"Breaks new ground in analyzing China's decision to enter the war and its subsequent struggle to hold its own against the world's most powerful nation. Should stand for some time as the standard comprehensive treatment of China in the Korean War". -- William Stueck, author of The Korean War. "Offers provocative insights into Mao's thinking about strategy, tactics, and the human costs of warfare. Highly recommended". -- John Lewis Gaddis, author of The Long Peace.

This is the first systematic study of modern China's military campaigns and the actual fighting conducted by the People's Liberation Army since the founding of the People's Republic. It provides a general overview of the evolution of PLA military doctrine, and then focuses on major combat episodes from the civil war with the Nationalists to the last significant combat in Vietnam in 1979, in addition to navy and air operations through 1999. In contrast to the many works on the specifics and hardware of China's military modernization, this book discusses such topics as military planning, command, and control; fighting and politics; combat tactics and performance; technological catch-up and doctrinal flexibility; the role of Mao Zedong; scale and typologies of fighting; and deterrence. The contributors include scholars from Mainland China, Taiwan, and the United States, who draw from a wealth of fresh archival sources.

If a host of pundits are to be believed, we are fast approaching .the Pacific Century,. and, many of them argue, the centerpiece of the new era will be China. Some forecasts have China rising to become the world's largest economy over the next two decades, and acquiring attendant political and military power in the process. Unquestionably, China's size, population and burgeoning economy will elevate it to a more prominent role in Asia, the Pacific and the world by 2020. All the more reason then for those concerned with America's security to develop a keener understanding of this rising giant. Perhaps a good place to start is with some introspection about ourselves in relation to the Chinese. Lieutenant Colonel Susan Puska, in the monograph that follows, provides just such an examination of the reciprocal relations between China and the United States over the past century and a half. She articulates the theme that cycles of misperception have characterized the relationship. If this past is prologue, then potential conflict looms darkly over future U.S.-China interactions. The first step toward precluding conflict, according to the author, is to understand the nature of the past relationship. Then, the two countries must overcome the deep perceptual gap between their cultures, their historical views and their ideological perspectives. Such understanding, widely shared in each society, will not assure development of bilateral partnership, but is essential to giving it a chance.

Drawing on ancient texts and modern interpretations, this work explores the foundations for war in China's strategic culture Shih, Li and Tao. The work uses Shih theory to explain the anomalies that continue to perplex Euro-American observers in modern China's uses of force.

Why would one country impose economic sanctions against another in pursuit of foreign policy objectives? How effective is the use of such economic weapons? This book examines how and why the United States and its allies instituted economic sanctions against the People's Republic of China in the 1950s, and how the embargo affected Chinese domestic policy and the Sino-Soviet alliance.

In this unique study of China s militarism, Andrew Scobell examines the use of military force abroad - as in Korea (1950), Vietnam (1979), and the Taiwan Strait (1995 1996) - and domestically, as during the Cultural Revolution of the late 1960s and in the 1989 military crackdown in Tiananmen Square. Debunking the view that China has become increasingly belligerent in recent years because of the growing influence of soldiers, Scobell concludes that China s strategic culture has remained unchanged for decades. Nevertheless, the author uncovers the existence of a Cult of Defense in Chinese strategic culture. The author warns that this Cult of Defense disposes Chinese leaders to rationalize all military deployment as defensive, while changes in the People s Liberation Army s doctrine and capabilities over the past two decades suggest that China s twenty-first century leaders may use military force more readily than their predecessors.