The concept of likeness to truth, like that of truth itself, is fundamental to a realist conception of inquiry. To demonstrate this we need only make two rather modest aim of an inquiry, as an inquiry, is realist assumptions: the truth doctrine (that the the truth of some matter) and the progress doctrine (that one false theory may realise this aim better than another). Together these yield the conclusion that a false theory may be more truthlike, or closer to the truth, than another. It is the aim of this book to give a rigorous philosophical analysis of the concept of likeness to truth, and to examine the consequences, some of them no doubt surprising to those who have been unduly impressed by the (admittedly important) true/false dichotomy. Truthlikeness is not only a requirement of a particular philosophical outlook, it is as deeply embedded in common sense as the concept of truth. Everyone seems to be capable of grading various propositions, in different (hypothetical) situations, according to their closeness to the truth in those situations. And (if my experience is anything to go by) there is remarkable unanimity on these pretheoretical judge ments. This is not proof that there is a single coherent concept underlying these judgements. The whole point of engaging in philosophical analysis is to make this claim plausible.

The modern discussion on the concept of truthlikeness was started in 1960. In his influential Word and Object, W. V. O. Quine argued that Charles Peirce's definition of truth as the limit of inquiry is faulty for the reason that the notion 'nearer than' is only "defined for numbers and not for theories". In his contribution to the 1960 International Congress for Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science at Stan ford, Karl Popper defended the opposite view by defining a compara tive notion of verisimilitude for theories. was originally introduced by the The concept of verisimilitude Ancient sceptics to moderate their radical thesis of the inaccessibility of truth. But soon verisimilitudo, indicating likeness to the truth, was confused with probabilitas, which expresses an opiniotative attitude weaker than full certainty. The idea of truthlikeness fell in disrepute also as a result of the careless, often confused and metaphysically loaded way in which many philosophers used - and still use - such concepts as 'degree of truth', 'approximate truth', 'partial truth', and 'approach to the truth'. Popper's great achievement was his insight that the criticism against truthlikeness - by those who urge that it is meaningless to speak about 'closeness to truth' - is more based on prejudice than argument.

In the ancient disciple-rabbi relationship, the disciple would follow the rabbi so closely that he would be covered in the dust kicked up from his rabbi's feet. Thousands of years later, though we walk on roads of pavement and not dust, we are still called to be disciples—to follow our Rabbi, Jesus Christ, so closely that we are covered with his life, changed, and made new. Into His Likeness provides an approachable but in-depth exploration of how to live as a disciple and experience the transformation Jesus wants to work in our lives. We might desire to live more like Christ, but we know we fall short. This book simply helps us follow those initial promptings of the Holy Spirit, so that we may more intentionally encounter Jesus anew each day and be more disposed to his grace changing us ever more into his likeness.

Studies the philosophical development of the meaning of the Greek word eoikos, which can be used to describe similarity, plausibility or even suitability. It focuses on Xenophanes, Parmenides and Plato's Timaeus and shows how such a study serves to enhance our understanding of their epistemology and methodology.

What emerges in this second book of the trilogy is that the very “ground” and content of experience is richer than what can be reduced to a particular account of it. As such, dialogue develops from the “natural” diversity of what is “of” faith and what is “of” reason. Neither faith nor reason, however, originates “from” experience; rather, both are “witnessed” in experience. In other words, taking up questions about the nature of man, whether philosophically, psychologically or in terms of social structures, manifests both a variety of points of departure and, at the same time, the manifold conversations that are possible in the “field of culture”.Focusing particularly on the work of St. John Paul II, the first essay examines the answer of reason and the answer of faith to the same question: What is man? Conversion, too, entails an “unexpected” relationship to natural truth, which, in its own way, is both adequate and inadequate to salvation. Communication, as it were, runs throughout these essays; however, in particular, there is a need to enrich our human understanding of the process of “coming to ourselves” with the insights of spiritual discernment. Axiomatically, however, it is possible to say that just as we come to exist through a relationship to others, so our healing and holiness are manifest through our relationship to others in the “Other”. Furthermore, while it is ultimately true that we exist as individually rooted in the social structure of our origin and the times in which we live, we need to critically participate in the dialogue which identifies our common “reality” and not live our lives covered in “psycho-social” labels of one kind or another.As a whole, then, there is an incomparable range and depth to “dialogue”. Indeed, given the many critical situations in the world, it is increasingly indispensable and essential that humanity choose the incredible wealth of dialogue in contrast to the possibility of a “polarised” and “conflictual” structure between people and peoples.