First published in 1973. Few concepts in the modern age have created more controversy in the discussion of social, moral, and political issues than that of ideology. Ever since the term was coined by Destutt de Tracy to refer to a scientific study of the origin of ideas, its meaning has undergone a series of mutation, until we have reached the stage where ideology can now be used to refer to almost any organized body of beliefs. Amidst these changes in the meaning of the term certain common preoccupations are detectable and certain fundamental problems remain. Is human reason capable of comprehending reality 'as it is'? Or is its approach necessarily influenced by the thinker's values, personal or class interests and personal or social prejudices? Is human reason a culturally neutral instrument or a socially acquired capacity that is unconsciously shaped by a particular historical age or society or class? There are fundamental problems too concerning the internal structure and rationale of specific ideologies such as conservatism, pluralism, and apartheid. This title will be of great interest to students of philosophy and politics.

Whether or not the U.S. is in decline can be debated, but there is evidence that its political system is becoming less able to solve major problems. This is in part because loyalty to a belief or an ideology may be taking priority over learning how to understand the problems. This work attempts to revitalize the importance of learnability by reviewing some fundamentals of who we are, how the system works, and why learning is difficult. Humans driven by opinions and perceptions tend to discount politics similar to the way they might discount science, yet it was the study of science and politics that brought much of mankind to remarkably higher standards of living. Government, and the economic system it implemented, was initially designed for the purpose of channeling self-interests into public benefits. Understanding what an inclusive political culture is, or why there is a Constitution, for example, could be useful toward restoring the credibility of our central political organization, the core of society’s stability and development. We are losing respect for our government’s decision-making ability, but in a democracy, citizens must be held more accountable for who their government is. The hypothesis is that if more humans are more learnable, we will increase the possibilities for finding the “best” solutions to big problems.

What is ideology, and what is the scope of its influence? Are all political doctrines ideological? Is there such a thing as a non-political ideology? Can these questions be answered conclusively, and if so by what means? Different conceptions and theories of ideology offer a variety of contradictory answers, resulting in general muddle and confusion. This powerful and original book argues that philosophy alone can give clear and decisive answers to such questions. Its rigorous logical analysis reveals ideology to be a distinctive form of thought with its own particular vocabulary and structure. It is these logical features that define ideology, and not any allegedly necessary connection with social class or fanaticism or even politics. What ideology does necessarily connect with is human action and its moral justification. Understanding the nature of ideological belief goes to the heart of the relationship between theory and practice, and consequently to the way in which human beings understand themselves. The Logic of Political Belief is essential reading for those concerned with political theory, moral philosophy and the social sciences in general. Its outstanding clarity and force of argument will also commend it to all those with an interest in wider political, social and human issues. Contents: Chapter One: Ideology and Confusion; Ideology and Political Theory; Ideology and Political Science; Ideology and Philosophy; Chapter Two: Understanding, Knowledge, and Ideological Concepts; Forms of Understanding and Kinds of Knowledge; Practice and Theory; The Vocabulary of Political Belief; Chapter Three: Ideology, Science, and Theory; Ideology as Bad Science: Karl Popper; Science as Ideology: Thomas Kuhn; The Nature of Ideological Theory; Chapter Four: Ideology and Ethics; The Nature of Ordinary Morality; Morality and Ethical Belief; Ideology and Religion; Chapter Five: Human Nature and the Structure of Ideology; Ideological and Non-Ideological Conceptions of Man; The Struct

In the foundational document of modern public-opinion research, Philip E. Converse’s "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics" (1964) established the U.S. public’s startling political ignorance. This volume makes Converse’s long out-of-print article available again and brings together a variety of scholars, including Converse himself, to reflect on Converse’s findings after nearly half a century of further research. Some chapters update findings on public ignorance. Others outline relevant research agendas not only in public-opinion and voter-behavior studies, but in American political development, "state theory," and normative theory. Three chapters grapple with whether voter ignorance is "rational." Several chapters consider the implications of Converse’s findings for the democratic ideal of a well-informed public; others focus on the political "elite," who are better informed but quite possibly more dogmatic than members of the general public. Contributors include Scott Althaus, Stephen Earl Bennett, Philip E. Converse, Samuel DeCanio, James S. Fishkin, Jeffrey Friedman, Doris A. Graber, Russell Hardin, Donald Kinder, Arthur Lupia, Samuel L. Popkin, Ilya Somin, and Gregory W. Wawro. This book was originally published as a special issue of Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society.

This book uses social psychology to discuss politics, specifically liberalism.

The first edited collection to explore one of the most rapidly growing area of philosophy: political epistemology. The volume brings together leading philosophers to explore ways in which the analytic and conceptual tools of epistemology bear on political philosophy--and vice versa.

Ideology critique generally seeks to undermine selected theories and beliefs by demonstrating their partisan origins and their insidious social functions. This approach rightly reveals the socially implicated nature of much purported knowledge, but also brackets or bypasses its cognitive properties. In contrast, Michael Morris argues that it is possible to integrate the social and epistemic dimensions of belief in a way that preserves the cognitive and adjudicatory capacities of reason, while acknowledging that reason itself is inevitably social, historical, and interested. Drawing upon insights from Hegel, Lukacs, Mannheim, and Habermas, he interprets and reconstructs Marx's critique of ideology as a positive theory of knowledge, one that reconciles the inherently interested and inextricably situated nature of thought with more traditional conceptions of rational adjudication, normativity, and truth. His wide-ranging examination of the social and epistemic dimensions of ideology will interest readers in political philosophy and political theory.