Ariel Rubinstein's well-known lecture notes on microeconomics—now fully revised and expanded This book presents Ariel Rubinstein's lecture notes for the first part of his well-known graduate course in microeconomics. Developed during the fifteen years that Rubinstein taught the course at Tel Aviv University, Princeton University, and New York University, these notes provide a critical assessment of models of rational economic agents, and are an invaluable supplement to any primary textbook in microeconomic theory. In this fully revised and expanded second edition, Rubinstein retains the striking originality and deep simplicity that characterize his famously engaging style of teaching. He presents these lecture notes with a precision that gets to the core of the material, and he places special emphasis on the interpretation of key concepts. Rubinstein brings this concise book thoroughly up to date, covering topics like modern choice theory and including dozens of original new problems. Written by one of the world's most respected and provocative economic theorists, this second edition of Lecture Notes in Microeconomic Theory is essential reading for students, teachers, and research economists. Fully revised, expanded, and updated Retains the engaging style and method of Rubinstein's well-known lectures Covers topics like modern choice theory Features numerous original new problems—including 21 new review problems Solutions manual (available only to teachers) can be found at: http://gametheory.tau.ac.il/microTheory/.

Economic concepts and techniques presented through a series of "big questions," models that show how to pose a questions rigorously and work toward an answer. This book helps readers master economic concepts and techniques by tackling fundamental economic and political questions through a series of models. It is organized around a sequence of “big questions,” among them: When do markets help translate individuals' uncoordinated, selfish actions into outcomes that are best for all? Do markets change people, and, if so, for worse or better? Translated into the language of modern economics, do Marx's ideas have merit? Why is there so much income inequality? Or is there too little? The arguments are in the theorem-proof format, distinguishing results derived in the context of fully specified models from educated speculation. Readers will learn how to pose a question rigorously and how to work toward an answer, and to appreciate that even (especially!) the broadest and most ambitious questions call for a model. The goal of the book is not to indoctrinate but to show readers how to reason toward their own conclusions. The first chapter, on the Walrasian model of general equilibrium, serves as the prerequisite for the rest of the book. The remaining chapters cover less conventional topics, including the morality of markets; matching theory; Marxism, socialism, and the resilience of markets; a formalization of Kant's categorical imperative; unintended consequences of policy design; and theories of justice. The book can be used as a textbook for advanced undergraduate or graduate students or as a resource for researchers in disciplines that draw on normative economics.

The structure of the micro-economic theory and its motivation.

David M. Kreps has developed a text in microeconomics that is both challenging and "user-friendly." The work is designed for the first-year graduate microeconomic theory course and is accessible to advanced undergraduates as well. Placing unusual emphasis on modern noncooperative game theory, it provides the student and instructor with a unified treatment of modern microeconomic theory--one that stresses the behavior of the individual actor (consumer or firm) in various institutional settings. The author has taken special pains to explore the fundamental assumptions of the theories and techniques studied, pointing out both strengths and weaknesses. The book begins with an exposition of the standard models of choice and the market, with extra attention paid to choice under uncertainty and dynamic choice. General and partial equilibrium approaches are blended, so that the student sees these approaches as points along a continuum. The work then turns to more modern developments. Readers are introduced to noncooperative game theory and shown how to model games and determine solution concepts. Models with incomplete information, the folk theorem and reputation, and bilateral bargaining are covered in depth. Information economics is explored next. A closing discussion concerns firms as organizations and gives readers a taste of transaction-cost economics.

People pursue their own interests, whatever those interests might be. Some people have interests that are narrow and selfish, while others have interests that are broad and altruistic. The idea that people are self-interested underpins all of economic analysis and raises two fundamental questions: 1. How do people choose the actions they think will further their own interests? 2. Can the potentially conflicting interests of different people be made to 'mesh' in some sort of socio-economic equilibrium? This book is devoted to a detailed study of the first question. Its Companion Volume (Economy-Wide Microeconomics: Equilibrium, Optimality, Applications and Tests) makes a detailed study of the second question.Following some foundational remarks, this book studies the Arrow-Debreu theory of consumer choice. That theory supposes people choose so as to maximize a complete, continuous, transitive, and reflexive binary preference relation over a non-empty and compact choice set. The book then studies numerous refinements, generalizations and extensions of each of these restrictions — up to and including recent work on Behavioral theories of choice and choice behaviour when preferences are intransitive/incomplete/discontinuous. Also considered is choice behaviour in environments that are not necessarily compact. A study is also made of intertemporal choice and choice under uncertainty. The study of Arrow-Debreu choice theory and its extensions are presented from the Primal, Dual, and Revealed Preference points of view.Consumers are not the only agents in the economy, as Producers are present as well. Beginning with a study of the Arrow-Debreu idea that producers choose from a convex production set so as to maximize profit, the book considers extensions and generalizations of this framework, particularly to non-convex environments. The study is presented from the Primal and Dual points of view.The final chapter in the book provides a link to its Companion Volume. The Chapter indicates how the theories of consumer and producer choice studied here help inform answers of the second question posed above.Resources are available to instructors who adopt this book. More details at www.worldscientific.com/worldscibooks/10.1142/12789-sm