well as Indonesia, alongside the key players, India, the US and also the EU.

China is engaged in a widespread assertion of sovereignty in the South and East China Seas. It employs a "gray zone" strategy: using coercive but sub-conventional military power to drive off challengers and prevent escalation, while simultaneously seizing territory and asserting maritime control. Contests of Initiative: Confronting China's Gray Zone Strategy provides three courses of action for the US and its Asian security partners to preserve regional peace, uphold freedom of the seas, and deter conflict. Building on theories of escalation dominance, Dr. Kuo casts gray zone strategies as "contests of initiative." States that direct the operational tempo and choice of engagements can exploit gaps in political commitment to seize objectives. Once lost, their opponents face much higher costs to reestablish control. Using case analysis backed by statistical methods, the three courses of action reach different balances between American leadership, allied costs, and Chinese responses. Ultimately, the book recommends the U.S. employ an "extended deterrence" approach. Washington should foster a regional sovereignty settlement, establish a political-military coordinating institution, and attain dominance in sub-conventional capabilities using unmanned ISR and strike platforms to contest and break Beijing's control. The study will be of great value to those in the national security community with responsibility for US policies in East Asia, but it also provides important insights for strategic planners and analysts who will be grappling with the larger strategic dimensions of US-China relations, certain to be the paramount issue in global politics for the foreseeable future. Dr. Raymond Kuo is an independent political scientist focused on international security and East Asia. In addition to this book, he authored Following the Leader: International Order, Alliance Strategies, and Emulation (Stanford University Press, forthcoming 2021), explaining how military alliance strategies generate international order. Dr. Kuo's other research has appeared in International Security, the Journal of Conflict Resolution, The National Interest, and The Diplomat, among others. He previously served in the United Nations, the National Democratic Institute, and the Democratic Progressive Party (Taiwan). Dr. Kuo holds a Ph.D. and M.A. from Princeton University, an M.Sc. from the London School of Economics, and a B.A. from Wesleyan University.

In modern history, China has been primarily a land power, dominating smaller states along its massive continental flanks. But China’s turn toward the sea is now very much a reality, as evident in its stunning rise in global shipbuilding markets, its vast and expanding merchant marine, the wide offshore reach of its energy and minerals exploration companies, its growing fishing fleet, and indeed its increasingly modern navy. Yet, for all these achievements, there is still profound skepticism regarding China’s potential as a genuine maritime power. Beijing must still import the most vital subcomponents for its shipyards, maritime governance remains severely bureaucratically challenged, and the navy evinces, at least as of yet, little enthusiasm for significant blue water power projection capabilities. This volume provides a truly comprehensive assessment of prospects for China’s maritime development by situating these important geostrategic phenomena within a larger world historical context. China is hardly the only land power in history to attempt transformation by fostering sea power. Many continental powers have elected or been impelled to transform themselves into significant maritime powers in order to safeguard their strategic position or advance their interests. We examine cases of attempted transformation from the Persian Empire to the Soviet Union, and determine the reasons for their success or failure. Too many works on China view the nation in isolation. Of course, China’s history and culture are to some extent exceptional, but building intellectual fences actually hinders the effort to understand China’s current development trajectory. Without underestimating the enduring pull of China’s past as it relates to threats to the country’s internal stability and its landward borders, this comparative study provides reason to believe that China has turned the corner on a genuine maritime transformation. If that proves indeed to be the case, it would be a remarkable if not singular event in the history of the last two millennia.

The United States is being confronted by the liabilities of its strength. Competitors are finding avenues for threatening U.S. interests without triggering escalation. Their approaches lie in the contested arena between routine statecraft and open warfare—the "gray zone." The United States has yet to articulate a comprehensive approach to deterring competitors in the gray zone. A concrete and actionable campaign plan is needed to deal with the gray zone challenge; in order to do so, the United States must identify and employ a broad spectrum of tools and concepts to deter, and if needed, to compete and win contestations in the gray zone.

Well over six years of Chinese anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden have directly supported People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) modernization goals and provided invaluable experience operating in distant waters. Lessons learned have spawned PLAN innovations in doctrine, operations, and international coordination. Many of the insights gleaned during deployments are applicable to security objectives closer to home; some officers enjoy promotion to important positions after returning. Anti-piracy operations have been a springboard for China to expand considerably its maritime security operations, from evacuating its citizens from Libya and Yemen to escorting Syrian chemical weapons to their destruction and participating in the search for Malaysia Airlines Flight 370. So great are the benefits to China's global maritime presence and enhanced image at home and abroad that when Gulf of Aden anti-piracy operations finally wind down, Beijing will have to develop new means to address its burgeoning overseas interests.