This landmark publication offers a unique comparative and interdisciplinary study of criminal insanity and neuroscience. Criminal law theories and ideologies which underpin the regulation of criminal insanity have always been the subject of controversy. The history of criminal insanity is characterised by conceptual and empirical tension between two disciplinary realms: the law and the mind sciences. The authors in this anthology explore in depth the state of the art of legal insanity and the numerous intricate, fascinating, pioneering and sophisticated questions raised by the integration of different criminal law and behaviour theories, diverse disciplines and methodologies, in a genuinely interdisciplinary perspective. This volume will serve as a practical guide for the comparative legal scholar and the judge, as well as stimulating scholarly reading for the neuroscientist, the social scientist and the philosopher with interdisciplinary scientific interests.

An examination of the relationship between the brain and culpability that offers a comprehensive neuroscientific theory of human responsibility. When we praise, blame, punish, or reward people for their actions, we are holding them responsible for what they have done. Common sense tells us that what makes human beings responsible has to do with their minds and, in particular, the relationship between their minds and their actions. Yet the empirical connection is not necessarily obvious. The “guilty mind” is a core concept of criminal law, but if a defendant on trial for murder were found to have serious brain damage, which brain parts or processes would have to be damaged for him to be considered not responsible, or less responsible, for the crime? What mental illnesses would justify legal pleas of insanity? In Responsible Brains, philosophers William Hirstein, Katrina Sifferd, and Tyler Fagan examine recent developments in neuroscience that point to neural mechanisms of responsibility. Drawing on this research, they argue that evidence from neuroscience and cognitive science can illuminate and inform the nature of responsibility and agency. They go on to offer a novel and comprehensive neuroscientific theory of human responsibility. The authors' core hypothesis is that responsibility is grounded in the brain's prefrontal executive processes, which enable us to make plans, shift attention, inhibit actions, and more. The authors develop the executive theory of responsibility and discuss its implications for criminal law. Their theory neatly bridges the folk-psychological concepts of the law and neuroscientific findings.

This book addresses the philosophical questions that arise when neuroscientific research and technology are applied in the legal system. The empirical, practical, ethical, and conceptual issues that Pardo and Patterson seek to redress will deeply influence how we negotiate and implement the fruits of neuroscience in law and policy in the future.

Cognitive neuroscientists have deepened our understanding of the complex relationship between mind and brain and complicated the relationship between mental attributes and law. New arguments and conclusions based on functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), electroencephalography (EEG), and other increasingly sophisticated technologies are being applied to debates and processes in the legal field, from lie detection to legal doctrine surrounding criminal law, including the insanity defense to legal theory. In Minds, Brains, and Law, Michael S. Pardo and Dennis Patterson analyze questions that lie at the core of implementing neuroscientific research and technology within the legal system. They examine the arguments favoring increased use of neuroscience in law, the scientific evidence available for the reliability of neuroscientific evidence in legal proceedings, and the integration of neuroscientific research into substantive legal doctrines. The authors also explore the basic philosophical questions that lie at the intersection of law, mind, and neuroscience. In doing so, they argue that mistaken inferences and conceptual errors arise from mismatched concepts, such as the disconnect between lying and what constitutes "lying" in many neuroscientific studies. The empirical, practical, ethical, and conceptual issues that Pardo and Patterson seek to redress will deeply influence how we negotiate and implement the fruits of neuroscience in law and policy in the future. This paperback edition contain a new Preface covering developments in this subject since the hardcover edition published in 2013.

Brain-damaged defendants are seen everyday in American courtrooms, and in many cases, their criminal behavior appears to be the product of extremely poor judgment and self-control. Some have a disorder in the frontal lobes, the area of the brain responsible for judgment and impulse control. Yet because defendants suffering from frontal lobe dysfunction usually understand the difference between right and wrong, they are unable to avail themselves of the only insanity defense available in many states, a defense based on the narrow McNaghten test. "Irresistible impulse" (or "control") tests, on the other hand, provide an insanity defense to those who committed a crime due to their inability to exercise behavioral control. Control tests have fallen into disfavor, however. Opponents of control tests offer three rationales for their abandonment: (1) that cognitive tests for insanity are sufficient, since those with impaired impulse control will also be cognitively impaired; (2) that mental health professionals are incapable of reliably assessing the capacity for impulse control, particularly in relation to criminal behavior, or of differentiating between a truly irresistible impulse and an impulse that is merely difficult to resist; and, therefore, that control tests lead to erroneous insanity acquittals; and, (3) that because "they directly pose the question of whether a person could control his or her behavior," control tests run counter to the law's assumption that people have free will and bear responsibility for their actions. Current neuroscience research presents a challenge to these claims. In the Article, I argue for a return to control tests for insanity, but with important doctrinal modifications.

This book examines core issues related to legal insanity, integrating perspectives from psychiatry, law, and ethics. Various criteria for insanity are analyzed and recommendations for forensic psychiatric and legal practice are offered. Many legal systems have an insanity defense, in one form or another. Still, it remains unclear exactly when and why mental disorders affect a person’s moral or criminal responsibility. Questions addressed in this book include: Why should insanity be a component of our legal system? What should be the criteria for an insanity defense? What would be the reasons for abolishing it? Who should bear the burden of proof? Furthermore, the book discusses the impact neurosciences may have on psychiatric and psychological evaluations of defendants as well as on legal decisions about insanity.