In this book, Professor Jeanine Grenberg defends the idea that Kant's virtue theory is best understood as a system of eudaemonism, indeed, as a distinctive form of eudaemonism that makes it preferable to other forms of it: a system of what she calls Deontological Eudaemonism. In Deontological Eudaemonism, one achieves happiness both rationally conceived (as non-felt pleasure in the virtually unimpeded harmonious activity of one's will and choice) and empirically conceived (as pleasurable fulfilment of one's desires) only via authentic commitment to and fulfilment of what is demanded of all rational beings: making persons as such one's end in all things. To tell this story of Deontological Eudaemonism, Grenberg first defends the notion that Kant's deontological approach to ethics is simultaneously (and indeed, foundationally, and most basically) teleological. She then shows that the realization of an aptitude for the virtuous fulfilment of one's obligatory ends provides the solid basis for simultaneous realization of happiness, both rationally and empirically conceived. Along the way, she argues both that Kant's notion of happiness rationally conceived is essentially identical to Aristotle's conception of happiness as unimpeded activity, and that his notion of happiness empirically conceived is best realized via an unwavering commitment to the fulfilment of one's obligatory ends.

Grenberg defends the idea that Kant's virtue theory is best understood as a distinctive form of eudaemonism that makes it preferable to other forms: a system of what she calls Deontological Eudaemonism - achieving happiness both rationally conceived (as non-felt pleasure) and empirically conceived (as pleasurable fulfilment of one's desires).

In this book, Professor Jeanine Grenberg defends the idea that Kant's virtue theory is best understood as a system of eudaemonism, indeed, as a distinctive form of eudaemonism that makes it preferable to other forms of it: a system of what she calls Deontological Eudaemonism. In Deontological Eudaemonism, one achieves happiness both rationally conceived (as non-felt pleasure in the virtually unimpeded harmonious activity of one's will and choice) and empirically conceived (as pleasurable fulfilment of one's desires) only via authentic commitment to and fulfilment of what is demanded of all rational beings: making persons as such one's end in all things. To tell this story of Deontological Eudaemonism, Grenberg first defends the notion that Kant's deontological approach to ethics is simultaneously (and indeed, foundationally, and most basically) teleological. She then shows that the realization of an aptitude for the virtuous fulfilment of one's obligatory ends provides the solid basis for simultaneous realization of happiness, both rationally and empirically conceived. Along the way, she argues both that Kant's notion of happiness rationally conceived is essentially identical to Aristotle's conception of happiness as unimpeded activity, and that his notion of happiness empirically conceived is best realized via an unwavering commitment to the fulfilment of one's obligatory ends.

In his Metaphysics of Morals (particularly in the Doctrine of Virtue), but also in other late works, Kant extends and refines the content of his earlier works on ethics (Groundwork and Critique of Practical Reason) to a considerable extent. These revisions and extensions not only show the limitations of an exclusive interpretation of Kant’s ethics as a deontological ethics of principles. His thoughts are also relevant for a large number of questions of theoretical morality currently under discussion. Thus, the distinction drawn in the Doctrine of Virtue between perfect and imperfect obligations informs the problem of the solvability of moral conflicts and the role of supererogatory actions. Kant goes further into the question of what it means to be a good person, what moral significance is contained in close human ties such as friendship, and what role is played by happiness and the so-called obligations towards oneself. The papers each discuss Kant’s central ideas in the context of his earlier writings, but also within the context of our contemporary ethical debates. Thus attention is drawn to the significance and possible extent of an ethics of virtue understood in the Kantian sense.

This book provides a comprehensive analysis of Kant's treatment of happiness in ethics. It considers the definition of happiness and the possible roles happiness may serve in ethics. It argues against critics who maintain that Kant's deontological ethic rejects happiness and against critics who assert that Kant's ethic is, in fact, consequential and concerned above all with ends such as happiness. By pointing to a system that organizes Kant's various claims about happiness, the book supports the view that happiness has positive roles to play in Kant's ethic.

Through a collection of new, previously unpublished essays,The Blackwell Guide to Kant’s Ethics addressesdiverse topics crucial to our understanding of Kant's moralphilosophy and its implications for the modern age. Provides a fresh perspective on themes in Kant’s moralphilosophy Addresses systematically Kant’s foundational work,Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals and his morespecific treatment of justice and virtue in The Metaphysics ofMorals Includes essays by both established scholars and risingstars Identifies common misperceptions of Kant's thought andchallenges some prevailing interpretations Shows how Kant developed and supplemented his earlier ethicalthought with specific discussions of practical issues in law,international relations, personal relations, and self-regardingvirtues and vices

This carefully crafted ebook: "The Ethics of Immanuel Kant" is formatted for your eReader with a functional and detailed table of contents. Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, also known as the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, is the first of Immanuel Kant's mature works on moral philosophy and remains one of the most influential in the field. Kant conceives his investigation as a work of foundational ethics—one that clears the ground for future research by explaining the core concepts and principles of moral theory and showing that they are normative for rational agents. Kant aspires to nothing less than this: to lay bare the fundamental principle of morality and show that it applies to us. The Metaphysics of Morals is a work of political and moral philosophy by Immanuel Kant. The work is divided into two main parts, "The Science of Right, which deals with the rights that people have or can acquire, and the Doctrine of Virtue, which deals with the virtues they ought to acquire." The Critique of Practical Reason is the second of Immanuel Kant's three critiques and deals with his moral philosophy. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) was a German philosopher, who, according to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is "the central figure of modern philosophy." Kant argued that fundamental concepts of the human mind structure human experience, that reason is the source of morality, that aesthetics arises from a faculty of disinterested judgment, that space and time are forms of our understanding, and that the world as it is "in-itself" is unknowable. Contents: Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals The Metaphysics of Morals Philosophy of Law (The Science of Right) The Metaphysical Elements of Ethics The Critique of Practical Reason: Theory of Moral Reasoning Perpetual Peace